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ABSTRACT
This study examines interim financial reporting (IR) disclosure in the Asia-Pacific region.
Motivated by the international diversity in IR practices and a lack of research on IR
disclosure, the study addresses two research questions: first, how does IR disclosure
compliance vary across the Asia-Pacific Region? and second, what are the factors associated
with variations in IR disclosure compliance in the Asia-Pacific Region? By exploring this
setting, the study focuses on countries where diversity in practice is expected to be significant
due to differences in regulation, auditing requirements, reporting frequency and the
timeliness of reporting.
Employing disclosure theory in the context of information economics, the central premise is
that managers trade off the related costs and benefits in their decisions about the level of
disclosure compliance. Accordingly, greater regulatory compliance and more useful
disclosures are made by those firms who are better able to capitalise on the benefits of
disclosure. It is argued that differences in IR regulations are likely to lead to variations in the
costs and benefits related to disclosure. Given that, it is hypothesised that IR disclosure
compliance levels are higher for firms that have adopted International Financial Reporting
Standards (IFRS) (H1) and engage an auditor to review their IR (H2). However, given
competing arguments, it is hypothesised that IR disclosure levels are not associated with
reporting frequency (quarterly versus half-yearly reporting) (H3), or reporting lag (H4).
A sample of 700 interim reports issued in 2012 by the top 100 listed firms in seven Asia-
Pacific countries (Australia, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand and
Vietnam) is used to address the research questions and related hypotheses. IR disclosure
compliance is measured using a researcher-constructed index consisting of disclosure items
commonly required across the sample countries. An ordinary least squares regression model
is developed to jointly test the hypotheses, with descriptive and inferential statistics employed
to provide further empirical insights into the cross-country disclosure behaviour.
The results indicate that IR disclosure compliance varies significantly across the region. IR-
related factors are significantly associated with the cross-country variations. Countries that
have adopted IFRS are more likely to have higher IR compliance as do firms in which an
audit review of the IR has occurred.  Further, firms with mandated quarterly reporting have
higher IR compliance than firms with half-yearly reporting. Finally, firms that take longer to
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produce the IR reports are found to have lower IR compliance. Thus the findings suggest that
differences in IR-related factors have a substantial impact on IR disclosure practices, even
with the manager’s cost-benefit trade-offs when deciding the IR disclosure levels.
This is the first cross-country study examining IR disclosure compliance practices in the
Asia-Pacific region. In this regard, it provides a significant contribution to the disclosure
literature and offers several other major contributions. First, the findings that regional
differences in IR regulation are associated with a significant variation in IR disclosure
compliance may be useful for regulators in reviewing regulatory effectiveness and in
selecting ‘best practice’ regulation. Second, the factors influencing disclosure compliance
provide a window into corporate disclosure quality, which can inform investors about the
reliability and usefulness of company disclosures. Finally, financial report preparers can use
the findings in evaluating and benchmarking their firm’s IR disclosures to assist them in
improving their disclosure practices.
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1CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
This study examines the nature and extent of interim financial reporting (IR) disclosure
compliance across the Asia-Pacific Region. International Accounting Standard (IAS) 34
Interim Financial Reporting, issued by International Accounting Standard Board (IASB),
defines an interim report as ‘a financial report that contains either a complete or condensed
set of financial statements for a period shorter than an entity’s full financial year’ (IASB,
2011, IAS 34, para. IN2). Although the disclosure literature has a long history, there is
limited empirical evidence on IR disclosure practices. However, it is evident that IR rules and
practices vary internationally and in particular, across the Asia-Pacific region. As such, the
study is motivated to investigate differences in the level of IR disclosure compliance and
factors influencing those differences in the Asia-Pacific Region.
1.1 Research Objective, Motivation and Research Questions
The objective of this study is to investigate IR disclosure compliance and its determinants in
a cross-country setting. The purpose of IR is to disclose updated financial information for an
interim period, thereby providing information to stakeholders in a timelier manner than is
provided by annual financial reports. The IASB emphasises that information provided in IR is
not a repetition of annual reporting disclosures, but rather an explanation of the events and
transactions that are significant to understand the changes of the preparer’s financial position
and performance from the last annual reporting period’s end (IASB, 2011, IAS 34, para.
IN7). Clearly, the relevance of IR disclosure of new information is emphasised in the
international accounting standard.
IAS 34 was first issued by the IASB’s predecessor, the International Accounting Standard
Committee, in February 1998 and was adopted by the IASB in April 2001.1 The standard
1 The most recent updated version of IAS 34 was issued in January 2013, and is effective for annual periods
beginning on or after January 1, 2013. However, the version discussed in the thesis includes amendments to
January 2011, which is applicable for the sample interim reports (financial year end 2012). The 2013 version
adds the requirements for disclosing the comparative information of the preceding period as specified in
paragraphs 38 and 38A of IAS 1, and disclosing the interests in other entities becoming or ceasing to be
investment entities. As such, the 2013 version does not influence the key IR aspects discussed in this study.
2prescribes the principles for recognition, measurement and the minimum disclosure content in
the preparation and presentation of IR. The objective is justified on the basis that:
Timely and reliable interim financial information reporting improves the ability of
investors, creditors, and others to understand an entity’s capacity to generate
earnings and cash flows and its financial condition and liquidity (IASB, 2011, IAS
34, para. Objective).
IR plays an important information role in capital markets when the reports provide up-to-date
information to users (IASB, 2011, IAS 34, para. Objective). It assists users in better
forecasting and valuing entities (see, for example, Gordon, 1961; Green, 1964) and, being
timelier, IR may be more useful than annual financial reports (Ball & Brown, 1968). IAS 34
allows considerable discretion regarding IR disclosure by the preparers. In particular, it ‘does
not mandate which entities should be required to publish interim financial reports, how
frequently [reporting frequency] or how soon after the end of an interim period [regulatory
lag]’ (IASB, 2011, IAS 34, para. 1).2 Whilst frequency is not defined or mandated, IAS 34
encourages a publicly traded entity to produce interim reports at least for the period of the
first half of its financial year, and to release it within 60 days after that period ends (IASB,
2011, IAS 34, para. 1).
Further options exist for the reporting form. An entity is required to issue either a complete
set of financial statements or a condensed set by using the same accounting measurement
policies3 as being applied in an annual financial report (IASB, 2011, IAS 34, paras 4 & 28 ).
Additionally IAS 34 does not mandate an audit requirement for IR.
Not surprisingly, these IR attributes (reporting form, reporting frequency, regulatory lag, and
the audit requirement) are often stipulated differently by securities regulators, securities
exchanges and accounting bodies, and are likely to lead to cross-country variations in IR
disclosure compliance. More importantly, as compared to other forms of mandatory financial
information disclosure, for example annual reporting, regulation for IR disclosure has
2 Emphasis is added to highlight terminology used in this thesis.
3 This view is called the discrete view in which each interim period is considered a discrete accounting period.
That is, the same accounting methods are applied to recognise and measure disclosed items in both interim and
annual financial reports. The discrete method is used for IR by all seven sample countries.
3substantial divergence across countries. However, there is limited empirical evidence on how
IR disclosure differs across countries and how these IR-specific attributes influence cross-
national variation in IR. As such, research into IR disclosure compliance in a cross-national
setting can advance our current knowledge regarding how mandatory corporate disclosure
varies as well as identifying the country-specific determinants driving the variation.
While there has been significant effort on a global basis to establish one set of International
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), there has been little effort to harmonise interim
reporting or consider the suitability of discretion permitted in the standard. Disagreement
over the appropriate model for interim reporting and the absence of sufficient guidelines may
be contributing factors (Bollom & Weygandt, 1972). Consequently, this may result in the
lack of comparability of IR information that gives rise to difficulties for investor’s decision
making, especially in an international environment.
Additionally, variation in IR disclosure practices is likely to occur between countries because
some countries have not adopted, or only partly adopted IAS/IFRS (hereafter IFRS). Even
where national regulatory bodies have fully adopted IFRS, the stock exchanges of each
country often impose their own specific IR reporting requirements. Therefore IR regulations
could be under-regulated in one country but over-regulated in another (e.g., Tan & Tower,
1997, 1999). This suggests that interim reporting regulations may differ; and consequently
the nature and extent of IR disclosure compliance may vary across countries.
Briefly, this study of cross-national IR disclosure is motivated by a number of factors. The
research particularly focuses on a channel of communication that is quite different from
annual report disclosures in terms of the timeliness (reporting frequency), the focus of
relevant information (update on the latest annual report), and reliability (audit requirement).
More importantly, the audit requirement, reporting frequency, and regulatory lag are not
consistent across countries. Such variations may influence the level of IR disclosure
compliance and the usefulness of reported interim information because the lack of
comparability of IR accounting numbers may complicate cross-country analysis and therefore
investment decision making. However, the extent to which this is likely to occur is not well
known due to the absence of research on the diversity of international IR practices.
4By exploring IR regulations in the Asia-Pacific region, this thesis identifies the diversity in
the disclosure requirements for the interim financial information across the Asia-Pacific (see
the details discussed in Chapter 2). Given the cost and benefit trade-off in disclosure the
dissimilarities are expected to reveal factors influencing the variations in IR disclosure levels
by firms cross-nationally. Consistent with the objective and inspired by the above motivation,
the following research questions are addressed in this study:
RQ1: How does IR disclosure compliance vary across the Asia-Pacific Region?
RQ2: What are the factors associated with variations in IR disclosure compliance in the
Asia-Pacific Region?
1.2 Scope of the Thesis
The study is confined to IR mandatory disclosure and the discretion mangers exercise in this
mandatory environment rather than all IR disclosures. Additional, the thesis does not measure
the value relevance of the IR information and hence does not directly measure disclosure
quality. However, the quality of disclosure is reflected by the IR aggregate disclosure levels
(reported later in the study) which capture both mandatory disclosure and discretionary
disclosure. Further, not all Asia-Pacific countries are examined. The study is confined to
seven countries in the region with notable differences in IR regulations, with reports available
in English.4 As a result, the countries examined are Australia, Hong Kong, Malaysia,
Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam.
1.3 Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses
There is sparse evidence regarding the factors influencing IR disclosure compliance levels
across countries (Chapter 3) in which IR disclosure requirements are different in key aspects,
such as the stage of IFRS-adoption, audit requirement for IR, type of mandatory IR, and
allowable time for the report lodgement (Chapter 2). With the absence of a single theory to
explain disclosure compliance behaviour, this study employs information economics theory
4 The exception is Vietnam, where reports are not produced in English; however, it is the nature language of the
researcher.
5in which the central premise is that managers trade off the related costs and benefits when
they decide the level of disclosures (Chapter 4). On the basis of this theory, it is argued that
firms with a better ability to capitalise on the benefits of disclosure are more likely to be more
compliant and disclose more useful information. Particularly, it is hypothesised that IR
disclosure compliance is higher for firms in countries that have adopted IFRS (H1), and have
‘audit-reviewed’5 IR (H2); however, it is hypothesised that IR disclosure compliance has no
association with reporting frequency (H3), and reporting lag (H4), given competing arguments
for a positive and negative association.
1.4 Research Design
As the focus of this thesis is on the nature and extent of IR disclosure compliance, the study
starts with the investigation of relevant regulations governing IR disclosure in the sample
countries in the Asia-Pacific region. The regulation includes the relevant IR accounting
standards, corporations (companies) acts, and securities exchange listing and disclosure rules
(Chapter 2). The regulation is then used to inform the development of an IR disclosure
compliance index (Chapter 5) which is applicable to all seven sample countries. In order to
address the two research questions, 700 interim reports of the second quarter/half-year for the
accounting year 2012 (100 from each of the seven sample countries) are examined.
To address the first research question, descriptive statistics are provided to establish how IR
disclosure compliance varies across the region. Further, tests for differences in means of IR
disclosure compliance levels, including ANOVA, Tukey’s HSD, and t-tests are conducted to
determine whether the cross-country variations are statistically different across the sample.
Related to the second research question, the study concentrates on an analysis of the
association between IR-related factors and disclosure compliance (as specified in the
hypotheses). The findings from a regression analysis are used to explain the association
between IR-specific regulations and IR disclosure compliance after controlling for other
known determinants of disclosure compliance. To further explore the variations in disclosure
5 Audit-reviewed IR refers to the quarterly reports or half-yearly reports that have been reviewed by an external
auditor. This term has been adopted in this thesis for simplicity because there are only two firms in the sample
that had their interim reports fully audited, as reported later in Table 6.8.
6and for robustness purposes, various alternative regression models are specified and
estimated.
1.5 Summary of Findings and Major Contributions
The institutional differences in IR regulation are reported in Chapter 2, and variations in IR
disclosure compliance and associated factors are provided in Chapters 6 and 7. The following
are the main findings.
First, the study provides an in-depth review of the nature of differences in IR in seven
countries in the Asia-Pacific region. The comparison of requirements for IR disclosures
provided in Chapter 2 indicates that IR disclosure practices are subject to different sources of
regulations, which differ across the region in the reporting frequency (quarterly versus half-
yearly), regulatory lag (timeliness of reporting), reporting form (full or condensed format),
and in audit requirements.
Second, the study provides empirical evidence on IR disclosure compliance by Asia-Pacific
listed firms. The statistical results indicate that IR disclosure compliance levels vary
significantly cross-nationally. In particular, the findings consistently show that Malaysian
firms have the highest levels of IR disclosure compliance, whereas Vietnamese firms have
the lowest levels. Firms in Australia, Hong Kong, the Philippines, and Thailand have above-
average levels of IR disclosure compliance, while those in Singapore have below-average
compliance. The highest levels for Malaysian firms could be because those firms, under the
listing rules, have to make explicit statements in their quarterly reports on the required
disclosure items if they are not applicable. The lowest levels for Vietnamese firms could be
because of lax enforcement.
Third, the study reveals that IR-related factors are significantly associated with IR disclosure
compliance. The multiple regression results indicate that adopting IFRS (H1) and having
audit-reviewed IR (H2) have a positive association with IR disclosure compliance levels;
whereas half-yearly reporting (H3) and reporting lag (H4) have a negative association with
disclosure compliance. In terms of model specification, the multiple regression models with a
combination of the IR-related factors, firm-specific factors and industry sector dummy
7variables are statistically significant in explaining cross-country variations on IR disclosure
compliance levels.
This thesis provides several significant contributions. First, the findings on the association
between IR-related factors and cross-country variation in the levels of disclosure compliance
may assist policy makers in reviewing regulatory effectiveness and in selecting ‘best practice’
regulation. In particular regulatory authorities including the securities commission,
government, stock exchanges, and accounting standard setters of each country may consider
supporting the adoption of IFRS if not yet committed to do so. Further, mandating an auditor
review of interim reports and requiring more frequent reporting (quarterly as opposed to half-
yearly) or shorter regulatory lag may also enhance the level of IR disclosure compliance.
Second, for users, the reliability and usefulness of the interim report is enhanced when factors
ensuring higher IR disclosure compliance are regulated in the interim reporting accounting
standard. Finally, report prepares can improve their disclosure by evaluating and
benchmarking their firms’ IR disclosures practices.
1.6 Structure of the Thesis
The remainder of the thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the
institutional setting of seven Asia-Pacific countries, focusing on relevant regulations
governing IR disclosure practices by listed firms. Chapter 3 reviews the relevant literature
drawing from both research streams of interim reporting and annual reporting disclosure. In
Chapter 4 the theoretical framework and hypotheses are developed. Chapter 5 describes the
research design for addressing the research questions and related hypotheses. Chapter 6
provides the statistical results for examining the first research question and the four
hypotheses related to the second research question. Chapter 7 provides a discussion of the
supplementary analyses of IR disclosure compliance. The thesis concludes with Chapter 8,
which provides a summary and discussion of findings, contributions, limitations, and ideas
for future research.
8CHAPTER 2: INSTITUTIONAL SETTING
This chapter provides an overview of the institutional setting in which the study is
conducted.6 Initially, Section 2.1 provides a comparison of regulations governing IR in the
seven sample countries focusing on five main aspects of IR regulation: (1) regulatory
specific, (2) reporting frequency, (3) regulatory lag, (4) reporting form, and (5) audit
requirement.
Regulatory specific refers to the relevant regulation that imposes mandatory requirements for
preparing and disclosing IR. Reporting frequency refers to the regularity or required reporting
frequency of IR, which can be either half-yearly or quarterly. Regulatory lag refers to the
maximum allowable time from the end of the reporting period to the release of the IR.
Reporting form refers to the format of IR, which may be either a full set of financial
statements (full form) or condensed financial statements (condensed form). Condensed
financial statements permit less information to be reported than in annual financial statements
on the basis of providing an update to financial statements. Audit requirement refers to the
assurance requirement mandated for the IR. The assurance requirement may require the IR to
be audited or reviewed by an external auditor (hereafter referred to as ‘audit reviewed’ for
simplicity). Audit reviews are normally limited assurance engagements performed by a firm’s
auditors. A country may also have no formal assurance requirement (i.e., no audit/audit
review requirement) for the IR.
Section 2.2 provides a summary of key differences in IR regulations across the sample
countries. Section 2.3 summarises the chapter.
2.1 IR Regulation in the Asia-Pacific Region
Given that many of the provisions in IAS 34 are substantially voluntary in nature, it is not
surprising that IR practices vary across countries, especially in the required disclosures,
audit/assurance requirement, reporting frequency, and regulatory lag. Such variation across
6 A condensed version of this chapter is published in Nguyen, H. C., Gallery, G. T., & Artiach, T. (2013).
Interim financial reporting in the Asia-Pacific region: a review of regulatory requirements. Corporate
Ownership and Control, 10(3), 380-388.
9countries can be attributed to the influence of national securities regulations, stock
exchanges’ listing rules,7 as well as the rules and guidelines of domestic accountancy bodies.
The following sub-sections review IR regulation for each of the seven sample countries:
Australia, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam
respectively.
2.1.1 IR Regulation in Australia
In Australia, IR requirements for listed firms are stipulated in the Corporations Act 2001, the
Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) Listing Rules, and the Australian Accounting
Standard Board (AASB) 134 Interim Financial Reporting.
The Corporations Act 2001 (amended 2011) stipulates that a listed firm must prepare half-
yearly financial statements in accordance with accounting standards (sec. 302 & 304). The
reports must be audit reviewed or fully audited (Corporations Act 2001, sec. 302 & 307). The
ASX listing rules affirm half-yearly disclosures required by the Corporations Act 2001 and
require the reports to be lodged with the Australian Securities and Investments Commission
(ASIC) and ASX within two months of the period’s end (ASX 2010, Rule 4.2A & 4.2B).8
Australia has adopted IFRS for the periods commencing on or after January 1, 2005 (AASB,
2013; IFRS Foundation, 2014). Accordingly, AASB 134 applies to interim periods beginning
on or after this date (AASB, 2011, para. Aus 1.4). AASB 134 stipulates that listed entities
must prepare their half-yearly reports in accordance with the Corporations Act 2001 (AASB,
2011, para. Aus 1.1). Although AASB 134 contain some country-specific provisions (i.e.
‘Aus’ paragraphs), the mandatory requirements for IR disclosure under AASB 134 and IAS
134 are equivalent. A listed entity in Australia has the option of issuing either a condensed or
7 The stock exchanges examined in this study are the main boards for each selected sample country. Therefore,
only listing and disclosure rules imposed by the main boards are analysed.
8 Commitments test entities and mining exploration entities are required to prepare quarterly cash flow reports
(ASX, 2010, Rule 4.7 & 5.1, app. 4C & 5B). Commitments test entities refer to entities listed on the ASX that
do not satisfy the ASX’s profit test listing rule. The entities are listed under the assets test based on Quarterly
report for entities admitted on the basis of commitments (ASX, 2010, Rule 4.7, app. 4C). In addition to quarterly
cash flows, a mining exploration entity must lodge with the ASX a ‘quarterly activity report’ on its exploration
results (ASX, 2010, Rule 5.6, app. 5A). Mining exploration entities must lodge quarterly reports with the ASX
immediately when the information is available and within one month after the quarter’s end (ASX, 2010, Rule
5.3). Mining exploration entities are not required to provide ‘Appendix 4D’ (ASX, 2010, Rule 4.2A.3 ).
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a full set of interim financial statements in accordance with AASB 134 (AASB, 2011, paras
4-8).
In summary, Australia has fully adopted IFRS from 2005. ASX listed entities are required to
prepare half-yearly reports (either in a condensed or full form) and lodge the reports with
ASIC within two months after the period ends. The reports are required to be either audited
or audit reviewed.
2.1.2 IR Regulation in Hong Kong
Regulation governing IR practices in Hong Kong comprises the Companies Ordinance
(amended 2011), Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited (HKEx) Listing Rules,9 and
Hong Kong Accounting Standard (HKAS) 34 Interim Financial Reporting. The Companies
Ordinance (sec. 79H) requires listed companies to prepare IR. A listed company must deliver
IR in the English or the Chinese language to the Registrar.10 Rule 13.48 (HKEx, 2012a)
mandates a listed issuer to prepare its half-yearly reports in respect of the first six months of
its financial year and to make them available within three months after that period ends.11 At
a minimum, the IR must include a balance sheet, an income statement, a cash flows
statement, a statement of changes in equity, comparative figures for the statements, along
with accounting policies and explanatory notes (HKEx, 2012a, app. 16, para. 37). As such,
listed entities may issue half-yearly reports in a condensed or a full form. The IR must be
reviewed by the listed firm’s audit committee (HKEx, 2012a, app. 16, para. 39). However,
the IR is not required either to be audited or reviewed by an external auditor.
Hong Kong’s accounting standards were fully converged with IFRS effective from January 1,
2005 (Hong Kong Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 2011b; IFRS Foundation, 2014).
9 Listing rules discussed here refer to the main board listing rules, which do not include listing rules required for
firms listed on the second board, known as Growth Enterprise Market.
10 The Registrar means the registrar of the High Court or any Senior Deputy Registrar of the High Court, any
Deputy Registrar of the High Court, and any Assistant Registrar of the High Court appointed by the Chief
Justice for the purposes of this section.
11 The HKEx’s Corporate Governance Code and Corporate Governance Report recommends a listed firm
should prepare and disclose its quarterly financial statement within 45 days after the end of the relevant quarter
(HKEx, 2012a, app. 14, para. C.1.6). A listed firm’s quarterly financial statements should be reviewed by its
audit committee (HKEx, 2012a, app. 14, para. C.3.3). This thesis examines the mandatory requirement of half-
yearly reporting only.
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Consequently, IAS 34 is fully adopted with no major textual differences between HKAS 34
and IAS 34 (Hong Kong Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 2011a). As such, the
mandatory requirements for IR disclosure under HKAS 34 are similar to the IAS 34.
In summary, Hong Kong has fully adopted IFRS from 2005. HKEx listed entities are required
to prepare half-yearly reports either in a condensed or full form and to lodge the reports
within three months after the period ends. The released IR must be reviewed by the preparer’s
audit committee but is not required to be audited or audit reviewed.
2.1.3 IR Regulation in Malaysia
IR practices in Malaysia are described in the Capital Markets and Services Act (amended
2011), the Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad (BMSB) Listing Requirements, and Malaysian
Financial Reporting Standard (MFRS) 134 Interim Financial Reporting. The Capital Markets
and Services Act (sec. 319.1) stipulates that a listed firm must submit its interim and periodic
financial reports to the Securities Commission immediately after figures are available.
Paragraph 9.22 of the Main Market listing requirements (BMSB, 2012) requires a listed
issuer to provide its quarterly reports within two months after the quarter ends. No specific
audit requirement is stipulated by the Malaysian regulations.
Since January 1, 2012, non-private entities, except for agricultural and real estate entities,
have applied the MFRS framework, which is equivalent to the IFRS framework (IFRS
Foundation, 2014). MFRS 134, which is effective for annual accounting period on or after
January 1, 2012, is equivalent to the IAS 34 (MASB, 2011, pp. 938-939). Under Paragraph
IN5 of MFRS 134 (MASB, 2011), it is prescribed that IR must contain, at least, a balance
sheet, an income statement, a statement of cash flows, and a statement showing changes in
equity and explanatory notes. As such, BMSB listed firms may disclose IR in a condensed or
full form. The mandatory requirements for disclosing interim information under MFRS 134
and the IAS 34 are comparable. However, in Malaysia, the issuer must make an explicit
statement in the notes if the disclosure requirement is not applicable (BMSB, 2012, para. 9.22
- app.9B). This requirement differentiates IR disclosure practices by Malaysian firms from
those in other countries which tend to report applicable information, rather than make an
explicit statement of ‘not applicable’.
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In summary, Malaysia has adopted IFRS for non-private entities with the exception of
agricultural and real estate entities. BMSB listed firms are required to prepare quarterly
financial reports in a condensed or full form, and to lodge the reports within two months after
the period ends. No specific audit requirements for the interim reports are imposed by the
Malaysian regulations.
2.1.4 IR Regulation in Singapore
IR regulation in Singapore consists of the Companies Act (amended 2012), the Securities and
Futures Act (amended 2006), the Singapore Exchange (SGX) Rulebooks, and Financial
Reporting Standard (FRS) 34 Interim Financial Reporting. The Companies Act (sec. 201)
does not provide details for preparing interim reports, but requires directors of any company
incorporated in the country to provide financial statements that comply with financial
reporting standards.12
Rule 705 of the Rulebooks (SGX, 2011) mandates a listed company with a market
capitalisation exceeding SGD 75 million (USD 59,98 million)13 to provide IR for each of the
first three quarters of its financial year. A listed firm is required to disclose the quarterly
reports immediately, once the figures are available, and no later than 45 days after the quarter
ends. The rule further mandates listed companies, which are not mandatorily required to
provide quarterly financial reports, to disclose half-yearly financial reports in the same time
frame as quarterly financial reports. Listed firms may disclose quarterly financial reports in
any format provided it is consistent; whilst half-yearly financial reports are mandatorily
presented in the form similar to the most recent audited annual reports and in compliance
with prescribed disclosure items (SGX, 2011, Rule 705 - app. 7.2). As such, interim reports
provided by SGX listed firms may be in a condensed or full form. No specific audit
requirement is stipulated by the Singaporean regulations.
12 Even though Securities and Futures Act (sec. 268) requires a borrowing entity to lodge its first six-month
financial reports with the authority within three months after the period’s end, it has no stipulation about
periodic disclosures by the listed entities.
13 This includes to top 250 firms ranked by market capitalisation as at December 31, 2011.
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In May 2014, the Singapore Accounting Standards Council (SASC) announced that
Singaporean FRS will be fully converged with IFRS by 2018 (SASC, 2014). However, as of
November 2008, the SASC has promulgated a set of accounting standards and interpretations
that are almost fully converged with IFRS (Deloitte Global Services Limited, 2012). As such,
FRS 34 is equivalent to IAS 34. More specifically, the mandatory requirements for disclosing
information in IR are the same. Similar to IAS 34, FRS 34 does not mandate any entity to
issue IR, but rather ‘encourages publicly traded entities to provide interim financial reports
that conform to the recognition, measurement, and disclosure principles set out in this
Standard’ (SASC, 2009, FRS 34, para. 1).
In summary, SGX listed firms with market capitalisation exceeding SGD 75 million (USD
59.98 million) are required to disclose quarterly reports, whilst the others are required to
disclose half-yearly reports.14 Quarterly reports prepared by SGX listed firms are in a
condensed or full form and lodged within 45 days after the period ends. Half-yearly reports
are in the full form and also lodged within the 45 days. The Singaporean regulations do not
impose any specific audit requirement for the interim reports.
2.1.5 IR Regulation in the Philippines
IR requirements in the Philippines are regulated by the Corporation Code (amended 1980),
the Securities Regulation Codes (SRC), the Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE) Listing and
Disclosure Rules, and the Philippine Accounting Standard (PAS) 34 Interim Financial
Reporting. The Corporation Code (sec. 141) stipulates that every corporation that conducts
business in the Philippines must provide its reports of specific periods based upon the
requirements of the Philippine Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The SRC Rule
68 (as amended 2011) regulates the forms and contents of financial statements. Disclosure
Rules (PSE, 2003, sec. 17.2) mandate a listed company to file with the exchange its quarterly
reports in a condensed form (i.e. form 17-Q of the SEC) for the first three quarters within 45
days after the quarter ends. The Philippines’ regulations do not impose any specific audit
requirement for the quarterly reports.
14 It should be noted at this point that all of the firms in the Singaporean sample have market capitalisation
exceeding SGD 75 million.
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The Philippines has fully adopted IFRS from 2005 without modification (Deloitte Global
Services Limited, 2005; IFRS Foundation, 2014). Accordingly, the mandatory disclosure
requirement for IR under PAS 34 (effective from January 1, 2005) is equivalent to the IAS
34.
In summary, PSE listed entities are required to prepare quarterly financial reports in a
condensed form, and to lodge the reports within 45 days after the period ends. No specific
audit requirement for IR is imposed by the Philippine regulations.
2.1.6 IR Regulation in Thailand
IR regulation in Thailand is monitored by the Securities and Exchange Act B.E. 2535 (as
amended 2008), the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) Rules Book, and Thai Accounting
Standard (TAS) 34 Interim Financial Reporting. The Securities and Exchange Act (sec. 56)
mandates a listed firm to prepare quarterly financial reports and have them reviewed by an
auditor. The SET listing rules oblige an issuer to produce its four quarterly financial reports
and to commission auditors to review the reports in conformity with the Securities and
Exchange Act (SET, 2001, 2007, 2009). The reports must be submitted to the SET and the
Securities and Exchange Commission within 45 days after the period ends (SET, 2007,
2009). Listed firms are required to lodge with the SET a translated English version of their
quarterly reports in the full form (SET, 2007, 2009). Thailand has not adopted IFRS; however
TAS have been converged with IFRS since 2011 (IFRS Foundation, 2014).15 Accordingly,
IAS 34 has been fully implemented in Thailand since 2008 (Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu
Jaiyos, 2008; PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2008). As such, the mandatory disclosure of interim
information under TAS 34 is equivalent to IAS 34.
In summary, SET listed entities are required to prepare quarterly reports in a full form, and to
lodge the reports with the SET and the Thai SEC within 45 days after the period ends. Interim
reports require an audit review.
15 This convergence does not include the industry specific standard (IAS 41 Agriculture), and the financial
instrument standards (IAS 32 Financial Instruments: Presentation, IAS 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition
and Measurement, IFRS 7 Financial Instruments: Disclosures, and IFRS 9 Financial Instruments).
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2.1.7 IR Regulation in Vietnam
Regulation governing IR practices in Vietnam is stipulated in the Enterprise Law 2005, the
Law on Accounting 2003, the Law on Securities 2006, and Vietnamese Accounting Standard
(VAS) 27 Interim Financial Reporting. The Enterprise Law (Art. 9) requires that all
accounting work in enterprises is in accordance with the Law on Accounting. According to
the Law on Accounting (Art. 29), a business entity is obliged to comply with accounting
standards when producing their financial reports. Pursuant to the Law on Accounting,
Government of Vietnam’s Decree 129/2004/ND-CP (Art.15) requires state enterprises to
prepare quarterly financial statements, and to file the reports with tax offices, statistical
bodies, and business registration bodies within 20 days after the period ends. No specific
requirement for interim reports is imposed on listed entities by the Enterprise Law or the Law
on Accounting.
Pursuant to the Law on Securities (Art. 101) however, the Ministry of Finance (MOF, 2012,
Circular No. 52/2012/TT-BTC, Art. 10.3) instructs that a listed company must prepare
quarterly separate (consolidated) financial statements within 20 (45) days of the period’s end.
No audit requirement is stipulated for the quarterly reports. Notably, a listed firm is required
to prepare a separate set of half-yearly financial reports for the first six months of the
financial year. The half-yearly reports must be audit reviewed and issued within five working
days as from the auditor signed date, and no later than 45 days after the period ends for
separate financial statements, or 60 days for consolidated ones (MOF, 2012, Circular No.
52/2012/TT-BTC, Art. 10.2).
To date, Vietnam has neither adopted IFRS nor announced a formal date for IFRS adoption
(Vietnam Association of Accountants and Auditors, 2012). However, IAS 34 is in effect,
fully implemented in Vietnam, even though the country has not adopted IFRS
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2008). As specifically stated in paragraph 2, VAS 27 differs from
IAS 34 in that VAS 27 is mandatory for entities that are required to publish their interim
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reports in accordance with laws and regulations.16 VAS 27 (para. 6) encourages reporting
entities to provide IR in a form identical to annual reports.
In summary, listed entities in Vietnam are required to prepare both quarterly and half-yearly
financial reports. Firms are encouraged, but not required, to present the reports in a full form.
Additionally, only half-yearly financial reports require an audit review. The regulatory lag for
quarterly separate (consolidated) financial reports is 20 (45) days, or 45 (60) days for half-
yearly separate (consolidated) reports.
2.2 Summary of IR Institutional Differences
This section summarises the institutional differences in IR regulation across the seven Asia-
Pacific countries. Table 2.1 provides a summary of the source of relevant IR specific
regulations and the minimum mandatory requirements for disclosing interim information in
each of the seven sample countries. Table 2.2 draws a comparison of the key IR-related
attributes, which have been discussed in Section 2.1.
As can be seen from Table 2.1, mandatory regulations for IR disclosure differ substantially
across all seven countries with respect to reporting frequency, regulatory lag, audit
requirement, reporting form, and regulatory specific (IR regulatory sources).
Reporting frequency: Mandatory quarterly reporting is required in Malaysia, the Philippines,
and Thailand, whereas mandatory half-yearly reporting is required in Australia17 and Hong
Kong. Singapore mandates disclosing quarterly financial information for SGX listed entities
with market capitalisation exceeding SGD 75 million. By contrast, SGX listed firms with
market capitalisation less than SGD 75 million are mandated to provide half-yearly reporting.
In Vietnam, firms listing on HoChiMinh Stock Exchange (HOSE) and HaNoi Stock
Exchange (HNX) are required to disclose both quarterly reporting and half-yearly reporting.
This requirement distinguishes Vietnamese IR regulation from the other six countries that
mandate either quarterly or half-yearly financial reports, but not both.
16 In Vietnam, accounting standards are promulgated by the Ministry of Finance by various decisions. VAS 27 is
prescribed in the Decision 12/2005/QD-BTC (see, MOF, 2005).
17 An exception applies to Australian mining exploration and commitments test entities that require those
entities to lodge quarterly cash flow statements to the ASX.
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Table 2.1 - Summary of Variations in IR Regulation across Sample Countries
Country IR Regulation Source IR Mandatory Requirements
Australia Corporations Act 2001 (as amended 2011)
ASX Listing Rules
AASB 134 (adopted IFRS Jan 1, 2005)
Half-yearly reports in a condensed or a full
form within two months after the period ends,
requiring an audit or audit review.
Hong Kong Companies Ordinance (as amended 2011)
HKEx Main Board Listing Rules
HKAS 34 (adopted IFRS Jan 1, 2005)
Half-yearly reports in a condensed or full form
within three months after the period ends,
requiring an internal audit committee review.
Malaysia Capital Markets and Services Act (as
amended 2011)
Main market (BMSB) listing requirements
MFRS 134 (adopted IFRS Jan 1, 2012)
Quarterly reports in a condensed or full form
within two months after the period ends, with
no audit requirement stipulated.
Singapore Companies Act (as amended 2012)
Securities and Futures Act (as amended 2006)
SGX Rulebooks
FRS 34 (not yet adopted IFRS)
Quarterly reports for listed firms with market
capitalisation exceeding SGD 75 million or
half-yearly reports for the other listed firms in
a condensed or full form within 45 days after
the period ends, with no audit requirement
stipulated.
Philippines Corporate Code (as amended 1980)
Securities Regulation Code (as amended
2011)
PSE Listing and Disclosure Rules
PAS 34 (adopted IFRS Jan 1, 2005)
Quarterly reports in a condensed form within
45 days after the period ends, with no audit
requirement stipulated.
Thailand Securities and Exchanges Act, B.E. 2535
(1992) (as amended 2008)
SET Rule Books
TAS 34 (not yet adopted IFRS)
Quarterly reports in a full form within 45 days
after the period ends, requiring an audit
review.
Vietnam Law on Securities (2005)
Ministry of Finance’s Circulars
(on information disclosure)
VAS 27 (not yet adopted IFRS)
Quarterly separate (consolidated) reports in
either a condensed or a full form within 20
(45) days after the period ends, with no audit
requirement stipulated; and
Half-yearly separate (consolidated) reports in
either a condensed or full form within 45 (60)
days after the period ends, requiring an audit
review.
This table presents regulation source governing IR across the seven sample countries with the focus on the
mandatory requirements.
Regulatory lag: The regulatory lag for disclosing mandatory quarterly reports ranges from 20
days from the quarter’s end for Vietnam (separate financial reports) to 60 days from the
quarter’s end for Malaysia. The maximum reporting time lag for announcing half-yearly
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reports ranges widely from 45 days from the period’s end for separate financial reports in
Vietnam18 to 90 days from the period’s end in Hong Kong. Thus, Vietnamese regulations
impose the strictest requirement (shortest) for the timing of providing IR to the public by
listed firms, whilst Malaysia and Hong Kong regulations are the longest.
Audit requirement: Differences are also evident in the audit requirements across the
countries. An audit review of quarterly reports is required in Thailand, whilst no specific
audit requirement is stipulated in Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines. Mandatory half-
yearly reports require an audit review or audit in Australia, and audit review in Vietnam.
Reporting form: The reporting form varies from a full form (for Thailand) to a choice of a
full form and a condensed form of interim reporting (Australia and Vietnam), or condensed
form (for the Philippines). For the three remaining countries, there is no explicit requirement
for the reporting form. As such, listed firms in Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore may
issue their IR either in a full or condensed form.
Regulatory specific (IR regulation source): Regulation governing IR also differs across the
countries. The accounting standard on IR is not the only regulatory source governing interim
reporting disclosure. Each country has other regulations that impose requirements for the IR
disclosure, including laws (companies or corporations act, and securities act), and stock
exchanges’ disclosure and listing rules. This leads to substantial differences in the regulation
of IR disclosure.
The above differences indicate that IR regulation varies substantially across the region
regardless of whether or not these countries have adopted IFRS. The cross-country
differences observed in IR related regulation could influence IR disclosure levels by listed
firms across the region. As such, a comparison of IR regulations across the seven Asia-
Pacific countries is useful to understand the possible association between IR regulation and
IR disclosure levels by firms listing in the country.
18 As earlier noted, regulatory lag for firms listed in Vietnam is 45 days for quarterly consolidated reports and 60
days for half-yearly consolidated reports. The (relative) reporting lag by Vietnamese sample firms are computed
dependent on whether the interim report is a separate or consolidated one, as discussed in Section 5.4.2 and
Section 6.1.4.
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Table 2.2 compares IR disclosure requirements by highlighting the differences in the four IR-
related factors. As shown in the table, cross-country differences are evidence in: (1) the stage
of IFRS adoption, (2) audit requirement, (3) mandatory reporting frequency, and (4)
regulatory lag. These IR discretionary attributes are likely to influence cross-country
variations in IR disclosure compliance and therefore are the focus of this thesis.
Table 2.2 - Comparison of IR Regulation in the Sample Asia-Pacific Countries
Country
IR regulatory specifics
Australia Hong
Kong
Malaysia Singapore Philippines Thailand Vietnam
1. Having adopted IFRS Y Y Y N Y N N
2. Mandating an audit review for IR Y N N N N Y Y(*)
3. Mandating quarterly reports N N Y Y Y Y Y
3. Allowing a relative shorter reporting lag Y N N Y Y Y Y
This table provides a comparison of IR regulation across seven countries deriving from the discussion provided
in Section 2.1. Y (N) denotes for yes (no), which is employed to classify the seven sample countries into
dichotomous groups based on the four key IR-related regulatory differences.19 (*) Vietnam mandates both half-
yearly and quarterly reports; however, only the half-yearly report is required to have an audit review.
2.3 Summary
This chapter provides a review of the institutional differences in IR regulation. The review
reveals that IR disclosure practices by listed firms in the seven Asia-Pacific countries are
subject to different sources of regulations. The IR disclosure requirements differ in the stage
of IFRS-adoption, the audit requirement (mandatory or voluntary), the reporting frequency
(quarterly or half-yearly report), and regulatory lag (timeliness of reporting). As such, those
seven countries provide a useful setting for examining cross-country variations in IR
disclosure compliance levels and their associated factors. The next chapter provides a review
of the literature relevant to the examination of IR disclosure compliance in this study.
19 Apart from the four key IR-related regulatory differences, IR disclosure practice by firms in each country is
possibly influenced by the enforcement of the relevant regulation governing IR and the country institutions
(except for legal origin, economic development, and culture) as reported later in Chapters 6 and 7. Enforcement
and other institutional factors may influence IR disclosure compliance because it may be more or less costly to
disclose something in one country than another. However, given the difficulty of quantifying the differences in
regulatory enforcement and measuring other possible influencing institutional factors, this thesis has not
examined the influence of enforcement on IR disclosure compliance.
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CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW
This study examines the extent of IR disclosure compliance for firms in the Asia-Pacific
region and the determinant factors. Therefore, the focus of the literature review is on studies
of IR, especially in this regional setting. While there is a dearth of research into IR disclosure,
the existing empirical research on annual report disclosure is extensive. For this reason, the
literature review draws from both research streams. Section 3.1 highlights the importance of
IR. Section 3.2 provides a review of the research on IR disclosure. Section 3.3 provides a
brief review of key cross-country studies on annual financial reporting disclosure. Finally,
Section 3.4 provides a summary of the chapter.
3.1 Importance of Interim Financial Reporting
Although there is no universal norm for IR, its role for capital markets has long been
recognised. For example, the US market operators had attempted to elicit IR by corporations
in the 1920s as they felt such information, especially interim earnings, would be more useful
(see, for example, Taylor, 1965; Leftwich, Watts, & Zimmerman, 1981). In an early study
before quarterly reports became mandated in the US, Sanders (1934) highlights that
stockholders desire more frequent reporting. Later US studies reveal that quarterly reports
were increasingly used by researchers and analysts, and perceived as very useful to other
capital market participants as well as for improving market efficiency (e.g., Taylor, 1965;
Seidler & Benjes, 1967; Ball & Brown, 1968; Newell, 1969). In particular, disclosure of
‘mandatory’ quarterly earnings leads to lower stock price variability surrounding the release
of annual earnings because the quarterly reports pre-empt annual report information
(McNichols & Manegold, 1983).20 Consistent with the market efficiency claim, capital
markets research in the US provides evidences showing that interim reports provide valuable
information influencing stock price activity on the day of and one or two days after the
reports filing (Griffin, 2003). Notably, the informativeness of quarterly earnings increases
20 Their sample, covering from 1961 to 1968, is from the American Exchange. Until 1962, firms listing on the
American Exchange are not mandatorily required to produce interim reports unless they have an agreement with
the stock exchange when offering new securities or they list with the American Exchange for the first time.
Therefore, the sample firms face ‘mandated’ disclosure of interim reports (McNichols & Manegold, 1983).
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over time (Landsman & Maydew, 2002). Yee (2004) presents a review on the institutional
history of interim reporting frequency around the world. Based on analytical modelling, he
indicates that increasing interim report frequency improves market liquidity and reduces price
volatility.
Other studies in Europe, including Finland, Portugal and the UK, also indicate the usefulness
of interim reports by showing that its disclosure reduces information asymmetry as well as
affecting share prices, and trading actions (see, for example, Opong, 1995; Schadewitz,
Kanto, Kahra, & Blevins, 2002; Alves & Dos Santos, 2008). As compared to half-yearly
reporting (for Great Britain and Australian firms), quarterly reporting (for the US and
Canada) leads to higher stock price volatility which implies more informed stock pricing and
a more efficient capital market (Mensah & Werner, 2008). This implication is consistent with
a later market study in European countries by Cuijpers and Peek (2010) revealing that more
frequent (i.e. quarterly) financial reporting in Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK reduces
information asymmetry, therefore increasing share liquidity and stimulating share trading.
Similarly, Fu, Kraft and Zhang (2012) also find that the increased financial reporting
frequency in the US reduces information asymmetry and the cost of capital. However, the
benefits of increased financial reporting frequency, measured as how quickly earning
information is reflected in stock prices during the current reporting period, are lower for firms
with less severe information asymmetry (Butler, Kraft, & Weiss, 2007). From other users’
perspectives, survey research reveals that accountants, accounting managers and financial
analysts recognise the usefulness of IR content and disclosure as it displays the entity’s
financial position, assists managers’ decision making, increases the entity’s market share, and
provides updated information to users for measuring the entity’s performance and budgeting
or forecasting (see, for example, Joshi & Bremser, 2003; Mangena, Kinman, & Citron, 2007).
In Asia, the role of IR is also recognised by stock exchanges as noted in an early study on
disclosure requirement in the region by Craig and Diga (1998). A recent study in Japan by
Kubota, Suda and Takehara (2010) confirms the importance of IR by indicating that half-
yearly reporting serves as a useful supplement for reducing informational uncertainty which
may arise from annual reporting.
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Timeliness, precision, credibility, and comprehensiveness (or width) are important qualitative
disclosure characteristics often examined in the literature (Brown & Hillegeist, 2007). As
reviewed above, the extant literature finds that IR is important to efficient capital markets;
and financial reporting timeliness is related to its usefulness, even though there is no optimal
frequency for IR (see, for example, Van Buskirk, 2012). As such, costs associated with
increasing financial reporting frequency, such as compliance costs, monitoring costs, and
proprietary costs, should be taken into account (Verdi, 2012). With respect to credibility,
Alves and Dos Santos (2008) show that mandatory audited quarterly reports have more
impact on price reactions than mandatory unaudited ones.
Although IR is useful, early research indicates that the quality of quarterly financial reports
was an issue (Seidler & Benjes, 1967) as the reliability of quarterly information was often
questionable (Newell, 1969). Further, the precision of quarterly reporting seems to be lower
than annual reporting due to the lack of supplementary and supporting material (Brown &
Hillegeist, 2007). Researchers suggest that there are certain factors which may enhance the
quality of quarterly financial reports, such as mandatory audit requirement, standardised
accounting methods for recognising and measuring reported items, and the extent of effort in
preparing interim reports (see, for example, Seidler & Benjes, 1967; Newell, 1969; Tan &
Tower, 1997). They also suggest that quarterly financial reporting quality could be improved
by setting up a regulatory process for issuing IR, having IR audited, and further developing
accounting principles and practices for the preparation of IR (Seidler & Benjes, 1967).
Furthermore, other attributions of interim reporting also need to be considered so as to make
it more useful.
In a more recent study, Lee (2012) observes that quarterly reports with less readability
(measured by being unexpectedly longer and more textually complex) impede the
information efficiency of stock prices, thereby reducing the quality of the reports.
Additionally, the increased frequency of financial reporting may increase the probability of
inducing managerial short-termism to boost the current period earnings (Gigler, Kanodia,
Sapra, & Venugopalan, 2014). Consistent with this proposition, the amendments of the
Transparency Directive (TD) in Europe prohibit the mandate for publishing quarterly reports
by listed firms unless the requirement does not constitute a significant financial burden for
the issuers, and unless the additional required information is needed for investment decision
making (European Council, 2013). However, a firm may voluntarily disclose more frequent
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reporting, that is, quarterly, if it feels forced to do so; and the voluntary disclosure is feasible
and not too costly (Wagenhofer, 2014).
Overall, market participants and regulators have recognised a significant role for IR in capital
markets. It is an important information channel providing more updated information on the
reporting entity, which has a substantial impact on capital market efficiency by reducing
information asymmetry and the cost of capital. The market based studies, as reviewed in this
section, highlight that IR quality has an impact on the usefulness of these reports from a
market perspective. In particular, differences in reporting frequency and audit assurance may
affect its informational roles. However, the questions that remain unanswered are: i) what is
an appropriate IR model? and ii) should regulators in each country continue or start to make
statutory provisions for audit requirement, reporting frequency, and reporting lag? As such,
research on IR regulations and disclosure compliance in a cross-national setting would
benefit the literature because it could reveal variation in IR disclosure compliance across
countries and the associated factors. The following section reviews the extent to which the
literature on IR disclosure has addressed the need.
3.2 IR Disclosure Studies
Although the disclosure literature has a long history, empirical research on IR disclosure,
both in cross-country or within-country setting, is sparse. Accordingly, this section includes
prior studies on IR disclosure both across and within countries.
In one of the earliest studies, Tan and Tower (1997) compare IR compliance in Australia and
Singapore by examining half-yearly reporting of 89 Australian firms and 97 Singaporean
firms for the 1995/1996 financial year. They report that 69.7 per cent of Australian firms
compared with only 29.9 per cent of Singaporean firms did not fully comply with the
requirements. The authors claim that the findings could be explained by the significant
differences in requirements for half-yearly reporting between two countries in that Australia
firms were subjected to over six times as many reporting requirements than Singaporean
firms. Tan and Tower (1997) contend that the differences could be attributable to either over-
regulations in Australia or under-regulation in Singapore. Over-regulations may cause lack of
compliance as they are costly to conform with. Their findings also reveal that firm size is
positively associated with compliance levels, whereas leverage is negatively associated with
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compliance. Industry membership is not associated with compliance level. Due to the low
percentage of Australian firms fully complying with the IR requirements, Tan and Tower
(1997) argue for the auditing of half-year reports and for a regulatory review. Despite
identifying the regulation differences, Tan and Tower (1997) do not examine the influence of
these regulatory differences and other country-specific factors compliance. Therefore, further
research on these factors may provide alternative explanations for the variations.
Using the same sample and study period as Tan and Tower (1997), Tan and Tower (1999)
develop an individual index to examine levels of disclosure compliance with IR regulations
by the 89 Australian and 97 Singaporean listed firms as well as the associated factors. Similar
to their early paper, they reveal that compliance level by listed firms in Singapore
(determined by 6 disclosure items) is significantly higher than those in Australia (determined
by 38 disclosure items). In particular, the mean of the compliance level with listing rules for
Australian firms is 0.75 (as compared to 0.93 for Singaporean counterparts). The average
level of compliance with the accounting standard for Australian firms is 0.87. Notably, there
were no identified disclosure items stipulated by Singaporean accounting standards
applicable for their sample. The multiple regression results suggest that country of origin is
significantly related to IR compliance levels. Further, firm leverage is negatively associated
with the level of disclosure compliance. However, the results for two sub-samples by country
reveal that the regression model including firm-size, leverage, and industry dummies
(resources, manufactures, and financials) are not significant either for Australia or Singapore.
Leverage is negatively and significantly associated with IR disclosure compliance in the
Australia model, but positively and insignificantly related in the Singapore model. As
countries differ in many aspects, Tan and Tower (1999) suggest that future research is needed
to examine country-specific factors, such as economic development and culture, with a larger
country sample.
The aforementioned studies document the significant differences in disclosure requirements
prior to the IFRS-adoption period for Australian and Singaporean listed firms. They also
identify the significant differences in IR disclosure compliance levels between the two
countries. While they reveal that IR disclosure compliance levels are significantly negative
association with leverage, the IR-related factors, for example reporting lag, were not
examined in their studies.
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In a more recent cross-country study, Link (2012) investigates reporting frequency
regulations in fifteen European Union (EU) countries in the context of adopting the
Transparency Directive (TD), which defines the minimum contents of interim and annual
reports. At the time, quarterly reporting was mandated only by some stock markets or
countries in the EU. However, mandatory quarterly reporting was scrapped with the 2011 TD
in order to harmonise reporting regulation across the EU.21 In this context, Link (2012)
examines the influential factors of voluntary quarterly reporting to establish the effect of this
abolition on interim reporting practices in the EU. The findings indicate that voluntarily
quarterly reporting is influenced by both firm-level factors (including size, profitability, the
extent of information asymmetry, the informativeness of earnings, disclosure and proprietary
cost) and country-level factors (the importance of the equity markets and legal enforcement).
While Link (2012) contributes to the disclosure literature by analysing interim reporting in 15
EU countries and the potential effects of TD on reporting frequency (i.e. quarterly or half-
yearly) in the region, his study does not provide insights into interim reporting practised by
firms (levels of disclosure or compliance) or the associated factors. Acknowledging the
limitation, he calls for further research on the cost-benefits of mandatory quarterly reports.
Likewise, the extant literature offers limited recent evidence of IR disclosure practices by
firms and their determinants in a single country setting. The earliest studies on quarterly
financial reporting were carried out in the US setting where interim reporting has been
required since 1973.22 McEwen and Schwartz (1992) explore IR practices of 76 companies
listed on the New York Stock Exchange and reveal that firms do not disclose all interim
21 The proposal was approved by the European Parliament on 22 October 2013 and effective from 26 November
2013; accordingly, issuance of the first and third financial reports is no longer mandated by the European
Council. However, Member States are able to mandate periodic financial information on a more frequent basis
than annual and half-yearly reports if the requirement is not costly, and if such more frequent information is
useful for investment decision-making (European Council, 2013).
22 In 1923, the New York Stock Exchange required (encouraged) newly (already) listed firms to disclose
quarterly; however, the SEC officially prescribed half-yearly and quarterly reporting by listed entities as earlier
as 1955 and 1970 respectively (Butler et al., 2007). In conformity with SEC regulations, the Accounting
Principles Board of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants requires the issuance of quarterly
reports by public companies from fiscal years beginning after December 31, 1973. However, the Board
encouraged earlier application of the provisions of quarterly financial reporting (Accounting Principles Board,
1973, Opinion No.28, para. 34). Although the US has a long history of quarterly reporting practices, quarterly
reporting disclosure was still deemed problematic, partly due to frequent adjustments in such reports by
reporting entities (Weir, 2002).
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information in accordance with Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 28 ‘Interim
Financial Reporting’. In addition, they argue that not fully complying with IR requirements
may impair the usefulness of interim reports. The preparers, for example, do not provide
information about the influence of seasonality because they either do not comply with
disclosure requirements or merely do not have such activities. Further, arguing that
enforcement of interim reporting requirements will enhance its usefulness, they suggest a
stricter enforcement and a regulatory regime for auditing IR.23
In the New Zealand setting, Bradbury (1991) reveals that voluntary earnings disclosures in
half-yearly reports by listed firms during the 1973-1976 period are positively related to
outside capital (more share issuance), payment of interim dividend, and unexpected earnings
(earnings forecast errors), but negatively associated with seasonal volatility. In a related paper
using the same sample and study period, Bradbury (1992) finds that unexpected earnings are
positively associated with non-quantified voluntary interim disclosures (reflecting
announcements not containing point estimates of earnings).
In the UK setting, IR practices by listed firms are examined in three related papers using the
same sample of 262 non-financial listed firms for the period 2001-2002. The three studies
examine IR disclosure practices by the UK listed firms in the context of prior IFRS-adoption
and specially focus on the influence of audit committee structure and external auditor
involvement. Mangena and Pike (2005) investigate the association between audit committee
(shareholding, financial expertise, and size) and IR disclosure determined by their self-
constructed indices, including mandatory and voluntary disclosure items to determine half-
yearly disclosure using both weighted and unweighted methods (adjusted for non-applicable
items). The weighted scoring scheme, which is based on 79 investment analysts’ perceptions
on the importance of each disclosure item, is an extension of the unweighted (dichotomous)
approach in that a ‘mean’ rating by the analysts is assigned to a disclosed item and ‘0’
otherwise. They find that IR disclosure levels vary considerably. Unweighted scores range
from 0.11 to 0.92 with a mean (median) of 0.69 (0.72), whereas weighted scores fluctuate
from 0.11 to 0.91 with a mean (median) of 0.72 (0.73). Unweighted and weighted scores are
23 Some more recent studies on IR in the US setting investigate associations of reporting frequency with security
price reaction and information asymmetry (e.g., Butler et al., 2007; Van Buskirk, 2012).
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significantly correlated. Mangena and Pike (2005) find that audit-committee share ownership
has a significant negative relation with IR disclosure levels; the association for audit
committee financial expertise is significant positive; whereas no significant association is
found for audit committee size. In addition, firm size (total assets), multiple listings, and
auditor involvement (measured as whether or not the IR was reviewed or audited) have a
significant positive association with IR disclosure levels.
In a related paper using the same sample and study period, Mangena and Tauringana (2007)
examine the factors associated with level of IR disclosure ‘compliance’ with the statement on
IR issued by the UK Accounting Standards Board (ASB).24 The statement is not an
accounting standard, but a formulation of best practices. The level of IR non-mandatory
disclosure compliance is determined by their self-constructed index, excluding any
mandatory disclosure items required by the UK listing rules, and by using a dichotomous
approach adjusted for non-applicable items. They find that the level of compliance with the
ASB statement by UK listed firms is significant and positively associated with firm-specific
factors, including multiple listing, firm size (total assets), (paying or proposing) interim
dividend, and (issuing) new share. In terms of audit-related variables, Mangena and
Tauringana (2007) find that auditor involvement, audit committee independence, and audit
committee financial expertise are significantly and positively related to the level of IR
compliance.
Using the same sample and study period, Mangena and Tauringana (2008) examine the
association between audit committee characteristics and voluntary external engagement to
review IR by UK listed firms. They reveal that likelihood of the auditor involvement in IR is
positively associated with independence and financial expertise, but negatively associated
with audit committee shareholding. Given that audit review of interim reports is an indicator
of the quality of IR, their findings are consistent with Mangena and Pike (2005) finding that a
well-structured audit committee (measured as audit committee independence and financial
expertise) has a positive impact on IR disclosure levels.
24 Compliance (with non-mandatory statements of best practices) is the wording used in their paper, but
essentially means voluntary disclosure.
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In a developing country setting, Schadewitz and Blevins (1998) examine the determinants of
IR disclosure by 256 Finnish non-financial listed firms for the period from 1985 to 1993
using their researcher-structured index. They find that firm business risk (standard deviation
of percentage change in net sales or standard deviation of change in fixed to total assets ratio)
and firm size (number of employees) are significantly and positively correlated with IR
disclosure levels, whereas the association between firm growth potential and IR disclosure
level is significantly negative.
Oberholster and Nieuwoudt (2001) investigate levels of IR compliance with South Africa
IR’s statutory requirements (i.e. South African Companies Act) and regulatory requirements
(i.e. the Johannesburg Stock Exchange’s Listing Rules) by 50 listed firms for the period from
1997 to 1999. They highlight that the level of IR compliance with each disclosure item
required by the accounting standards on IR (i.e. IAS 34 and South Africa Accounting
Statement 127) is very low. For example, only 24 per cent of their 1997 sample firms disclose
accounting policies and method of computation; whereas that of 1998 and 1999 sample is 16
per cent and 52 per cent respectively. By contrast, the level of IR compliance with
Companies Acts and the Stock Exchange Listing Rules is much higher. Based on the
findings, Oberholster and Nieuwoudt (2001) suggest potential reasons for the low
compliance, such as too many regulations governing IR, directors’ insufficient care in
preparing IR, a lack of IR monitoring by the stock exchange, preparers’ negative perception
of IR as not timely and useless, and difficulty associated with extracting interim information
from accounting records. Further, they suggest that, in improving IR, regulatory bodies
should ensure better linkage and alignment of IR regulations, and removal of duplicated
disclosure requirements.
In the context of Germany, D'Arcy and Grabensberger (2003) examine the quality of
quarterly reports by focusing on the disclosure compliance level of 47 Neuer Markt listed
firms’ third quarter reports (of 1999, 2000 and 2001) and its associated factors using bivariate
correlation analysis as well as observation of differences in means and medians. Following an
unweighted approach (without adjusting for non-applicable items), disclosure compliance
levels are determined using indices which measure whether each report complies with
disclosure requirements prescribed by Neuer Markt Rules and Regulations, IAS 34, and US
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). They find that the level of disclosure
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compliance has increased over time; especially with the incremental enforcement mechanism
(added in 2000) under which quarterly reports are required to be presented in a standardised
format. The analyses of correlations do not reveal any connection between reporting lag
(number of days of delay), firm size (market capitalisation) and disclosure compliance level.
However, descriptive statistics show that the aggregate disclosure level is higher for firms
which apply US GAAP (versus IAS), provide full accounts (versus only reconciliation), and
present IR in the full format (versus condensed set).
Ku Ismail and Chandler (2004) assess quarterly reporting timeliness of Malaysian listed firms
by investigating the reporting lag of 117 quarterly reports in 2001. The results show that 116
firms comply with the requirements for providing quarterly reporting within a regulatory lag
of two months. The findings reveal that timeliness (measured by the actual number of days a
firm takes to provide the quarterly report) is positively associated with firm size, profitability
and growth, but negatively associated with leverage.
In a related study using the same sample and study period, Ku Ismail and Chandler (2005)
apply content analysis to investigate the extent of narrative disclosure in the quarterly reports.
The extent of disclosure is measured by the total number of words disclosed in three
explanatory notes (material changes in the quarterly results, performance review, and
comment on current year prospects) scaled to total assets. The authors find that the firms
tended to comply with the minimum disclosure requirements (i.e. moderate narrative).
Further, they report great dispersion in disclosures among those firms. They also reveal that
leverage is significantly and positively associated with the disclosure level, whereas the
associations with profitability (profit margin) and growth (percentage change in net sales) are
not significant.
In a more recent Malaysian study, Alias, Clark and Roudaki (2009) examine the four quarter
reports for the period from 2005 to 2007 for 60 companies and find that no company fully
complied with all the disclosure requirements of the BMSB. Additionally, even though the
mean times for the filings of the quarterly reports varies for the four quarters, and is shorter
than the allowable time, there are still companies that file their reports after the due date,
except for the second quarter. Although their study provides evidence of low levels of IR
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disclosure compliance and differences in reporting lags among the firms, they do not
investigate which factors could explain the IR disclosure practices in Malaysian companies.
In the Indian context, Saxena, Saxena and Kumar (2012) observe the extent of compliance
with IR regulations by examining the four quarterly reports for the 2009/2010 financial year
of five nationalised banks listed on the Securities Exchange Board of India. Compliance is
measured by completeness (or content) and context (a composite of timeliness, audit, board of
director approval, means of announcement). Their findings show a moderate level of
compliance, approximately 65 per cent, for both content and context compliance. Because of
the low compliance levels, they suggest that the regulatory bodies should initiate certain
checks and take action to improve compliance.
In summary, empirical evidence on IR disclosure compliance provided by prior studies, both
in a cross-country setting and single-country setting, are sparse. In particular, they offer few
insights into factors associated with IR disclosure levels and are limited by the single country
setting prior to IFRS-adoption period. A summary of these reviewed studies is provided in
Appendix I. Further, although IR regulations vary across countries, as evident in Chapter 2 of
this study, also in Tan and Tower (1997), and Tan and Tower (1999), no identified prior
research has investigated whether these variations are associated with IR disclosure
compliance levels. As such, there is a need for “compliance-based” research on IR disclosure
in a cross-country setting which may provide insight into the differences in IR practices and
the impact of IR regulations. In addition to IR-related factors, the differences in IR disclosure
may be impacted by other country-level factors, such as economic development and national
culture, as suggested by Tan and Tower (1999). In this regard, a review of the related
research which examines determinants of annual reporting disclosure in a cross-country
setting could provide useful insights into factors possibly influencing cross-country variations
in IR disclosure levels.
3.3 Annual Report Disclosure in Cross-country Setting
There is a long history of disclosure research that examines both mandatory and voluntary
disclosure of both financial and non-financial information by firms either in a single-country
setting or cross-country setting. Reviewed in this section are the relevant cross-country
31
studies on IAS/IFRS disclosure and general annual reporting disclosure with the focus on the
determinant factors, given the extensive research in the field.
3.3.1 Cross-country Studies on IAS/IFRS Disclosure
The study by Meek, Roberts and Gray (1995) is one of the first cross-country studies
investigating factors influencing voluntary disclosure (classified into strategic, non-financial
and financial information). Their sample comprised 226 multinational firms across the UK,
the US, and Continental European countries, including France, Germany, and the
Netherlands. Their findings reveal that firm size is positively associated with levels of non-
financial, financial and overall disclosure, whereas foreign listing is positively related to
levels of strategic, financial, and overall disclosure. Firm leverage is negatively related to
overall disclosure, which is contrary to their prediction. They concluded that the preparers’
assessment of perceived cost-benefit trade-offs is possibly the underlying cause of the
association. The findings also indicate that country of origin is important to disclosure levels.
Specifically, Continental European multinational corporations disclose more strategic
information than those in the other countries, which is possibly because firms in Continental
European countries may regard such disclosure as a means of overcoming a conservative bias
in their measurement practices. Multinational corporations in the UK and Continental
European countries provide more non-financial information than those in the US since such
kinds of disclosure are more developed in Europe than in the US. Multinational corporations
in the UK are less willing to disclose financial information than those in the other countries.
However, Meek et al. (1995) do not examine which country-specific factors have impact on
disclosure levels.
More relevant to this study, Craig and Diga (1998) provide an early cross-country study in
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) region. Their focus was on common
patterns and differences in annual financial reporting disclosure required by the Companies
Acts, securities market regulation, and domestic accounting standards as at December 31,
1993 in five ASEAN countries (Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and
Thailand). They developed two checklists to access disclosure requirements and actual
disclosure practices by 145 firms in these countries: (1) a checklist of 530 items, each of
which was required to be disclosed in at least one of the five countries; and (2) a checklist of
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270 disclosure items, each of which was commonly required in at least four of the five
countries.
Craig and Diga (1998) find that 33 per cent (i.e. 177 items) of the 530 required disclosure
items were common across the five countries, whilst only 18 per cent were unique to each
country. They observe that these countries differ in the number of items which were required
to be disclosed, ranging from a half (by Indonesia) to three quarters (by Singapore) of the
total required disclosure items. Specifically, countries incorporated IAS into their domestic
disclosure rules prior to IFRS adoption, such as Malaysia, had a greater number of required
disclosed items relative to the remaining sample countries. Based on the second checklist of
270 disclosure items, Craig and Diga (1998) find that the mean level of annual financial
report disclosure is only just approximately half of the disclosure requirements. The authors
assert that the low level of disclosure is possibly because the expected costs associated may
outweigh the perceived benefits of providing information. In terms of determinant factors,
they show firm size has positive and statistically significant association with the disclosure
levels (as measured based on the checklist of 530 items), while foreign ownership is
negatively and statistically significant associated. They also reveal that industry groups and
country of origin are statistically significantly associated with the disclosure levels. Political
cost avoidance, as the authors assert, is a possible explanatory factor for the association
between the disclosure levels with firm size and industry group.
One of the limitations of Craig and Diga (1998) is the employment of the 530-item checklist
to compare the actual disclosure practices across the five ASEAN countries. It is possibly that
firms listed in a country wherein more disclosure requirements are imposed may achieve
higher levels of disclosure. Given that, the use of the 530-item checklist may promote a better
understanding of the possibility of accounting harmonisation in the region, but could be
inappropriate to make judgment and provide suggestion on the effectiveness of each
country’s enforcement mechanisms. Therefore, using a checklist of common items required
across the five countries, i.e. 177 items, could be better to determine the disclosure levels.
Further, even though all countries of origin were found to have significant association with
the disclosure levels, similar to Meek et al. (1995), Craig and Diga (1998) did not seek any
possible country-specific factors to explain the association. Accordingly, they emphasise ‘the
need for in-depth analysis of how and why various institutional and environmental factors
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influence the development of financial accounting systems in ASEAN’ (Craig & Diga, 1998,
p. 269).
In a similar setting, Tower, Hancock and Taplin (1999) investigate levels of IAS compliance
by examining the 1997 annual reports of 60 listed firms in six Asia-Pacific countries
(Australia, Hong Kong, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) based on the
twenty-six IASs applicable to 1997 financial-year end (i.e. IAS: 1, 2, 5, 7-11, 13, 14, 16-25,
27, 28, 30-33). A major difference with Craig and Diga (1998) is that annual reporting
disclosure is determined by IAS-based index, rather than all relevant authoritative disclosure
regulations. Across the region, Tower et al. (1999) report a high mean (90.68%) of IAS
compliance if non-disclosure is deemed as compliant, but a lower mean (42.2%) if non-
disclosure is deemed as non-compliant. Consistent with Craig and Diga (1998), Tower et al.
(1999) also reveal that country of origin is strongly related to levels of IAS compliance. In
particular, countries with accounting regulations that rely heavily on IAS (i.e. Australia,
Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore) have higher level of compliance than those relying on the
UK GAAP (i.e. Hong Kong) or the US GAAP (i.e. the Philippines). Tower et al. (1999) do
not find evidence supporting the relation between firm-level factors (size, leverage,
profitability, industry group) and the compliance levels. However, they reveal that reporting
lag shows a moderate negative association (significant at 10% level) with the compliance
levels. Similar to Craig and Diga (1998), Tower et al. (1999) do not seek to explain the
relation between the variations in IAS compliance levels and other country-specific factors
other than financial reporting rules assumption.
Taplin, Tower and Hancock (2002) extend Tower et al. (1999) by separating compliance
scores into measurement and disclosure compliance and creating a discernibility index to re-
examine the extent of annual reports complying with the twenty-six IAS applicable to 1997
financial year for firms in the six above-mentioned Asia-Pacific countries. The discernibility
index is the ratio of items disclosed and detectable to the total possible items subtracting any
obvious non-applicable items. They document that the levels of compliance are higher for
disclosure issues than measurement issues and vary with each accounting standard. Similar to
Tower et al. (1999), country of origin is significantly related to levels of compliance and
disclosure. Specially, the level of non-disclosure is lower for countries with common law
(Australia, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore) than for code law traditions (the
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Philippines and Thailand); a finding attributed to a stronger need by entities in common law
to meet their more extensive equity market demands. They also find that profitability has a
positive association with disclosure levels because more profitable firms are likely to disclose
more information as a means of conveying good news to minimise political costs.
Ali, Ahmed and Henry (2004) examine the factors influencing the level of disclosure
compliance with 14 IASs effective at the end of 1998 by 556 firms in three South Asia
countries (Bangladesh, India and Pakistan). The findings show that compliance levels are
highest for firms in Pakistan and lowest for firms in Bangladesh. The multiple regression
results indicate that multinational company status, profitability, and firm size are positively
significantly associated with the compliance levels. Ali et al. (2004) do not provide empirical
evidence on influential country-specific factors because the average compliance levels are not
statistically significantly different across the three countries.
The findings of Craig and Diga (1998), Tower et al. (1999), Taplin et al. (2002), and Ali et
al. (2004) may be less generalisable to more recent settings because they were carried out in
the pre-IFRS period, where more variation in accounting standards exists across the region
compared with the more recent IFRS-adoption period. Further, the impact of additional
disclosure requirements on disclosure levels due to IFRS-adoption had not been assessed.
Therefore, recent disclosure studies could increase the generalisability of these research
findings.
A number of cross-country studies have recently extended the early research to the IFRS
period. In one of the more relevant studies, Morris, Susilowati and Gray (2012) examine the
impact of IFRS adoption on eight Asian countries with a sample of 256 annual reports in pre-
IFRS (2002) and post-IFRS (2007). The findings reveal that IFRS adoption has significant
and positive impact on annual reporting disclosure. More specifically, the result from a series
of multivariate analyses with the inclusion of IFRS-adoption, other country-specific factors,
and firm-specific factors only consistently supports a positive relation between IFRS-
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adoption and the level of disclosure, as prediction.25 Further, by comparing the disclosure
levels of four IFRS-adopting countries (Australia, China, Hong Kong, and the Philippines) in
the two study years and their changes over the period relative to those of four IFRS non-
adopted countries (India, Japan, Malaysia, and Singapore), the authors find that IFRS
adoption has made a positive difference to disclosure levels in the region. Firms in China and
the Philippines achieved a substantial increase in disclosure levels as the countries shifted to
adopt IFRS. The findings also reveal the positively significant relation between disclosure
levels and firm leverage, number of business segments, multinational firms, and issuance of
equity or debt capital in the reporting year.
Morris et al. (2012) make a contribution to the literature of annual reporting disclosure by
showing the positive influence of IFRS adoption. However, their coding treatment of all non-
disclosure items as non-compliance without considering whether they are or are not
applicable to the reporting entities may introduce a downward bias in disclosure scores.26
This bias may be more severe in the non-IFRS-adoption country firms because they are
subjected to differing disclosure requirements.
In a European context, Glaum, Schmidt, Street and Vogel (2013) investigate levels of
disclosure by 357 firms in 17 European countries in conformity with IFRS 3 Business
Combinations and IAS 36 Impairment of Assets. They reveal considerable non-compliance
with the standards in the annual reports for 2005. In addition, they find that country- and
firm-specific factors jointly influence levels of compliance. In testing the joint effects of
country- and firm-specific factors on compliance levels, the findings indicate the influential
country factors are the strength of law enforcement, economic development, and national
25 Other country-level factors include legal origins, enforcement (measured by rule of law), similarity of local
accounting standards to IFRS, and national culture (measured by secrecy score). The measure of secrecy follows
Gray (1988) and is defined as a preference for confidentiality and the restriction of disclosure of information
about the business only to those who are closely involved with its management and financing.
26 Morris et al. (2012) acknowledge the advantages of the scoring method in which not-applicable items are
excluding from the determination of each firm’s disclosure index. However, they decided not to apply this
approach because of a large number of coders contributed to coding their dataset.
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culture.27 The findings confirm the positive association between law enforcement and
disclosure levels as revealed by prior research, such as Al-Shammari, Brown and Tarca
(2008) and Morris et al. (2012). In addition, they document various firm-specific factors
influencing the levels of compliance. Goodwill (ratio of goodwill to total asset), audit quality
(Big-4 auditing firms), presence of audit committee, and issuance of new capital are positive
and significantly associated with compliance levels; whilst ownership concentration and
financial sector categorisation exhibit a significant negative association.
3.3.2 Cross-country Studies on Annual Report Disclosures
In addition to cross-country studies on IAS/IFRS disclosure, researchers have investigated the
influence of country-specific factors on annual reporting disclosure using disclosure indices
provided by external rating agency; for example Center for International Financial Analysis
and Research (CIFAR),28 and the Transparency and Disclosure ratings prepared by Standard
and Poor’s.
Jaggi and Low (2000) examine the effect of country-level factors including legal origin,
national culture, and other firm-level factors on annual reporting disclosure levels, as
provided by CIFAR, achieved by 401 firms from six countries.29 The findings indicate that
firms in common-law countries disclose greater information than firms in code-law countries.
In addition to legal origin, they examine the relation between corporate disclosure and
national culture, measured as Hofstede’s (1984) cultural dimensions. However, the
conclusions are inconclusive as the findings show that culture values have either insignificant
or no impact on corporate disclosures in common-law countries, and provide mixed signals
for those in code law countries. The findings suggest that national culture has no significant
impact on annual reporting disclosure levels.
27 Law enforcement reflects the intensity degree of public enforcement, following Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes and Shleifer (2008). Economic development is measured by the size of national stock market. National
culture is measured by the degree to which individuals in a country are open (emphasising independent thought
and welcoming change) or conservative (emphasising restriction and resisting change).
28 CIFAR ratings are no longer available.
29 Jaggi and Low (2000) included Canada (n=22), France (n=36), Germany (n=25), Japan (n=77), UK (51), and
USA (n=190).
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With regard to firm-level factors, Jaggi and Low (2000) find that disclosure levels are
positively associated with multinational status of firms. Disclosure levels are also positively
associated with leverage of firms in common-law countries, but negatively related for firms
in code-law countries. Jaggi and Low (2000) assert that differences in nature of debt and the
related agency problem among these countries could be the reason for the inconsistent
association. Firms in common-law countries are financed more by public debt, and
experienced more agency problems, accordingly they are therefore likely to disclose greater
information to meet the debtors’ need for monitoring debt contracts. Meanwhile, this is not a
case for firms in code-law countries, which are financed more by private debt.
Archambault and Archambault (2003) extend the prior literature by utilising a larger sample
of firms (761) and countries (37) to investigate the association between a broad set of
country-specific factors and firm-related factors with the annual reporting disclosure levels
gathered from CIFAR. The findings reveal that the financial-disclosure decision is a function
of multiple country-specific factors (cultural, political, and economic) and firm-specific
factors (financial and operating).30
Hope (2003) also examines the influences of legal origin and national culture on annual
reporting disclosure levels, obtained from CIFAR, but employs a significantly larger and
more representative country sample than Jaggi and Low (2000) and Archambault and
Archambault (2003). Hope (2003) includes 1,883 observations from 42 countries in his test
for the effect of legal origin and 1,851 observations from 39 countries in his test for the
effects of both legal origin and national culture.31 Hope (2003) reveals that annual reporting
disclosures are significantly associated with both legal origin and national culture, even
though neither legal origin nor national culture alone dominates the overall explanatory
power for differing disclosure scores internationally. As for firm-specific factors, his findings
30 Corporate financial system variables included in their study are ownership, exchange listings, dividends,
auditors, and leverage; whereas corporate operating system variables are firm size, number of industries, and
foreign sales.
31 National culture was operationalised by Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, following the predominant literature
on cross-country studies, and by Schwartz’s (1994) cultural dimensions. Hope (2003) only includes two of
Schwartz’s dimensions, namely conservatism (primarily concerned with security, conformity, and tradition) and
mastery (promoting the active efforts of people to change their surroundings and get ahead of others).
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document that firm size and foreign listing status are positively related to disclosure levels,
whereas leverage is negatively related.
In a more recent study, Dong and Stettler (2011) re-examine the effects of various country-
and firm-level factors on corporate disclosure by using Transparency and Disclosure scores
provided by a survey by Standard and Poor’s in 2002. Their final sample includes 797 firms
from 34 countries. Country level variables include legal origin, national culture, economic
development, stock market development, and inflation. Multivariate analysis shows that
almost all country factors (except for the cultural value of uncertainty avoidance) are
significantly associated with disclosure levels. However, when employing multi-level
modelling, the results only indicate that the levels of disclosure are positively associated with
common law origin, the country’s economic growth, analysts’ recommendation, and degree
of multi-nationality.32 Further, the results of multi-level analysis reveal that firm size,
multiple listing and ownership diffusion are the firm factors having the most positive and
significant impact on disclosure scores.
Dong and Stettler (2011) introduce multi-level modelling by arguing that the method
overcomes the limitation of the single-level ordinary least squares (OLS) regression wherein
i) the share of common characteristics and perceptions by firms in the same home country is
ignored (referred to as the disaggregation method) or otherwise ii) the within-country
variations between individual firms are not evaluated (referred to as the aggregation method).
However, multi-level modelling requires a sample with a minimum of 30 countries (see, for
example, Hofmann, 1997; Maas & Hox, 2005). Notably, in a recent editorial on the
methodological issue for the use of multi-level modelling, Peterson, Arregle and Martin
(2012) advise that employment of regression-based techniques using solely either
disaggregated or aggregated analyses is preferable if the sample falls short of the
requirements for applying multi-level modelling.
In summary, the extant literature provides cross-country evidence of variations in level of
annual reporting disclosure and its association with country- as well as firm-specific factors.
32 Economic growth indicates the growth of national economic, which is measured by Gross Domestic Product
per capita growth.
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The key findings are summarised in Appendix I. The review in this section reveals that a
researcher-constructed index is the predominant approach for determining levels of reporting
compliance or disclosure. Multivariate analysis is the common method employed to
investigate factors influencing disclosure levels. Although the findings are not always
consistent, cross-country studies on annual reporting disclosure show that legal origin,
economic development, and national culture have impact on the levels of annual information
provided. However, there is still a lack of examination on the association of regulatory-
specific factors and annual reporting disclosure levels, which may also be applicable to
investigation of IR disclosure compliance practices.
As for firm-specific factors, firm size, foreign listing, and profitability are most consistently
found to have positive association with annual reporting disclosure levels. Leverage is not
consistently found to have association with levels of disclosure in annual reports. Audit
quality is also shown to have positive association with the disclosure levels in some prior
studies. The extant studies acknowledge that there is no single theory existing to explain
incentives for firms’ disclosure/compliance decision (e.g., Morris et al., 2012; Glaum et al.,
2013), but agency theory and cost-benefit analysis are the ones most commonly applied to
predict and explain the variations in annual reporting disclosure and the influential factors
(see, for example, Meek et al., 1995; Craig & Diga, 1998; Ali et al., 2004; Morris et al.,
2012; Glaum et al., 2013).
3.4 Summary
This chapter provides a review of the relevant literature focusing on research into interim
reporting disclosure compliance and annual reporting disclosure in cross-country settings.
The review highlights that the extant literature has extensively examined the level of
disclosure in annual reports prepared in accordance with IFRS and its associated factors,
whereas very little attention has been devoted to investigating cross-country IR regulations,
disclosure compliance in interim reports, and the associated factors. This suggests the need
for “compliance-based” disclosure research in the area of interim reporting.
The studies reviewed in this chapter have identified the association between annual reporting
disclosure levels and country-specific factors (such as legal origin, economic development,
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and national culture) as well as firm-specific factors (such as firm size, leverage, profitability,
foreign listing, and audit quality). Nevertheless, the empirical evidence on the association
between those factors with IR disclosure levels is sparse. As a consequence, a theoretical
framework for financial reporting disclosure is not well established leading to the use of
various general theories to explain differences in disclosure levels. Drawing on the prior
disclosure research, the next chapter presents the theoretical framework and hypothesis
development relating to the factors influencing cross-country variations in IR disclosure
compliance.
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CHAPTER 4: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESIS
DEVELOPMENT
As discussed in Chapter 3, in the absence of a single theory to justify disclosure choices, prior
studies have utilised different theories to explain variations in disclosure practices. To
address the research questions defined in Chapter 1, the common theories used in the prior
literature are reviewed in this chapter to inform the development of the study’s theoretical
framework (Section 4.1) and related hypotheses (Section 4.2).
4.1 Theoretical Framework
Disclosure is widely regarded as a means of reducing information asymmetry and allowing
for a greater monitoring role by outside investors, which may benefit all capital market
participants (see, for example, Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991; Scott, 1997; Core, 2001; Healy
& Palepu, 2001; Francis, Huang, Khurana, & Pereira, 2009). However, the challenge in
developing theories on corporate disclosure is still evident in a number of prior studies on
disclosure. Many researchers recognises a lack of a unified theory of (mandatory) disclosure
(see, for example, Dong & Stettler, 2011; Morris et al., 2012; Glaum et al., 2013), although
they recommend that the development of a comprehensive theory should be based on the
principle of addressing information asymmetry (see, for example, Dye, 2001; Healy &
Palepu, 2001; Verrecchia, 2001). More recently, Beyer, Cohen, Lys and Walther (2010)
suggest that information provided (voluntarily, mandatorily, and by analysts) to the capital
market may vary in extent due to the costs and benefits of the disclosure.
The primary focus of this study is to examine cross-country variations in the nature and
extent of IR disclosure compliance by firms. Interim reports released by firms across the
Asia-Pacific region are subject to the constraints of each country’s disclosure regulation, as
discussed in Chapter 2. As such, the firms’ disclosure practices and strategies are likely to be
influenced by the differences in disclosure requirements because these differences impose
legal restraints on the release of interim reports. Following suggestions by prior studies, this
research applies agency theory in the context of information economics to explain the
variations in IR disclosure compliance levels by firms across the region. The central premise
42
of the theoretical framework is that the firms’ managers trade-off the related costs and
benefits in their decisions on IR disclosure levels. The following provide explanations on the
selection of the theory.
The trade-off between costs and benefits related to corporate disclosures has been discussed
in various other theories in the extant literature, which include legitimacy theory, stakeholder
theory, political economic theory, agency theory, signalling theory, and proprietary cost
theory. Notably, the underlying commonality of the six theories is that cost-benefit trade-offs
are taken into account when the regulator decides to impose new requirements and/or when
firms make disclosure decisions. The underlying principles of these theories are the
incentives and considerations of costs in relation to benefits by types of disclosures (Cotter,
Lokman, & Najah, 2011).33 The authors highlight that while the socio-political based theories
(legitimacy theory, stakeholder theory, and political economic theory) explain differences in
firms’ behaviours towards voluntary disclosure by using social and/or political factors;
economic based theories (agency theory, signalling theory, and proprietary cost theory)
explain the variations on voluntary disclosure by focusing on the firms’ wealth maximisation.
Accordingly, each type of disclosures (such as strategic and forward looking, financial, and
non-financial information) is appropriately explained by using the most relevant theory. The
adoption of this approach helps researchers explain differences in disclosure levels among
firms, which can be inferred from the cost-benefit relation for firms in specific context (e.g.,
Depoers, 2000; Bellora & Guenther, 2013). In particular, Bellora and Guenther (2013)
highlight that the cost-benefit approach has been used by a number of prior studies under
various theories (such as agency theory, legitimacy theory, and stakeholder theory) to explain
disclosure behaviour.
This study argues that information economics theory may best explain the complex
phenomenon of (both mandatory and voluntary) disclosure, because it seeks to address
information asymmetry by considering cost-benefit trade-offs relating to disclosure in order
to prioritise disclosure items (Healy & Palepu, 2001; Johansen & Plenborg, 2013). The
33 See Cotter et al. (2011) for the comparison of similarities and differences of the six theories, which are most
often applied in the voluntary disclosure.
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information economic theory has been applied to examine the extent to which market and
other institutions have processed and communicated information since 1970s (Stiglitz, 2008).
Information economics theory, with its focus on market information asymmetry and the
economic value of information, was established by the three seminal works by Akerlof
(1970), Spence (1973), and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). In his seminal contribution,
Akerlof (1970) first formally analyses adverse selection in the product market whereby the
seller has more information than the buyer. Spence (1973) analyses information asymmetry,
also in the form of adverse selection, between the employee and the employer in the labour
market whereby the employee has an information advantage about its characteristics and
potential working productivity. Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) analyse information
asymmetry in the insurance market whereby people buying insurance have an information
advantage about their potential risks over insurance companies.
Information asymmetry is emphasised in agency theory. The theory suggests that agency
costs and information asymmetry arise from the separation of the ownership (the investor)
and control (the manager) (e.g., Jensen & Meckling, 1976); and information asymmetry is
fundamental to many accounting and corporate governance studies (e.g., Keasey & Wright,
1993; Nobes, 2014). Information asymmetry can exist in the form of adverse selection or
moral hazard (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989; Scott, 1997). With adverse selection, managers may
exploit their information advantage at the expense of investors by managing information
disclosure; consequently, investors’ investment decisions could be affected because of
managers’ disclosure behaviour. With moral hazard, managers may lack effort in order to
achieve the firm’s goal. Consequently, they may manage reported earnings to distort and
conceal the reality. Notably, agency theory originates from the field of information
economics and has been one of the most important theoretical paradigms in accounting,
which allows accounting researchers to explicitly incorporate conflicts of interest, incentive
problems, and mechanisms for controlling the incentives problems (see, for example,
Eisenhardt, 1989; Lambert, 2001).
Dealing with the agency problem in accounting, particularly disclosure research, information
economics theory does not distinguish regulated and unregulated disclosure and formally
recognises the existence of information asymmetry, in which some parties to business
transactions, or potential transactions, may have an information advantage over others (Scott,
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1997). Information asymmetry adds costs into buying-selling transactions of firm shares; and
a commitment to increased levels of disclosure lowers information asymmetries arising either
between the firms (managers) and investors or among investors (Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000).
The managers’ consideration for the extent of disclosure includes an assessment of the
perceived information value or usefulness to market participants (Wee, Tarca, & Chang,
2014).
In relation to mandatory disclosure, costs and benefits arise from the regulators, the preparers,
and from the users of information. Easterbrook and Fischel (1984) provide detailed
discussion of costs and benefits of mandatory disclosure. Cost-benefit trade-offs, for the
regulators, are associated with the imposition and enforcement of mandatory disclosure
policies. For the preparers, direct costs of mandatory disclosure relate to a process of
compiling and disclosing information; while indirect costs are proprietary cost and social
cost. Regarding the users of information, the costs of information dissemination and
information noise are weighed against the benefits of making better investment decisions
based on greater information. Empirical research provides evidences supporting the
application of information economics theory in prioritising disclosure strategy by revealing
that disclosure level is low for items being costly to preparers (for example notes to business
combination, financial instruments, and impairment tests) even though they are highly
demanded by the information user (e.g., Johansen & Plenborg, 2013).
Information economics theory is also an appropriate theoretical framework for empirical
analyses of voluntary disclosure because the theory suggests that firms which make voluntary
disclosures could reduce manager-investor information asymmetry, transaction costs,
investors’ estimation risk, and ultimately will lower cost of capital (e.g., Diamond &
Verrecchia, 1991; Botosan, 1997; Healy & Palepu, 2001; Botosan, 2006; Artiach & Clarkson,
2011, 2014). Although voluntary disclosure is primarily used to solve the agency problem, it
is constrained by information costs (e.g., Meek et al., 1995; Depoers, 2000; Shi, Magnan, &
Kim, 2012). In this regard, it is reasonable to argue that firms will elect to voluntarily provide
additional information only if the underlying benefits of those disclosures are expected to
exceed the associated costs (see, for example, Hayes & Lundholm, 1996; Shi et al., 2012).
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In conclusion, this research argues that the level of IR disclosure compliance is determined
by the managers’ ‘weighing-up’ the trade-offs between costs and benefits related to
disclosure in order to mitigate information asymmetry and agency problems. The application
of agency theory in the context of information economics theory is more appropriate to offer
insights into the phenomena of disclosure, given that managers seek to mitigate information
asymmetry (agency problem) by trading off the cost and benefits of disclosure when facing
with external reporting decisions (the economic value of information). Therefore, the
following section develops hypotheses to address the research questions employing the
information economics theory.
4.2 Hypothesis Development
The first research question investigates how IR disclosure compliance varies across the Asia-
Pacific region. As documented in Chapter 2, IR regulations vary in the stage of IR-adoption,
the audit requirement, the type of mandatory interim reports (quarterly or half-yearly), and
regulatory lag (allowable time for lodging interim reports) across the region. As such, listed
firms in different countries are subject to different disclosure requirements for interim
reporting disclosure. Consequently, IR disclosure compliance levels are likely to differ across
the sample countries because the diverse disclosure requirements impose differing legal
constraints for managers on the preparation and release of these reports. However, their
decisions on the level of IR disclosure compliance are dependent on the trade-off between
costs and benefits of the underlying disclosure. This section presents four hypotheses
developed to examine what factors are associated with IR disclosure compliance in the Asia-
Pacific region (the second research question). The hypotheses focus on the four IR-related
attributes that vary across the region, including the position of IFRS-adoption of the country,
the auditor involvement in interim reports, the reporting frequency, and the reporting lag.
4.2.1 Hypothesis One – IFRS adoption
IFRS adoption (IFRS) refers to each country’s current position for IFRS adoption. IFRS-
adopting countries are expected to provide high-quality financial reports because the IASB’s
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standards are ‘high quality, understandable, enforceable and globally accepted international
financial reporting standards’.34 Generally, the IASB’s standards are perceived to be of high
quality because of the greater number of mandatory disclosures, and more accurate
information content resulting from adopting the underlying measurement rules relative to
domestic standards (see, for example, Daske, 2006; Daske & Gebhardt, 2006; Christensen,
Hail, & Leuz, 2013). Prior research suggests that IFRS adoption leads to better disclosure
(see, for example, Ashbaugh & Pincus, 2001; Ding, Hope, Jeanjean, & Stolowy, 2007).
Notably, a recent study by Morris et al. (2012) reveals that the IFRS adoption is associated
with an improvement in the annual reporting disclosure levels of listed firms in the Asia-
Pacific countries. Additionally, Horton, Serafeim and Serafeim (2013) show that mandatory
IFRS adoption improves the information environment.35
As IAS 34 is a component of the set of IAS/IFRS, the impact of adoption IAS 34 on IR
disclosure levels is expected to be consistent with that of IFRS adoption. Firms in IFRS-
adoption countries are likely to provide more information than those in non-IFRS adoption
ones because IFRS imposes stricter disclosure requirements and demands more detailed
disclosure. As such, firms in IFRS-adoption countries are likely to achieve higher levels of
disclosure in order to avoid greater costs associated with non-compliance. Hence, consistent
with information economics theory, firms from IFRS-adoption countries (Australia, Hong
Kong, Malaysia, and the Philippines) are more likely to have higher compliance with IR
disclosure regulations than those from non-IFRS adopting counterparts (Singapore, Thailand
and Vietnam). It is therefore hypothesised that:
H1 IR disclosure compliance is higher for firms in countries which have
adopted IFRS.
34 As stated in its constitution on its website, see at http://www.ifrs.org/The-organisation/Pages/IASCF-and-
IASB.aspx. This IASB’s objectives are also pronounced in its IFRS publication, such as International Financial
Reporting Standards - Part A (IASB, 2011).
35 The extent of disclosure is only one aspect of disclosure quality as prior studies contend that researchers
cannot assess disclosure quality purely based on disclosure level (see the discussion in Beattie, McInnes, &
Fearnley, 2004). As such, the adoption of IFRS could improve disclosure level (relative quality), but not
necessarily enhance the overall quality of financial reporting (high quality).
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4.2.2 Hypothesis Two – Audit Type
Audit type (ATYP) refers to the extent to which external assurance is used for IR. As
discussed in Chapter 2, audit requirements for the sample interim reports vary across the
region. Australia requires a full audit or audit review for the interim reports, whereas
Thailand and Vietnam mandate an audit review. The four remaining countries (Hong Kong,
Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines) have no formal assurance requirement for IR;
however, firms in these four countries may voluntarily engage an auditor to review their
interim reports at the discretion of management.
The literature has long recognised both external and internal audits as important resources in
enhancing the reliability of financial reporting (e.g., Whittington, 1993; James, 2003; Rezaee,
2005; Bédard & Gendron, 2010; Kajüter, Klassmann, & Nienhaus, 2014). Given that the
auditor serves as an external and objective check of financial reports, its involvement
increases the firms’ incentive to disclosure more information (e.g., Clarkson, Ferguson, &
Hall, 2003; Mangena & Pike, 2005). Accordingly, researchers suggest imposing requirements
for auditing interim reports in order to improve the IR compliance levels (e.g., McEwen &
Schwartz, 1992; Tan & Tower, 1997) and increase the relevance and faithfulness of the
reports (e.g., Lightstone, Young, & McFadden, 2012).
Prior research also suggests that firms which voluntarily elect to have annual reports audited
or interim report reviewed by an auditor are ones that have higher agency costs and perceive
the benefits exceed the incremental costs (e.g., Ettredge, Simon, Smith, & Stone, 1994;
Collis, Jarvis, & Skerratt, 2004; Mangena & Tauringana, 2008; Collis, 2010, 2012). In
particular, audit review of interim reports potentially increases the credibility of the
disclosure and accordingly reduces agency costs (Ettredge et al., 1994) and also enhances
information content of earnings (e.g., Manry, Tiras, & Wheatley, 2003; Kajüter et al., 2014).
Moreover, quarterly audit reviews improve both interim and annual financial reporting
quality, which is measured by earning quality (Lee, Kang, Oh, & Pyo, 2014). In the context
of interim reporting, prior studies find a positive association between voluntary auditor
involvement and the level of IR disclosure in a single-country setting (Mangena & Pike,
2005; Mangena & Tauringana, 2007). Although these prior IR disclosure studies do not
distinguish mandatory and voluntary disclosure, the impact of auditors on IR voluntary and
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discretionary disclosure may be less than on mandatory disclosure due to the auditor liability.
In particular, where there is some uncertainty about the need for a disclosure (voluntary) or
the extent/quality of disclosure required to meet a mandatory requirement (discretionary) then
auditors would be more likely to ignore an omitted or poor disclosure than if there is no
uncertainty about a mandatory disclosure requirement.
All things considered, the audit or review of IR imposes more constraints on the preparers
regarding reporting quality, which potentially leads to greater and more credible IR
disclosure. As a client, the preparer is likely to provide sufficient information to comply with
IR regulations; otherwise they will bear the costs incurred by the auditor’s negative opinion
or comments. As such, consistent with information economics theory, firms which have
engaged an external auditor to review their IR are more likely to have higher disclosure
compliance than those who issue their reports without the auditor’s involvement. It is
therefore hypothesised that:
H2 IR disclosure compliance is higher for firms with audit-reviewed interim
reports.
4.2.3 Hypothesis Three – Reporting Frequency
Reporting frequency (RFRE) in this study is either the alternative of mandatory quarterly
reporting or half-yearly reporting across jurisdictions. There is no empirical evidence that
support the association between IR frequency and disclosure compliance levels. However, it
could be argued that firms are likely to provide more information in half-yearly reports
relative to quarterly reports given that reporting period and operational cycles may influence
their business activities. Firms also may provide greater information in half-yearly reports
because a larger amount of transactions occurred as compared to the quarterly frequency. One
other possible reason could be that external auditors have often engaged in the disclosed half-
yearly reports, which may lead to better disclosure in half-yearly reporting relative to
quarterly reporting, as discussed previously. Moreover, it is possible that preparers provide
greater information in half-yearly reporting to meet the users’ need as a compensation for the
less frequent disclosures, thereby gaining more benefits. This suggests that higher levels of
compliance would be evident in half-yearly reporting.
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However, some countries have opted for continuous disclosure regimes (Australia), or
disclosure of price sensitive information (Hong Kong), rather than prescribing the more
frequent quarterly reporting. In continuous disclosure regimes where the exchange rules are
re-enforced by securities regulations, the penalties for non-disclosure are much stronger. As
such, the capital markets may not rely on less frequent interim reports (half-yearly) because
more timely information is pre-empted through continuous disclosure.36 Further, firms may
have incentives to issue preliminary earnings and sales announcements or voluntary quarterly
reports. In this regard, half-yearly information may be (at least partially) pre-empted through
other forms of disclosures, leading to lower levels of disclosure relative to the levels provided
by firms in (mandatory) quarterly reporting jurisdictions.
Overall, given the competing arguments, it is not clear whether firms with mandatory half-
yearly reporting (Australia, Hong Kong, and Vietnam)37 or those with mandatory quarterly
reporting (Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and Thailand) are likely to have greater
compliance levels. Stated in the null form, it is hypothesised that:
H3 There is no association between IR disclosure compliance and reporting
frequency (quarterly versus half-yearly).
4.2.4 Hypothesis Four – Reporting Lag
Reporting lag (RLAG) refers to the time taken from reporting period end to the lodgement of
the IR with the relative stock exchanges. Generally, the firms that have less constraints on
time with a longer regulatory lag have a longer period to prepare their IR. However, under the
Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting issued by the IASB, timeliness is one of
enhancing qualitative characteristics of useful financial information (IASB, 2011, Conceptual
Framework, para. QC4). Timeliness means ‘having information available to decision-makers
36 It should be noted however, continuous disclosure regulations also exist with mandatory quarterly reporting.
For example, Singapore Exchange’s Rulebooks require listed firms to disclose immediately price sensitive
information (see, SGX, 2011, Rule 703). Similar requirements are imposed for listed firms in Malaysia (see,
BMSB, 2012, para. 9.03 & 9.04).
37 As discussed in Chapter 2, Vietnamese listed firms are required to disclose both quarterly and half-yearly
reports. In this research, the half-yearly reports for this country are used in the main analysis (Chapter 6) and
quarterly reports are examined in the robustness analysis (Section 7.1.5).
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in time to be capable of influencing their decisions’ (IASB, 2011, Conceptual Framework,
QC29). Timely disclosure is important to capital markets because it promotes market
efficiency by allowing markets to respond to earnings announcement or material changes
rapidly, and alerting all market participants to developments that may impact their investment
decisions (see, for example, Sarra, 2007). In addition to examining disclosure levels as an
indicator of information quality (Beattie et al., 2004; Beretta & Bozzolan, 2008), timeliness
of IR disclosure is characterised as one of properties of information quality (Aktaş & Kargin,
2011; Glaum et al., 2013).
However, there is little empirical evidence on the association between reporting lag and
disclosure levels. Tower et al. (1999) provide some support for the negative relation between
actual reporting lag with the level of annual reporting disclosure by listed firms in the six
Asia-Pacific countries.38
The literature does however provide evidences supporting the deliberate delay of news (good
news early, bad news late) (see, Verrecchia, 1983; Begley & Fischer, 1998; Leventis &
Weetman, 2004; Kothari, Shu, & Wysocki, 2009; Brown, Christensen, & Elliott, 2012). As
such, there are a number of reasons why firms may take longer to release the reports.  Bad
new could lead to a delay in completing the audit of financial reports. Auditor conservatism
requiring a greater deal of verifiability may delay the release of the financial reports. Further,
managers may deliberately postpone disclosure of bad news so as to lower proprietary costs;
to have more time for completing contract negotiations at their favourable terms, for
preparing responses to possible criticism or a plan to reverse the poor performance (e.g.,
Verrecchia, 1983; Begley & Fischer, 1998). Further, prior studies also suggest that managers
are likely to withhold bad news to enhance the firm’s market capitalisation and mitigate the
cost associated with disclosure of such unfavourable information (see, Verrecchia, 1983;
Verrecchia, 2001). The delay of bad news however is inconsistent with a litigation
hypothesis, which indicates that bad news is released quickly to avoid litigation. This is also
38 They include Australia, Hong Kong, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand with a small sample
size (10 listed firms each across 6 countries). In their study, reporting lag is measured as the actual days from
the end of the fiscal period to the date disclosed on the Directors Reports, whilst differences in regulatory lag are
not taken into account. As such, their results should be interpreted with caution.
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inconsistent with the asymmetric verification of bad news relative to good news as evidenced
in the principle of conservatism (see, for example, Basu, 1997; Kothari et al., 2009).
This study employs reporting lag to investigate the association between timeliness of
reporting and variations in IR disclosure compliance since reporting lags differ both within
and between the countries due to varying regulatory lags, as documented in Chapter 2. The
literature discussed above suggests there are competing factors which may influence the
propensity to release information earlier or later. Given the competing arguments, it is
therefore hypothesised, stated in the null form, that:
H4 There is no association between IR disclosure compliance and reporting lag.
4.2.5 Control Factors
Drawing from the prior disclosure studies, particularly those reviewed in Chapter 3, other
factors are also included to control for the association between IR-related factors with the
levels of IR disclosure compliance across the region. They consist of firm-specific factors
(size, leverage, profitability, foreign listing and audit quality)39 and country non-IR regulatory
factors (legal origin, economic development, and culture).
Firm size (SIZE): One of the most common factors examined in disclosure studies is firm
size. Dong and Stettler (2011) suggest that firm size is the only determinant which is
consistently documented by almost all prior studies to be associated with disclosure. The
extant literature argues that larger firms are likely to benefit more from providing greater
information than smaller ones because the larger firms are likely to have lower costs due to
competitive advantages (e.g., Buzby, 1975; Meek et al., 1995), may be less prone to suffer
from competitive losses (e.g., Meek et al., 1995), and may best afford a costly extensive
reporting and disclosure system (e.g., Singhvi & Desai, 1971; Buzby, 1975; Meek et al.,
39 Ownership structure is often found to have influence on voluntary disclosure, rather than mandatory
disclosure. The primary argument for this association is that managers have more incentives to disclose greater
voluntary disclosure to mitigate the monitoring cost by outside shareholders (see, for example, Eng & Mak,
2003). This incentive could be different from that for the mandatory disclosure compliance. Further, time
constraints and data collection difficulties prevent the researcher from collecting additional data. Consequently,
ownership structure is not included as a control variable in this thesis.
52
1995; Depoers, 2000; Ali et al., 2004). In addition, larger firms may have more incentives to
provide enhanced disclosure. For example, they tend to seek far more external financial
resources than smaller firms (e.g., Singhvi & Desai, 1971; Ali et al., 2004), and therefore
need to provide adequate information in order to obtain the resources cheaper and easier.
Greater disclosure also enables larger firms to lessen undesired pressure from the government
or political costs (e.g., Buzby, 1975; Cooke, 1989; Watts & Zimmerman, 1990; Ahmed &
Courtis, 1999), to sustain their public image or reputation (Ali et al., 2004), or to respond to
larger informational expectations of a wider spread ownership (Ahmed & Courtis, 1999).
The positive association between firm size and disclosure levels has been found in both cross-
and within-country studies. Cross-national research revealing the positive link includes Meek
et al. (1995); Hope (2003); Ali et al. (2004); and Dong and Stettler (2011). Since empirical
evidence as to the relation between firm size and disclosure levels is generally consistent,
there has been a large number of researchers showing the positive relation in a single-country
setting (see, for example, Singhvi & Desai, 1971; Cooke, 1992; Wallace, Naser, & Mora,
1994; Botosan, 1997; Depoers, 2000; Gallery, Cooper, & Sweeting, 2008; Palmer, 2008;
Dong & Stettler, 2011). However, a few studies fail to find the association (e.g, Tower et al.,
1999; Taplin et al., 2002; Glaum et al., 2013). This could be due to small sample size (Tower
et al., 1999; Taplin et al., 2002) or a sample homogeneity (Glaum et al., 2013).
Leverage (LEV): Agency theory suggests that highly leveraged firms have higher agency
costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Smith & Warner, 1979). In the presence of increasing
leverage, firms have more incentive to provide more external information to reduce
monitoring and agency costs. Greater disclosure may better facilitate creditors’ monitoring
and assessment of their activity and reduces inherent costs, including costs of debt (e.g.,
Smith & Warner, 1979; Dhaliwal, Salamon, & Smith, 1982).
Prior disclosure studies provide inconsistent results regarding the association between
disclosure and leverage. While some prior studies reveal the positive association (e.g.,
Ahmed & Courtis, 1999; Francis, Khurana, & Pereira, 2005; Palmer, 2008), others report a
negative (e.g., Meek et al., 1995; Tan & Tower, 1999) or insignificant association (e.g., Ho &
Wong, 2001; Gallery et al., 2008; Khlif & Souissi, 2010; Dong & Stettler, 2011).
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Profitability (PRO): Prior research maintains that highly profitable firms are likely to
disclose more information to show the firms’ success because the firms’ managers have
greater motivation for increasing the confidence of investors and, accordingly, management
compensation (see, for example, Singhvi & Desai, 1971). In addition, higher performing
firms may inspire the managers to produce more information to distinguish themselves from
other firms, thereby gaining more benefits for the firms resulting from such distinctive
strategy (e.g., Dye, 1985; Meek et al., 1995). The extant literature provides inconsistent
findings on the association between profitability and disclosure levels. For example, while the
positive association has been found in some studies (e.g., Wallace & Naser, 1995; Taplin et
al., 2002; Ali et al., 2004; Gallery et al., 2008; Palmer, 2008; Uyar & Kiliç, 2012); others
reveal this association to be not significant (e.g., Ahmed & Courtis, 1999; Dong & Stettler,
2011). This inconsistency could be due to differences in the degree of perceived information
asymmetry between managers and investors (Lang & Lundholm, 1993) or differences in type
of disclosure (Ahmed & Courtis, 1999).
Foreign listing (FOR): A foreign (multiple) listing firm is expected to disclose greater
information than a domestic listing firm since the former is exposed to additional disclosure
rules that are imposed by various stock exchanges and accounting regulations. Higher access
to capital also offers another reason to explain the connection between multiple listings and
the need to disclose more information. Those firms with greater information disclosure may
derive more benefit, such as enjoying a lower cost of capital, from meeting foreign financial
providers’ demands for information to assess investees’ worthiness (e.g., Cooke, 1992; El-
Gazzar, Finn, & Jacob, 1999). Moreover, multiple-listed firms are likely to be pressured to
supply more information because they are indeed exposed to more public surveillance (e.g.,
Cooke, 1992; Meek et al., 1995; Fernandes & Ferreira, 2008), have more shareholders, and
are more vulnerable to monitoring costs (Herrmann & Thomas, 1996). Hence, a positive
association between a firm’s disclosure extent and its foreign-listing status is reported in a
number of prior studies (see, for example, Meek & Gray, 1989; Cooke, 1992; Meek et al.,
1995; Inchausti, 1997; Dong & Stettler, 2011).
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Auditor quality (AUD): Audit quality is considered another determinant of corporate
disclosure quality, often measured as the top tier audit firms.40 An external audit, as part of
governance quality, is widely viewed as a controlling mechanism to mitigate information
asymmetry between investors and managers and reduce agency costs (e.g., Depoers &
Jeanjean, 2012; Luypaert & Van Caneghem, 2014).
The extant literature generally supports the auditor quality argument. A large number of
previous studies show a positive relation between audit quality and disclosure levels, for
example: Singhvi and Desai (1971), Inchausti (1997), Street and Gray (2002), Glaum and
Street (2003), Abdelsalam and Weetman (2007), Gallery et al. (2008), Palmer (2008),
Dahawy (2009), and Uyar and Kiliç (2012). Notably, a recent meta-analysis of Khlif and
Souissi (2010) also confirms the positive association. By contrast, a few studies do not find
that audit quality impacts on disclosure levels (e.g., Wallace et al., 1994; Alsaeed, 2006). One
possible explanation for the disconnection between audit quality and disclosure is that the
role of auditors is very limited to the boundaries of mandatory requirement (Alsaeed, 2006).
Industry Type (IND): Prior research shows that the variation in information provided by
firms is partly because of dissimilar rules and regulations applicable to each industry sector.
Wallace et al. (1994) argue that the peculiarities of firms in a specific industry sector might
induce them to apply additional disclosure requirements than those compulsory required for
all industries. As a consequence, the extent of disclosure differs across industries (e.g., Street
& Gray, 2002; Gallery et al., 2008; Omar & Simon, 2011). Yet other studies fail to show the
industry-disclosure relationship (e.g., Palmer, 2008).
Legal origin (LEG): The origins of each country’s legal regime are commonly grouped into
two families: common law and code law (see, for example; La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes,
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998; Nguyen, 1999; Tilleke & Gibbins, 2011). International accounting
research suggests that accounting principles and practices are different between common law
and code law countries (e.g., Seidler, 1967; Salter & Doupnik, 1992; Barniv, Myring, &
Thomas, 2005). More specifically, the influence of a country’s legal origin on corporate
disclosure is shown by its impact on accounting standard quality and law enforcement to
40 The Big-4 auditing firms generally refer to Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers.
55
protect investors, which may result from the design and enforcement of securities laws.
Common law countries offer stronger investor protection because of their emphasis on
private contracting, standardised disclosure with higher quality of accounting standards, and
their reliance on private dispute resolution using market-friendly standards of liability (La
Porta et al., 1998; La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2006). Importantly, differences in
investors’ protection between code law and common law countries are largely and powerfully
exerted by the countries’ rules, rather than their politics and media; and mandatory disclosure
is a very notable example of common law countries’ broader strategy for socially controlling
business activities (Djankov et al., 2008).
The influence of legal origins on financial disclosure practices are rooted in the differences in
agency problems in the two legal systems (Hope, 2003). Common laws countries are
normally more market-oriented than code law countries (Ball, 2006) with greater reliance on
equity-financing (see, Hung, 2000; Lueg, Punda, & Burkert, 2014). La Porta et al. (1998)
reveal that shareholders and creditors are better protected by common laws than by code
laws. As such, even though their study does not explore disclosure rules and regulations
imposed by stock exchanges, the findings suggest that disclosure and listing rules in common
law countries are of a higher quality than those in code-law countries, given that additional
rules from stock exchanges are aimed at safeguarding investors. Other empirical studies also
show the positive effects of common law origins on the level of disclosure (e.g., Jaggi &
Low, 2000; Hope, 2003; Dong & Stettler, 2011).
However, recent studies criticise the use of a simple dummy variable of legal origin (i.e.
common versus code law measure) in financial accounting research. For example, Lindahl
and Schadéwitz (2013) argue against the internal validity of the legal origin variable because
of a lack of explanation for the linkage between differences in legal system and financial
reporting quality, and the differences in investor protection between law families influenced
by other country-factors. In this regard, legal origin is included in a robustness test, rather
than in the main test.
Economic development (ECO): Prior research finds that economic development and
environment are important to the development of accounting and disclosure systems (e.g.,
Belkaoui, 1983; Choi & Meek, 2011); and corporate transparency or information
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environment has evolved in response to economic development (e.g., Francis et al., 2009).
Therefore, differences in the stage of economic development (i.e. advanced or emerging
economies) possibly lead to variation in accounting practices and disclosure behaviour. Prior
research indicates the link between economic development and corporate financial disclosure
(e.g., Dong & Stettler, 2011). A positive association between economic development and
financial reporting disclosures could be because firms need to raise more capital when the
economy becomes more developed, and therefore need to provide greater financial
information (Archambault & Archambault, 2003). Empirical studies provide evidence
supporting a positive relation between disclosure levels and economic development (Salter,
1998; La Porta et al., 2006; Dong & Stettler, 2011; Glaum et al., 2013). Similar to legal
origin, economic development is included in a robustness test to inform if additional
contextual factors are associated with IR disclosure compliance.
National Culture (CUL): Culture is examined in the disclosure literature as an informal
institution potentially influencing disclosure practices. Hope (2003) asserts that national
culture is an important determinant explaining differences in financial reporting disclosures
across countries. Other empirical cross-country studies find that national culture has
significant influence on disclosure scores (e.g., Dong & Stettler, 2011; Glaum et al., 2013).
However, the findings from Jaggi and Low (2000) suggest that national culture does not have
significant impact on annual reporting disclosure. Hence, this country non-IR related variable
is also augmented into the base model for checking the robustness of the primary findings.
4.3 Summary
This chapter outlines the theoretical framework and hypotheses used to address the research
questions. The theoretical framework is based on disclosure theory in the context of
information economics. According to this theory, managers trade-off the underlying costs and
benefits in their disclosure decisions. Applying this theory to a mandatory disclosure
environment, managers are expected to exercise discretion in the extent of their disclosure
compliance. Those firms who are better able to capitalise on the benefits of disclosure are
expected to be better compliant and provide more useful disclosure compared with firms less
able to exploit those benefits.
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Based on this disclosure theory it is predicted that certain IR-related factors impact on the
cost-benefit relationship leading to differences in the extent of disclosure compliance with IR
requirements. Specifically, disclosure compliance levels are expected to be higher for firms
that have adopted IFRS (H1), engage an auditor to review their IR (H2); but not to be
associated with reporting frequency (H3) and reporting lag (H4). The following chapter
describes the research method and design used to test the four hypotheses.
58
CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This chapter describes the research design to examine cross-country variations in IR
disclosure compliance and the association with IR-related factors. The chapter proceeds as
follows. Section 5.1 outlines the sample selection procedure and sample characteristics.
Section 5.2 describes the method used to measure IR disclosure and the resulting interim
reporting disclosure indices. Section 5.3 discusses the validity of the IR disclosure index.
Section 5.4 describes the research design for testing the hypothesised association between
cross-country variations in IR disclosure compliance and IR-related factors. Finally, Section
5.5 provides the concluding comments.
5.1 Sample Selection and Characteristics
5.1.1 Selection of Countries and IR Regulations
As indicated in Chapter 1, the focus of this study is on the nature and extent of IR disclosure
compliance in the Asia-Pacific region. The sample consists of seven countries: Australia,
Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam. These countries
are selected because they represent a broad cross-section of Asia-Pacific countries, a mix of
IR regulatory aspects and other country non-IR regulatory attributes (such as legal origin,
economic development, and culture) with financial reports and regulations produced in
English.41 Given these differences, the sample allows the examination of how IR disclosure
compliance level varies across the region including the impact of country-specific factors.
Differences in IR relevant regulations, as articulated in Chapter 2, potentially impact IR
disclosure practices by firms across countries. As such, the selection and comparison of the
seven Asia-Pacific countries’ IR regulations serve as the foundation steps for investigating IR
disclosure compliance and the influential factors across the region. In addition to IAS 34, IR
41 The selection of sample countries is mainly based on the diversity in IR regulation, which is readable by the
researcher. As such, sample countries were finalised after the researcher’s review of the relevant regulations and
accounting standards. Initially, the selection includes Japan. However, the country is excluded from the final
sample because Japanese accounting standards have not been fully translated into English. Vietnam is an
exception, where listed firms provide IR in Vietnamese, which is the researcher’s native language.
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regulations that are analysed and compared consist of the domestic IR accounting standards,
corporations (companies) regulations, securities regulations, and stock exchange listing and
disclosure rules.
5.1.2 Selection of Companies
The sample consists of the top 100 listed firms by market capitalisation as at December 31,
2011 for the main stock exchange in each of the seven countries, as identified from the Osiris
(via Bureau Van Dijk) database.42 Accordingly, the final sample consists of 700 firms.
Mining exploration entities are excluded because many of their periodic disclosures are made
in conformity with unique industry specific requirements.43
Table 5.1 presents the proportion of sample firms to the total firms listed on the respective
stock exchanges as at December 31, 2011, which are available in the Osiris database. The
representative proportions vary substantially from 6.1 per cent for Australia to 45.2 per cent
for the Philippines. As such, the selected sample may not be representative of all IR practices
of the countries’ population.
Table 5.1 - Comparison of Sample with Listed Companies for the Selected Countries
Country Stock Exchange Total listed firms(at 31/12/2011)
Sample
firm %
Australia Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) 1,632 100 6.1
Hong Kong Hong Kong Exchanges & Clearing (HKEx) 1,370 100 7.3
Malaysia Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad (BMSB) 856 100 11.7
Philippines Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE) 221 100 45.2
Singapore Singapore Exchange (SGX) 653 100 15.3
Thailand Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) 493 100 20.3
Vietnam HoChiMinh Stock Exchange (HOSE)
HaNoi Stock Exchange (HNX)
619 100 16.2
This table presents the proportion of sample firms to total firms listed of the related stock exchanges as at
December 31, 2011 available on the Osiris database.
42 Each top 100 firms by market capitalisation is identified based on the Osiris (via Bureau Van Dijk) database.
As such, these may not be the top 100 by market capitalisation actually listed on the relevant stock exchanges as
at December 31, 2011.
43 Unlike some other disclosure studies, the financial industry sector is not excluded because there are no
identified additional requirements for IR disclosure by financial firms. Also, external rating agencies (e.g. the
Transparency & Disclosure reports by the Standard and Poor’s) often include financial firms in their cross-
country evaluation of disclosure levels.
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Table 5.2 presents the distribution of the 700 sample firms by country and by industry. The
sample represents 10 industries as classified using the Global Industry Classification
Standard (GICS) industry sectors.
Table 5.2 - Distribution of Sample Firms by Country and Industry
Industry sectors
GICS
Code
Country
Total %
AU HO MA SI PH TH VI
Financials 40 28 45 23 27 38 25 27 213 30.4
Industrials 20 16 14 21 26 16 11 20 124 17.7
Consumer
Discretionary
25 10 17 13 12 11 14 4 81 11.6
Consumer Staples 30 6 4 22 12 10 11 13 78 11.1
Materials 15 16 6 5 4 7 12 18 68 9.7
Energy 10 9 1 4 6 5 9 6 40 5.7
Utilities 55 5 6 4 2 8 4 5 34 4.9
Health Care 35 8 1 3 2 1 5 4 24 3.4
Telecommunication
Services
50 1 4 4 3 2 6 0 20 2.9
Information
Technology
45 1 2 1 6 2 3 3 18 2.6
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 700 100.0
This table presents the distributions of the 700 firms across seven countries and 10 GICS industry sectors. AU =
Australia, HO = Hong Kong, MA = Malaysia, SI = Singapore, PH = the Philippines, TH = Thailand, VI =
Vietnam.
As indicated in Table 5.2, the proportion of firms for the pooled sample in each industry
sector varies significantly, from 2.6 per cent for the Information Technology sector to 30.4
per cent for the Financials sector. The Financials sector consistently accounts for the highest
percentage across the countries. However, Information Technology is not the lowest in all
countries. For example, Information Technology is ranked the fourth in Singapore. Australia
has a larger number of Health Care firms relative to the other countries; whereas Malaysia,
Singapore, and Vietnam have a relatively larger number of Consumer Staples, Industrials,
and Materials respectively. Hong Kong has a smaller number of Energy firms; while
Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam have a relatively smaller number of Utilities,
Telecommunication Services, and Consumer Discretionary respectively. The inter-country
differences for the distribution suggest that the influence of industry may vary across the
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region and within-countries. Consequently, industry is included as a control variable in the
analysis to examine the impact of industry on disclosure.
5.1.3 Sources and Selections of Interim Reports
Interim reports are collected from the country’s securities exchanges’ online archives. Table
5.3 presents the type of interim reports (i.e. quarterly or half-yearly) utilised to assess the
extent of IR disclosure made by listed companies by country.
Table 5.3 - Interim Financial Report Types and Sources
Countries
Types of IR
Sources
2nd Quarterly Half-yearly
Australia  ASX (http://www.asx.com.au/)
Hong Kong  HKEx (http://www.hkexnews.hk/)
Malaysia  BMSB (http://www.bursamalaysia.com)
Philippines  PSE (http://www.pse.com.ph)
Singapore  SGX (http://www.sgx.com)
Thailand  SET (http://www.set.or.th/en)
Vietnam  HOSE (http://www.hsx.vn)
HNX (http://www.hnx.vn)
This table summarises the types and sources of interim financial reports.
The time frame for defining the sample IR is the end of the second quarter for the accounting
year 2012 since the corresponding interim reports are the most recent available from the stock
exchanges of the seven countries.
5.2 IR Disclosure Compliance Measurement
The focus of this research is on IR disclosure compliance. As such, IR disclosure compliance
is the primary construct of interest. The following sub-section presents the development and
measurement of the disclosure index used to capture IR disclosure compliance levels.
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Disclosure studies in the extant literature generally employ two approaches for determining
disclosure levels: researcher-constructed indices or external ratings of disclosure (see, for
example, Beattie et al., 2004; Beyer et al., 2010; Artiach & Clarkson, 2011). The researcher-
constructed index is regarded as a ‘partial type of content analysis’ method in which the
researcher specifies ex ante a list of key items and scrutinises the text for their presence,
ignoring sections of the text that do not relate to this list (Beattie et al., 2004, p. 208). Studies
following the second approach measure disclosure by utilising external ratings of disclosure,
such as those previously published annually by the Association for Investment Management
and Research or those provided by the CIFAR.44 As there are no external ratings available for
IR, the researcher-constructed index approach is adopted here to measure IR disclosure
compliance.
Development of a researcher-constructed index has three common steps: i) selection of
disclosure items, ii) assignment of the importance of each item, and iii) validation of the
indices. The following sections provide an analysis of the information included in each
component and the steps involved in developing the IR index.
The IR disclosure index is confined to the mandatory IR disclosures which are common
across all of the seven countries as identified through a comparison of IAS 34, each country’s
equivalent domestic accounting standard and its stock exchange’s listing rules. The index
(Section 5.2.3) comprises two components. The first component reflects compliance with the
mandatory reporting requirements and the scoring of the mandatory disclosures common
across the countries. This component is described in Section 5.2.1. The second component
measures the extent to which managers use their discretion to provide additional information
regarding the mandatory disclosure. In particular, managers may choose to disclose a
differing level of detail or explanation on the items that must be disclosed. As such, the
second component endeavours to reflect the extent of discretionary disclosures made in
compliance with the reporting requirements. This component is described in Section 5.2.2.
44 Both external ratings of disclosure by the Association for Investment Management and Research, and the
CIFAR have been discontinued.
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5.2.1 Regional IR Mandatory Disclosure (DSRM) Scoring Method
The first component of the IR disclosure compliance score is identified as the regional
mandatory disclosure (DSRM) score that reflects the scoring of compliance with the common
mandatory IR reporting requirements across all of the sample countries. The DSRM is
constructed by selecting all of the disclosure items that are in IAS 34, which are applicable to
all seven sample countries. In total, 17 items (hereafter referred to as RM items) are identified
as common mandatory disclosures. Table 5.4 provides a summary of the 17 RM items
included in the DSRM index and the scoring scheme allocated to each item. Each mandatory
disclosure item is broken down into its component parts as identified by the relevant
reference paragraphs in IAS 34.
As presented in Table 5.4, the disclosure requirements of the RM items are explicit and
therefore easy to apply, with the exception of RM7 relating to the disclosure of significant
events. Whether or not an event or a transaction is significant is entity-specific as determined
by the preparers. As such, it is difficult to define what events and transactions are significant
to the understanding of the changes in financial position and performance since the end of the
last annual reporting period when coding the RM7 item. Accordingly, if the preparers have
not provided an explicit disclosure, the coding relies primarily on the example of 13 events
and transactions identified by IAS 34 (para.15B) as likely to be significant to determine the
disclosure compliance with the RM7 item. The list of significant events and transactions is
provided in Appendix II.
Prior disclosure studies have employed weighting and unweighting of items in scoring
disclosures. In a weighted scheme, the relative importance of information items is judged by
either the researchers or users (such as analysts and investors). A weighting technique is often
used in an attempt to better capture the overall quantity and quality of information disclosure.
For example, Wallace et al. (1994) suggest their weighted index better captures the depth
(comprehensiveness) of information provided in Spanish annual reports. Botosan (1997)
considers quantitative disclosure (scores of ‘2’) is more important than qualitative disclosure
(scores of ‘1’) as she argues that the former provides more precise and more useful
information. Inchausti (1997) uses disclosure scores of ‘0’, ‘0.5’, and ‘1’ to assess the varying
degrees of information disclosure in annual reports. Gallery et al. (2008) construct a nine-
point scoring system, from no disclosure to detailed description, in order to comprehensively
capture different levels of IFRS adoption disclosures. The main criticism of the weighted
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approach is that weighting may lead to bias in the scoring scheme because the weights
attached to the disclosure items are based on the perception of specific information-user
groups (see, for example, Cooke, 1989; Mangena & Pike, 2005).
Table 5.4 - Regulatory Requirements and Scoring Method for Measuring Regional IR
Mandatory Disclosure (DSRM)
Item Requirement IAS 34 Reference Score
RM1 General requirements: 3
1) Provides either a complete or a condensed set of interim financial
statements
Para 9 1/0
2) Complies with the accounting standard on Interim Financial
Reporting
Para 19 1/0
3) Is consolidated, for the parent entity, if the most recent annual
statements are consolidated
Para 14 1/0/NA
RM2 Interim report includes: 5
1) Balance sheet (or statement of financial position) Para 8(a) 1/0
2) Income statement (or statement of comprehensive income) Para 8(b) 1/0
3) Statement of changes in equity (exception: Vietnamese listed firms
present this statement in the explanatory notes)
Para 8(c) 1/0
4) Statement of cash flows Para 8(d) 1/0
5) Explanatory notes (or notes to financial statements) Para 8(e) 1/0
RM3 Each of following interim financial statements contains, at the
minimum, headings and subtotals presented in the most recent annual
financial statements:
Para 10 4
1) Balance sheet (or statement of financial position) 1/0
2) Income statement (or statement of comprehensive income) 1/0
3) Statement of changes in equity (exception: Vietnamese listed firms
present this statement in the explanatory notes)
1/0
4) Statement of cash flows 1/0
RM4 Interim report provides information for: 5
1) Balance sheet: Current interim period and immediately preceding
financial year
Para 20(a) 1/0
2) Income statement: Current interim period and cumulatively for the
current financial year-to-date (YTD)
Para 20(b) 1/0
3) IS: Corresponding period of the immediately preceding financial
year
Para 20(b) 1/0
4) Statement of changes in equity: Current period's financial YTD
and comparable YTD of the immediately preceding financial year
Para 20(c) 1/0
5) Statement of cash flows: Current period's financial YTD and the
comparable YTD of the immediately preceding financial year
Para 20(d) 1/0
RM5 Discloses basic earnings per share (EPS) in the statement that presents
the components of profit or loss
Para 11 1/0
RM6 Discloses diluted EPS in the statement that presents the components of
profit or loss
Para 11 1/0/NA
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Item Requirement IAS 34 Reference Score
RM7 Discloses events and transactions significant to the understanding of
changes in financial position and performance since the end of the last
annual reporting period (defined by IAS 34, para 15B, see Appendix II)
Para 15 1/0/NA
RM8 Discloses accounting policies: 4
1) Same accounting policies (as those used in the most recent annual
report except for the changes)
Para 16A(a) 1/0
2) Same methods of computation (as those used in the most recent
annual report except for the changes)
Para 16A(a) 1/0
3) Changes of accounting policies and methods of computation Para 16A(a) 1/0
4) Restatements in prior interim reports because of changes in
accounting polices
Para 16A(a) 1/0/NA
RM9 Comments about the seasonality and cyclicality of interim operations Para 16A(b) 1/0
RM10 Discloses unusual (exceptional) items affecting assets, liabilities,
equity, net incomes, or cash flows
Para 16A(c) 1/0
RM11 Discloses changes in estimates of amounts reported in prior interim
periods or prior financial year (such as provisions, the average annual
income tax rate, useful lives of plants, properties, and equipment)
Para 16A(d) 1/0
RM12 Discloses issues, repurchases, and repayments of debt securities Para 16A(e) 1/0/NA
RM13 Discloses issues, repurchases, and repayments of equity securities Para 16A(e) 1/0/NA
RM14 Discloses current interim period's dividends: Para 16A(f) 3
1) Whether or not interim dividends have been declared or
recommended
1/0
2) Dividend paid (declared) per ordinary shares 1/0/NA
3) Total dividends paid (declared) for ordinary shares and other
shares
1/0/NA
RM15 Discloses segment information Para 16A(g)
1) Business segment 2
a) Segmental revenue 1/0/NA
b) Segmental result 1/0/NA
2) Geographical segment 2
a) Segmental revenue 1/0/NA
b) Segmental result 1/0/NA
RM16 Discloses material subsequent events Para 16A(h) 1/0
RM17 Discloses effects of changes in the composition of the entity (e.g.
business combinations, acquisition or disposal of subsidiaries, long-
term investments, restructurings, and discontinuing operations)
Para 16A(i) 1/0
This table provides the list of disclosure items used in determining the DSRM score. A score of ‘1’ is given if
the required disclosure has been made; ‘0’ if it has not; and ‘NA’ if the required disclosure has not been
disclosed and it is explicitly irrelevant to the firms.
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The unweighted approach was initiated by Cooke (1989) and likewise has been applied in
many disclosure studies (see, for example, Meek et al., 1995; Abdelsalam & Weetman, 2007;
Omar & Simon, 2011; Tower, Vu, & Scully, 2011). The basis of this approach, known as a
binary coding scheme, is that if a firm discloses an item of information from a predetermined
list, it will receive a score of one (1) and otherwise zero (0). There are advantages and
disadvantages in this approach. For example, certain items less important to the users of
information may be dominant in the index, which could introduce bias and reduce the quality
of disclosure scores. Nevertheless, the unweighted approach is appropriate to assess how well
disclosures conform to required regulations, which emphasises the extent of overall
disclosure compliance rather than any specific disclosure items (e.g., D'Arcy &
Grabensberger, 2003; Abdelsalam & Weetman, 2007). Further, this approach may avoid
subjectivity and bias in the disclosure scores introduced by the researcher, analysts, or a
specific group of information users in weighing disclosure items (e.g., Cooke, 1989; Wallace
& Naser, 1995; Tower et al., 2011). This approach is also more appropriate for cross-country
studies given that the counterpart approach is likely to face an additional problem because
information users may perceive the importance of specific disclosure items differently (see,
for example, Ngangan, Saudagaran, & Clarke, 2005).
To address some of the shortcomings in the unweighted scoring procedure, a number of
techniques may be adopted. For example, to avoid penalising for nondisclosure of an item
that is not applicable to specific entities, prior studies have extended the binary coding
scheme by introducing the value of not applicable (NA) (e.g., Buzby, 1975; Cooke, 1989;
Meek et al., 1995; Street & Bryant, 2000; Street & Gray, 2002; Ali et al., 2004; Glaum et al.,
2013). Consequently, the use of ‘NA’ in the coding scheme allows for producing more
precise disclosure scores than the use of a binary coding scheme. The researchers may also
break down more important disclosure categories into smaller categories to better capture and
determine levels of disclosed information.
The unweighted approach is applied to score disclosure items in the DSRM index (Table 5.4)
because this study is not directed at a specific group of information users, consistent with
Cooke (1989) and following the most common practices in the literature, as remarked by
Glaum et al. (2013). Each item of the DSRM index is given a score of one (1) if the required
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disclosure has been made, and zero (0) if it has not; or not applicable (NA) if the required
disclosure has not been disclosed and it is explicitly irrelevant to the firms. 45
To illustrate the scoring, AGL Energy Limited (an Australian firm) is used for assessing the
disclosure compliance of RM15 which relates to the provision of segment information. RM15
is evaluated based on the disclosure of revenue (RM15.1a) and result (RM15.1b) by business
segment as well as the disclosure of revenue (RM15.2a) and result (RM15.2b) by
geographical segment (see Table 5.4). AGL Energy Limited has operated in one principal
geographical area (Australia) and in multiple business segments comprising retail energy,
merchant energy, upstream gas, and energy investment. Accordingly, applying the DSRM
scoring scheme to the firm, a score of ‘1’ is assigned to RM15.1a and RM15.1b because AGL
has disclosed revenues and results for its four operating segments; whereas a score of ‘NA’ is
assigned to RM15.2a and RM15.2b.
In summary, the DSRM score of a firm i listed in country k (DSRMk,i) is calculated as the ratio
of the total actual items disclosed by the firm i to the maximum possible score (adjusted for
‘NA’ items) applicable to that firm.
5.2.2 Regional IR Discretionary Disclosure (DSRD) Scoring Method
The second component of the IR disclosure index reflects the scoring discretion in disclosure
which firms have made in compliance with mandatory IR requirements that are common
across the sample countries. This component is identified as the regional discretionary
disclosure (DSRD) score.
A number of items on the DSRM list allow preparers to exercise their discretion over the level
of detail or explanation provided in the interim reports. As such, the inclusion of those items
45 However, as discussed in Chapter 2, Malaysia is an exceptional case where listed firms are required to make
explicit statements as to ‘not applicable’ disclosure items in the notes of IR. This practice distinguishes
Malaysian listed firms from those in the other six sample countries wherein there are no similar requirements;
therefore listed firms in the other countries are likely to disclose applicable (material) information rather than
provide a ‘not applicable’ or ‘nothing to report’ statement. To address this difference in reporting culture, ‘not
applicable’ statements are scored in the same way as non-disclosures (coded as 0) in the supplementary analyses
(Section 7.1.3).
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in the DSRD index is to capture the richer information disclosed in interim reports by the
listed firms. There are 11 items on the regional mandatory list (Table 5.4) which allows
preparers to present information with different levels of specificity. To determine the
applicability of these items to the sample, 21 interim reports randomly selected from the
sample (3 each across 7 countries) are examined. Overall, these 11 items (hereafter referred
as to RD items) form the basis of DSRD. Table 5.5 presents a summary of these 11 items and
their possible scores.
Table 5.5 - Regulatory Requirements and Scoring Method for Measuring Regional IR
Discretionary Disclosure (DSRD)
Items Reference Requirement Possible Score
RD1 RM5 Detailed disclosure of basic EPS 0 1 2 3 NA
RD2 RM6 Detailed disclosure of diluted EPS 0 1 2 3 NA
RD3 RM7 Detailed disclosure of significant events or transactions (defined by
IAS 34, para.15B, see Appendix II)
0 1 2 3 NA
RD4 RM8 Nature and effects of the changes of accounting policies and methods
of computation
0 1 2 3 NA
RD5 RM9 Comments on the nature and effects of seasonality and/or cyclicality 0 1 2 3 NA
RD6 RM10 Comments on the effects of unusual items 0 1 2 3 NA
RD7 RM11 Details of changes in estimates 0 1 2 3 NA
RD8 RM12 Details of issuances, purchases and repayments of debt securities 0 1 2 3 NA
RD9 RM13 Details of issuances, purchases and repayments of equity securities 0 1 2 3 NA
RD10 RM15 Detailed disclosure of the primary segment information 0 1 2 3 NA
RD11 RM17 Detailed disclosure of changes in the composition of the entity 0 1 2 3 NA
This table presents the list of disclosure items used in determining the DSRD score. Scores for items RD1 to
RD11 are given either zero (0), one (1), two (2), three (3), or not applicable (NA). ‘0’ is given where required
disclosure has not been made, whilst ‘NA’ is assigned where required disclosure is explicitly inapplicable to the
reporting entity. ‘1’, ‘2’, or ‘3’ is awarded dependent on the level of details in the disclosure as articulated in
Appendix III. Reference is to the items in Table 5.4.
The score of each item within the DSRD is determined depending on whether or not the item
is disclosed or applicable and how comprehensively the item is disclosed. Consistent with the
scoring scheme for the DSRM, a score of ‘0’ is given if the RD item is not disclosed and
‘NA’ is given if the RD item is not applicable. When the RD item is disclosed, a score of ‘1’,
‘2’, or ‘3’ is assigned depending on the comprehensiveness of the information being
presented. This scoring scheme follows the weighted approach applied by prior studies (see,
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for example, Botosan, 1997; Inchausti, 1997). In particular, a score of ‘1’ is given for the
lowest level of descriptive disclosure; ‘2’ is given for a medium level of disclosure; and ‘3’ is
given for the highest level of disclosed information.
A justification for this scoring scheme is that IAS 34 and the equivalent domestic accounting
standards do not provide guidance on how ‘comprehensive’ or what ‘depth’ of information
should be provided, but instead require the presence of specific information in interim
reporting. For each of the 11 RD items, an explanation of what constitutes ‘low’, ‘medium’,
or ‘high’ is articulated and provided in Appendix III. Appendix III also outlines the details of
how each RD item could be coded based on the degree of interim information being
disclosed.
As an example, the discretionary disclosure item RD10, which relates to the mandatory
disclosure of segment information (RM15), is coded as ‘1’ if a firm merely discloses the
segmental revenue and result (profit); or ‘2’ if a firm discloses the reconciliation of the
segmental amounts (i.e. revenue and result); or ‘3’ if a firm discloses more information about
the segments (such as assets and liabilities).
Applying the scoring of RD10 to the coding for AGL Energy Limited, a score of ‘3’ is
assigned because the firm has disclosed the highest level of segmental information including
the revenue and results of its four reportable operating segments, the reconciliation of
operating segments, and the additional information about segmental assets and liabilities.
In summary, the DSRD score of a firm i listed in country k (DSRDk,i) is determined as the
ratio of the total actual disclosure score by the firm i to the maximum possible score
applicable to that firm (adjusted for ‘NA’ items).
5.2.3 Regional IR Aggregate Disclosure (DSRA) Scoring Method
The DSRA score is designed to capture not only the extent, but also the quality of mandatory
IR disclosure across the countries. Therefore, the sum of the two components forms the
primary construct, a regional IR aggregate disclosure score (DSRA). As such, the DSRA of a
firm i in country k (DSRAi,k) is measured as the sum of the regional mandatory disclosure
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score (DSRMi,k) and the regional discretionary disclosure score (DSRDi,k), which is presented
in Equation 5.1.
DSRAk,i = ∑ (DSRMk,i + DSRDk,i)
Continuing with the AGL Energy Limited illustration, the DSRA score for AGL Energy
Limited is determined as follows.
Figure 5.1 Example Illustration of the DSRA scoring - AGL Energy Limited
DSRM score DSRD score DSRA
score
Firm Total
possible
score
NA
items
Assigned
scores
DSRM Total
possible
score
NA
items
Assigned
scores
DSR
D
AGL 38 3 35 1.0 33 0 30 0.91 1.91
With an assigned score of 35 to a total possible score of 35 (after being adjusted for 3 ‘NA’
items), the DSRM score for AGL is one (1). With an assigned score of 30 to a total possible
score of 33, the DSRD score for AGL is equal to 0.91. Thus, AGL’s DSRA score is 1.91
being the aggregate of DSRM plus DSRD.
5.3 Validity of the IR Disclosure Index
As highlighted by review studies (see, for example, Beyer et al., 2010; Artiach & Clarkson,
2011), the use of a researcher-constructed index to measure disclosure may be biased because
such metrics involve subjective judgment by the researcher. The index is constructed based
on the perception of what the researcher deems as relevant and important to information
users, and their interpretation of the disclosure. This can have an impact on the reliability and
validity of the disclosure scores. Consistent with common practices in the disclosure
literature, several steps are taken to enhance the reliability and validity of the IR disclosure
index.
First, the IAS 34-based items are carefully checked against the domestic equivalent
accounting standards to ensure the inclusion of items which are commonly required by all
seven sample countries. This step is essential because regulation governing IR disclosure is
(Eq. 5.1)
71
different across the region as discussed in Chapter 2. By doing so, the selected common items
enable measurement of the extent of IR disclosure at the regional level and make it
comparable cross-nationally. The inclusion of commonly-required disclosure items selected
from IAS 34 in the IR disclosure index increases the validity of the study’s findings because
the index is potentially applicable to other cross-country settings with consistent common
disclosure requirements.
Second, two independent coders are used to assess inter-rater reliability of the disclosure
index. Inter-rater reliability refers to a process whereby data are independently coded and
then compared for level of agreement (Armstrong, Gosling, Weinman, & Marteau, 1997).
Initially, the disclosure index and scoring scheme were provided to two accounting-qualified
independent coders for review. The process enables calibration of the disclosure scoring
instrument, which led to a few minor amendments (primarily regarding the treatment of not
applicable items). Once there was general agreement and alignment on how to score an
interim report, the amended version of scoring scheme and a sample of 70 interim reports (10
from each of the seven sample countries) were given to the two independent coders.46
The independent coding was conducted in two phases. First, each of the two coders was
asked to independently apply the coding scheme to five interim reports from 10 sample
Malaysian firms. The scores produced by the coders were then compared to the scores
produced by the researcher, resulting in an average agreement between the researcher’s
scores with those of independent coders of 95 per cent. For the remaining five per cent, the
disagreements were discussed and resolved to ensure improved consistency and alignment in
the remaining coding.
In the second phase, the independent coders scored the remaining 60 randomly selected
reports (10 for each country). Coder 1 scored 10 companies each from Australia, Hong Kong
and the Philippines. Coder 2 scored 10 companies each from Singapore, Thailand, and
46 Random sampling involves determining the interim reports for independent coding. More specially, the last
firm in each alphabetical grouping of 10 firms is selected which results in a set of 10 firms for each sample
country (i.e. 70 firms in total).
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Vietnam.47 The researcher scores for the 60 reports were identical to those of the independent
coders, except in the case of Australia, where there was 97 per cent agreement. Based on the
independent coding of 10 per cent of the sample, it is concluded that the researcher’s scores
represent a reasonably unbiased and reliable interpretation of the IR disclosure compliance
that enhances the validity of the dependent variables, DSRA, to capture the level and extent of
IR disclosure compliance.
5.4 Statistical Design
This section outlines the statistical design adopted to examine the two research questions,
including a discussion of the method for investigating how IR disclosure compliance varies
across the region (Section 5.4.1), for examining what factors are associated with IR
disclosure compliance variations in the region (Section 5.4.2), and the procedures for
robustness test and supplementary analysis of IR disclosure compliance (Section 5.4.2).
5.4.1 IR Disclosure Levels Across the Region
Cross-country differences in IR disclosure regulation are evident in major aspects, including
stage of IFRS-adoption, type of mandatory IR, regulatory lag, and audit review requirement,
as revealed in Chapter 2. These differences are useful to examine how IR disclosure
compliance varies across the Asia-Pacific Region (RQ1).
As discussed in Section 4.2, no formal hypothesis has been developed to investigate cross-
country variation in IR disclosure compliance as this is an exploratory question in nature. As
such, to address this research question, first, the descriptive statistics for IR disclosure
compliance levels are used to determine the extent of IR disclosures across the sample
countries. Then a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) test is performed to compare if
there are statistical differences in the level of disclosure compliance across the seven
countries. A post-hoc comparison of the means using Tukey’s HSD is conducted to determine
which countries are different from the others in IR disclosure levels.
47 Coder 2 is a Vietnamese national and therefore was able to read IR by Vietnamese firms.
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(Eq. 5.2)
5.4.2 Multiple Regression Model for Hypothesis Testing (H1 to H4)
The four IR-related hypotheses are formulated (Section 4.2) to investigate factors associated
with variations in IR disclosure compliance in the Asia-Pacific Region (RQ2). The four IR-
related hypotheses are jointly tested using the 2012 interim period pooled data to estimate an
OLS regression model as specified in Equation 5.2
, = + , + , + , + , + ,+ , + , + , +
where:
DSRAk,i = the score of IR aggregate disclosure by the firm i listed in the country k,
which is a sum of DSRMk,i and DSRDk,i.
DSRMk,i is the score of regional IR mandatory disclosure by the firm i listed
in the country k (as identified in Section 5.2.1)
DSRDk,i is the index of regional IR discretionary disclosure by the firm i
listed in the country k (as identified in Section 5.2.2)
Independent Variables
IFRSk,i = the stage of IFRS adoption of country k for firm i, which is coded as ‘1’ if the
country has adopted IFRS for accounting year 2012 (Australia, Hong Kong,
Malaysia, and the Philippines) and ‘0’ otherwise (Singapore, Thailand, and
Vietnam), as specified by IFRS Foundation (2014) and the announcements of
seven countries’ accounting standard setters. The inclusion of the stage of
IFRS adoption follows Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001), Ding et al. (2007), and
Morris et al. (2012).
ATYPk,i = the audit review status of the released IR by firm i in the country k. ATYPk,i is
coded as ‘1’ if IR was audit reviewed and ‘0’ otherwise. This measure
reflects the regulatory position of country k on audit/audit review
requirement and the decision of firm i on voluntarily purchase of audit
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review. The inclusion of the audit review status follows Mangena and Pike
(2005) and Mangena and Tauringana (2007).
RFREk,i = the type of mandatory IR issued by firm i in country k, which is coded as ‘1’
if IR is a half-yearly report (Australia, Hong Kong, and Vietnam) and ‘0’
otherwise (Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and Thailand).
RLAGk,i = the reporting lag of the released IR by firm i in country k, measured as a ratio
of actual lag to the regulatory lag. The actual lag is the number of days that
elapse between the end of the firm’s interim period and the lodgement date of
the interim reports, which is obtained from each sample country’s stock
exchanges. The regulatory lag is the maximum allowable time (days) from
the end of the reporting period to the release of the IR, as summarised in
Table 2.1. The inclusion of the reporting lag follows Tower et al. (1999).
Control Variables
SIZEk,i = firm size for firm i in country k, measured as the natural log of the firm’s
total assets as at the interim period’s end. The inclusion of size follows a
large number of prior research, including Singhvi and Desai (1971), Cooke
(1992), Wallace et al. (1994), Meek et al. (1995), Wallace and Naser (1995),
Inchausti (1997), Ali et al. (2004), Mangena and Pike (2005), Mangena and
Tauringana (2007), Gallery et al. (2008), and Tower et al. (2011). Total
assets are collected from the interim reports and translated to the US dollar
by using individual exchange rate (obtained from Osiris database) for each
interim report.48
LEVk,i = financial leverage of firm i in country k, measured as a ratio of the firm’s
total liabilities to total assets as at the interim period’s end.49 The inclusion of
48 The translation of the amounts (used in measuring firm size, leverage, and profitability) into US dollars
enables that the amounts disclosed in different countries’ IR are stated on the same basis, consistent with prior
studies, for example Meek et al.(1995).
49 There is a lack of consistence in the presentation of short-term and long-term liabilities in the interim reports
across the region. Hence, rather than using the ratio of total debt to total assets, the liabilities to total assets ratio
is employed as a proxy for leverage in the model.
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leverage follows prior studies, including Inchausti (1997), Tan and Tower
(1997), Ahmed and Courtis (1999), Tan and Tower (1999), Ku Ismail and
Chandler (2005), Gallery et al. (2008), and Palmer (2008). The data is
collected from the interim reports.
PROk,i = the profitability of firm i in country k, measured as return on assets, which is
a ratio of the firm’s net income of the interim period to total assets as at the
interim period’s end. The inclusion of profitability follows prior research,
including Eng and Mak (2003), Francis et al. (2005), Palmer (2008), and
Archambault and Archambault (2003). Quarterly profitability for the firms
issuing half-yearly reporting is estimated as a half of the half-yearly
profitability which makes the measure comparable and consistent across the
sample. The data is collected from the interim reports.
FORk,i = foreign listing status indicates whether firm i has shares listed outside
country k, coded as ‘1’ if the firm is quoted on the country’s stock exchange
and on other foreign one(s), and ‘0’ otherwise. The inclusion of foreign
listing follows a number of prior studies, including Meek and Gray (1989),
Cooke (1992), Meek et al. (1995), Inchausti (1997), Street and Gray (2002),
Francis et al. (2005), and Dong and Stettler (2011). The data is obtained from
the Osiris database.
AUDk,i = audit firm indicates audit quality, coded ‘1’ if the IR of the firm i listed in
country k was audit reviewed by one of the Big-4 audit firms and ‘0’
otherwise. The inclusion of audit quality follows a large number of prior
studies, including Singhvi and Desai (1971), Inchausti (1997), Street and
Gray (2002), Abdelsalam and Weetman (2007), Gallery et al. (2008), and
Palmer (2008). The data is collected from the interim reports.
INDk,i = dummy variables indicate the industry to which firm i in country k belongs,
based on two-digit GICS codes (10 industry sectors). The inclusion of
industry dummies follows a number of prior studies, including Inchausti
(1997), Street and Gray (2002), Gallery et al. (2008), Palmer (2008), and
Omar and Simon (2011). The data is obtained from the Osiris database.
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The four hypotheses, as proposed in Section 4.2, posit that the levels of IR disclosure
compliance are positively associated with IFRS (H1) and ATYP (H2), vary by RFRE (H3), and
RLAG (H4). As such, the coefficients of the IFRS (β1) and ATYP (β2) are predicted to be
positive; whereas the coefficients of the RFRE (β3) and RLAG (β4) have no predicted sign.
5.4.3 Robustness Tests and Supplementary Analysis of IR Disclosure Compliance
In addition to the primary analysis, a series of sensitive and supplementary analyses are
conducted. First, the sensitivity tests for the base regression model (Equation 5.2) are
performed to check the robustness of the primary results with i) the alternate measures of
explanatory variables (SIZE and PRO), ii) augmentation of country non-IR regulatory factor
(legal origin, economic development, and national culture), and iii) the inclusion of audit
quality, all of which are reported after the primary results (Section 6.2.2). Second, the
robustness tests of the four hypotheses are performed using i) the two components of IR
disclosure compliance (i.e. DSRM and DSRD) as the dependent variable instead of DSRA
(Section 7.1.1 and 7.1.2); ii) the recoding scores in which ‘NA’ disclosure items are coded in
the same way as non-disclosures (Section 7.1.3); iii) the sub-scores of ‘sensitive’ disclosure
items (Section 7.1.4); iv) the second quarter reports for the 100 Vietnamese listed firms
instead of their half-yearly reports (Section 7.1.5); and v) country dummy variables and
reclassification of industry groups (Section 7.1.6). Finally, the analyses of within-country IR
disclosure compliance are also performed to offer further understanding of variations in IR
disclosure compliance across the seven sample countries. These within-country analyses are
provided in Section 7.2.
5.5 Summary
This chapter describes the sample selection procedure and the research design adopted to
examine IR disclosure compliance variation and the hypothesised determinants of the
variation across the region. The method used for measuring IR disclosure compliance is
detailed together with the statistical procedures that will be used to address the first research
question relating to how IR disclosure compliance varies across the region. To address the
second research question on factors impacting disclosure compliance, a regression model is
developed. In the model, the disclosure scores are used as the dependent variable; and proxies
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for the four IR-factors hypothesised to be associated with differences in disclosure levels are
included as independent (explanatory) variables. Other variables found to be significant
determinants of disclosure levels in similar contexts are added to the model as control
variables. The next chapter provides the empirical results for examining the research
questions and related hypotheses based on the research design described in this chapter.
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CHAPTER 6: RESULTS
This chapter provides the statistical results for addressing research questions and hypotheses
related to the nature and extent of IR disclosure compliance. The chapter proceeds as follows.
Section 6.1 provides the descriptive statistics and tests of mean differences for the levels of
IR disclosure compliance in order to examine the extent to which firms in the Asia-Pacific
Region comply with IR disclosure requirements. Section 6.2 discusses the multivariate results
for testing the four hypotheses to answer the second research question investigating what
factors are associated with variations in IR disclosure compliance in the Asia-Pacific Region.
Finally, Section 6.3 provides the concluding comments.
6.1 IR Disclosure Compliance Level (RQ1)
This section provides the descriptive statistics for the IR disclosure compliance levels (the
dependent variable) and tests of mean differences in the scores of IR disclosure compliance
for listed firms in order to address the first research regarding the variations in IR disclosure
compliance across the Asia-Pacific region. The tests for differences in means of IR disclosure
compliance scores across the region (ANOVA) and independent-sample t-tests between
groups are conducted to investigate whether these variations are significant. The descriptive
statistics are also provided for the component score of the regional IR disclosure compliance
score (i.e. DSRM and DSRD) to provide further insights into differences in the extent and
nature of IR disclosure across the region.
6.1.1 Regional IR Aggregate Disclosure (DSRA) Scores and Descriptive Statistics
DSRA reflects the level of aggregate information disclosed in IR, which is measured as a
summation of the regional IR mandatory disclosure (DSRM) score and the regional IR
discretionary disclosure (DSRD) score. As such, the DSRA score captures the extent of IR
disclosure by firms in the Asia-Pacific region. Table 6.1 provides descriptive statistics and
results of tests for differences in means of DSRA.
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Table 6.1 - Descriptive Statistics and Tests for DSRA
N Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max
ANOVA test
F-value p-value
Panel A: Descriptive statistics & ANOVA test for the country mean difference
Pooled Sample 700 1.501 1.528 0.199 0.885 1.933
By country (raking by mean) 101.38 <0.001
Australia (4) 100 1.548 1.559 0.161 1.092 1.909
Hong Kong (2) 100 1.570 1.589 0.119 1.271 1.864
Malaysia (1) 100 1.687 1.708 0.114 1.324 1.882
Singapore (6) 100 1.334 1.333 0.138 1.074 1.734
Philippines (5) 100 1.547 1.572 0.192 0.917 1.933
Thailand (3) 100 1.553 1.563 0.129 1.187 1.822
Vietnam (7) 100 1.267 1.250 0.152 0.885 1.699
Average of Std. Dev. 0.144
Panel B: Tukey’s HSD test for DSRA mean difference among country
Means of Differences (i – j)
Country(i)
Country (j)
Australia Hong
Kong
Malaysia Singapore Philippines Thailand Vietnam
Australia 0
Hong Kong -0.0213 0
Malaysia -0.1380* -0.1167* 0
Singapore 0.2148* 0.2360* 0.3528* 0
Philippines 0.0016 0.0228 0.1396* -0.2132* 0
Thailand -0.0056 0.0157 0.1324* -0.2203* -0.0071 0
Vietnam 0.2821* 0.3034* 0.4201* 0.0674* 0.2806* 0.2877* 0
This table provides the descriptive statistics for DSRA scores and statistical tests. Panel A provides the descriptive
statistics and ANOVA test for DSRA mean differences across the seven countries. Panel B provides Tukey’s HSD
test for DSRA mean differences among country. DSRA is measured as a sum of DSRM score and DSRD score. (*)
denotes significance at the 0.05 level.
Panel A of Table 6.1 shows that DSRA varies substantially across the region, ranging from a
minimum of 0.885 to a maximum of 1.933, with a mean (median) of 1.501 (1.528). Malaysia
has the highest mean (median) level of IR disclosure compliance with a DSRA score of 1.687
(1.708). Australia, Hong Kong, the Philippines and Thailand have above-mean DSRA score.
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The lowest mean (median) level of IR disclosure compliance is for Vietnam with a DSRA
score of 1.267 (1.250). The DSRA score for Singapore is also below the mean DSRA score for
the region.
The one-way ANOVA test for differences in DSRA means, as provided in Table 6.1 Panel A,
shows that DSRA is statistically significant across the region (F = 101.38, p <0.001). Tukey’s
HSD tests for comparing multiple pairs of DSRA mean scores (Table 6.1 Panel B) reveal that
the regional IR aggregate disclosure levels for firms in Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam are
significantly different from the other countries. However, the DSRA scores for firms in
Australia are not significantly different from Hong Kong, the Philippines, and Thailand.
The supplementary disclosure rules prescribed by the stock exchanges of Malaysia (i.e.
BMSB) could explain why firms listing on BMSB achieve higher DSRA scores. The BMSB
Listing Rule 9.22-App.9B (para.16) requires listed firms to make a statement in their
quarterly reports to any of the required disclosure items in the notes to statement of
comprehensive income if it is not applicable. This rule also requires listed firms to disclose
specific items in detail, such as changes in earnings per share, material litigation, unusual
items, and segmental information. This requirement for providing a specific statement
regarding not-applicable items is only evident in Malaysian IR regulation and may be one of
the factors that explain a higher level of disclosure compliance for the BMSB listed firms.
Further, during the coding process, the researcher observes that the other Malaysian listed
firms disclose their second quarterly reports of the accounting year 2012 in the format which
is very similar to that of the BMSB,50 even though the format is not stipulated and
standardised by Malaysian IR regulations. Prior research also finds that standardisation of
interim reporting improves the level of disclosure compliance (see, D'Arcy & Grabensberger,
2003).
To initially examine whether differences in IR are associated with hypothesised IR factors
(IFRS adoption, auditor involvement, and reporting frequency), Table 6.2 provides
50 The IR disclosure score for Bursa Malaysia Berhad (BMSB) is quite high, 0.97 for DSRM, 0.78 for DSRD and
1.75 for DSRA.
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descriptive statistics and the results for independent-sample t-tests of DSRA means for the
three IR-specific factors.
Table 6.2 - Descriptive Statistics and Mean Difference Tests for DSRA by IR Factors
N Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max
t-test
t-value p-value
IFRS adoption (IFRS)
IFRS adoption 400 1.588 1.598 0.160 0.917 1.933
15.553 <0.001
Non IFRS adoption 300 1.384 1.381 0.186 0.885 1.822
Audit review status (ATYP)
Audit-reviewed IR 385 1.481 1.515 0.192 0.885 1.909
-2.963 0.003
Not audit-reviewed IR 15)315 1.525 1.552 0.205 0.917 1.933
Reporting frequency (RFRE)
Half-year report 300 1.462 1.490 0.200 0.885 1.909
-4.580 <0.001Quarterly report 400 1.530 1.552 0.193 0.917 1.993
This table presents the descriptive statistics and t-tests (2-tailed) for mean differences for DSRA scores by three
categorical groups consistent with the independent variables (IR-related factors) included in Equation 5.2. DSRA
score is measured as a sum of DSRM score and DSRD score.
The results indicate that the DSRA score varies significantly among groups with differences
in IR-regulatory specifics. The independent-sample t-test for mean differences offers initial
evidence supporting the H1 prediction. Specifically, IR disclosure compliance for firms in
IFRS-adoption countries is significantly higher than for non-IFRS adoption firms (t = 15.553,
p < 0.001). However, the results reveal that IR disclosure compliance is significantly lower
for firms with audit-reviewed reports (t = -2.963, p = 0.003), which is inconsistent with the
H2 prediction. Regarding reporting frequency (H3), the results suggest that IR disclosure
compliance for firms with mandatory half-yearly reports is significantly lower than those
with mandatory quarterly reports (t = -4.580, p < 0.001).
Table 6.3 provides the descriptive statistics of DSRA by industry and the result from the
ANOVA test. The result indicates that DSRA scores vary across industry sectors (F = 3.163,
p = 0.001). However, the Tukey’s HSD tests (see Appendix IV – Panel A) reveal that only
the disclosure compliance levels for Industrial firms are significantly different than for
Telecommunication Services firms.
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Table 6.3 - Descriptive Statistics and ANOVA Tests for DSRA by Industry
N Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max
ANOVA test
F-value p-value
Pooled Sample 700 1.501 1.528 0.199 0.885 1.933
By industry sectors 3.163 0.001
Financials 213 1.520 1.556 0.196 0.949 1.867
Industrials 124 1.459 1.489 0.197 1.000 1.852
Consumer Discretionary 81 1.490 1.525 0.194 0.917 1.933
Consumer Staples 78 1.544 1.569 0.175 1.187 1.882
Materials 68 1.457 1.484 0.194 1.019 1.864
Energy 40 1.462 1.513 0.198 0.977 1.775
Utilities 34 1.570 1.620 0.263 0.885 1.909
Healthcare 24 1.469 1.455 0.200 1.156 1.798
Telecommunication Services 20 1.610 1.648 0.152 1.255 1.802
Information Technology 18 1.465 1.487 0.179 1.144 1.833
This table presents descriptive statistics and ANOVA test for DSRA by industry sectors (GICS 2-digits). DSRA
score is measured as a sum of DSRM score and DSRD score.
Overall, both descriptive statistics and statistical tests for differences in means of DSRA show
that the levels of IR aggregate disclosure by listed firms vary significantly across the region.
Firms that have adopted IFRS, engaged an auditor to review their IR, and issued mandatory
half-yearly reports have IR aggregate disclosure levels significantly different from the
counterpart firms. Firms across industry sectors also show statistical differences in DSRA
disclosure levels.
6.1.2 Regional IR Mandatory Disclosure (DSRM) Scores and Descriptive Statistics
The sub-component of IR disclosure compliance is reflected in the DSRM score. This sub-
component measures the level of information disclosed in IR by firms in conformity with
mandatory regulations across the region. Table 6.4 provides the descriptive statistics and
mean difference tests for DSRM scores for the pooled sample and by country.
Panel A of Table 6.4 reveals that DSRM score varies across the seven countries, ranging from
a minimum of 0.579 to a maximum of 1.0 with a mean (median) of 0.866 (0.889). However,
the variability of DSRM score within a country (with the average of standard deviation of
0.054) is substantially lower than that of the pooled sample (with the standard deviation of
0.084). The variability of DSRM score is also very low compared to the DSRA score with an
average standard deviation being 0.144 (see Table 6.1). The overall cross-country variation in
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the DSRM score is quite similar to the DSRA score. In particular, the DSRM scores for
Australia, Hong Kong, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand are above the mean, whereas
Singapore and Vietnam are below the mean of DSRM score for the pooled sample. Malaysia
has the highest mean score, whereas Vietnam has the lowest. The ranking, by means, has
changed slightly for the three countries with Hong Kong moving from second to third;
Thailand moving from third to fourth; and Australia moving from fourth to second.
Table 6.4 - Descriptive Statistics and Mean Difference Tests for DSRM
N Mean Median Std.
Dev.
Min Max Mean Difference
Panel A: Descriptive statistics & ANOVA tests for the country mean difference F-value p-value
Pooled Sample 700 0.866 0.889 0.084 0.579 1.000 155.12 <0.001
By country (ranking by mean)
Australia (2) 100 0.913 0.917 0.040 0.800 1.000
Hong Kong (3) 100 0.900 0.892 0.047 0.771 0.974
Malaysia (1) 100 0.936 0.941 0.039 0.857 1.000
Singapore (6) 100 0.805 0.794 0.060 0.697 0.943
Philippines (5) 100 0.868 0.886 0.074 0.667 1.000
Thailand (4) 100 0.896 0.906 0.053 0.706 0.974
Vietnam (7) 100 0.744 0.739 0.063 0.579 0.938
Average of Std. Dev. 0.054
Panel B: Descriptive statistics & t-tests for DSRM scores by IR factors t-value p-value
IFRS adoption (IFRS) 16.567 <0.001
IFRS adoption 400 0.904 0.914 0.057 0.667 1.000
Non IFRS-adoption 300 0.815 0.811 0.086 0.579 0.974
Audit review status (ATYP) -1.357 0.176
Audit-reviewed IR 385 0.862 0.889 0.087 0.579 1.000
Not audit-reviewed IR 315 0.871 0.889 0.079 0.667 1.000
Reporting frequency (RFRE) -3.812 <0.001
Half-yearly report 300 0.852 0.886 0.092 0.579 1.000
Quarterly report 400 0.876 0.892 0.075 0.667 1.000
This table provides the descriptive statistics and mean difference tests for DSRM scores. Panel A provides the
descriptive statistics and ANOVA test for DSRM mean differences across the sample countries. Panel B provides
the descriptive statistics and t-tests (2-tailed) for mean differences for DSRM scores by three categorical groups
consistent with the independent variables (IR-related factors) included in Equation 5.2.
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The one-way ANOVA test for differences in DSRM means shows that variations are
statistically significant (F = 155.12, p < 0.001). Similar to DSRA, the results of Tukey’s HSD
for DSRM means, as presented in Appendix V, indicate that DSRM disclosure levels by firms
in Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam differ significantly from those in the other countries.
Australia firms’ DSRM disclosure levels are not significantly different from those in Hong
Kong and Thailand. However, there is a slight difference in that the DSRM score for
Philippine firms becomes significantly different from that for the other countries.
Consistent with the DSRA score, DSRM disclosure also varies within the three IR-specific
groups, as shown in Table 6.4 (Panel B). The results of t-test for DSRM mean differences of
sub-samples grouped by IFRS-adoption and reporting frequency are consistent with those for
DSRA. In particular, the mean of DSRM scores for firms in IFRS-adoption countries is
significantly higher than those in non-IFRS adoption countries (t = 16.567, p < 0.001); and
the regional IR mandatory disclosure is significantly lower for firms with half-yearly reports
relative to firms with quarterly reports (t = -3.812, p < 0.001). However, the DSRM score for
firms with audit-reviewed interim reports is no longer significantly different from that of the
non-reviewed.
Appendix VI provides the descriptive statistics and ANOVA test of mean differences for the
DSRM scores by industry. The results indicate that the level of IR mandatory disclosure
varies significantly across industry sectors (F = 2.188, p = 0.021). However, the results for
the Tukey’s HSD (see Appendix IV – Panel B) reveal that no industry sector has the DSRM
score significantly different from the others.
The extent of DSRM disclosure by items also differs substantially across the sample
countries, as presented in Table 6.5. The breakdown of each country’s DSRM scores by 17
RM items provides further evidence of cross-country variations in IR disclosure compliance.
The compliance score of each key item, presented in per cent, is calculated as a ratio of total
actual disclosure score for this item made by each 100 sample firms by country to the
maximum possible score (adjusted for ‘NA’ case). For example, after adjusted for ‘NA’
cases, 100 per cent of sample firms in Australia, Hong Kong, and Malaysia have complied
with the RM1 (referring to general requirements), whereas the percentage of compliance with
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this item for Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam is 69, 79, 98, and 76
respectively.
Table 6.5 - DSRM Scores by Item for Each Sample Country
Items (%)
Country
RM
1
RM
2
RM
3
RM
4
RM
5
RM
6
RM
7
RM
8
RM
9
RM
10
RM
11
RM
12
RM
13
RM
14
RM
15
RM
16
RM
17
Australia 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 75 22 100 97 65 100 95 63 96 97
Hong Kong 100 100 91 100 100 94 100 82 29 98 87 88 100 95 67 77 93
Malaysia 100 100 100 100 100 82 100 81 99 100 100 100 100 78 59 99 100
Singapore 69 100 100 100 34 34 100 98 7 100 93 90 100 74 37 9 100
Philippines 79 100 99 99 97 88 99 65 89 93 88 94 100 64 50 74 87
Thailand 98 100 100 100 100 35 100 85 3 98 99 100 100 68 72 58 100
Vietnam 76 100 100 99 99 13 100 9 1 99 99 100 100 40 48 58 100
Total sample 89 100 99 100 90 64 100 71 36 98 95 91 100 73 57 67 97
Std. Dev. 13.6 - 3.4 - 24.7 35.2 - 29.0 41.2 2.5 5.4 12.5 - 19.1 13.0 30.4 5.0
This table presents a breakdown of DSRM scores by 17 RM items, which is consistent with the scoring method
for measuring DSRM as discussed earlier in Section 5.2.1.
The average level of compliance with each key mandatory disclosure item differs
considerably, ranging from 36 per cent (for RM9) to 100 per cent (for RM2, RM4, RM7, and
RM13). There is also considerable variation within items with the standard deviation across
the item-cross-country. As indicated by the sample standard deviation, the disclosure of RM9
(41.2), RM6 (35.2), RM16 (30.4), and RM8 (29.0) shows the largest variations in IR
mandatory disclosure cross-nationally. As such, the variation in mandatory disclosure is
likely to be driven by the variations of a few items including RM9, RM6, RM16, and RM8.
RM9 relates to disclosure of seasonality or cyclicality of the firm’s interim operation. While
almost all firms in Vietnam (1%), Thailand (3%) and Singapore (7%) do not comply with the
disclosure requirement; the majority of firms in Malaysia (99%) and the Philippines (89%)
provide the information about seasonality and cyclicality of their interim operations. In
compliance with BMSB listing rules, Malaysian firms tend to make an explicit statement to
any disclosure item which is not applicable to their financial reports; whereas firms in other
countries tend to disclose information, if applicable, rather than make an explicit statement of
‘not applicable’. Of the 99 Malaysian firms complying with the disclosure for RM9, 60 firms
state explicitly that they were not affected by seasonal or cyclical factors. Such disclosure
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could result in the very high compliance with the requirement for providing explanatory
comments about the seasonality and cyclicality of the interim operation for BMSB listed
firms.51 Nevertheless, there is no clear reason why most firms in Vietnam, Thailand, and
Singapore do not make disclosures in conformity with RM9. It is possible that seasonality
(cyclicality) does not influence those firms; or that the reporting preparers intentionally
withhold such sensitive information.52
RM6 relates to the disclosure of diluted EPS on the face of the interim report. Vietnamese
listed firms have the lowest level of compliance (13%), which is followed by the Singaporean
(34%) and the Thai (35%). It is also not really clear why firms would fully comply with the
disclosure of basic EPS (RM5) but fail to disclose the diluted EPS (RM6). In particular, all
Thai listed firms and 99 per cent of Vietnamese firms listed have complied with the related
mandatory disclosure, that is, RM5, which requires the disclosure of basic EPS on the face of
the interim reports. In this regard, it is possible that the firms’ diluted EPS is equal to their
basic EPS; therefore they would explain this in the notes but not disclose the diluted EPS on
the performance statement. As such, the non-compliance for presenting diluted EPS in the
face is more likely to be considered immaterial, therefore not being reported rather than the
withholding of sensitive information.
Under SGX Rulebooks, listed firms in Singapore are required to provide a performance
review including details of significant factors that have effects on their revenue, cost, and
earnings (SGX, 2011, Rule 705, App. 7.2). The provision of the performance review (in
addition to the IR) may make managers of Singaporean firms less inclined to disclosure
performance information such as EPS in and on the face of the IR leading to the low
compliance score for RM5 (34%) and RM6 (34%). In this regard, one could argue that such
disclosures for diluted EPS should be treated as compliance with RM5 and RM6 or otherwise
it could be regarded as a coding error. However, the relevant accounting standards require
51 This practice is also evident in the disclosures of other required information. For example, 82 Malaysian firms
state explicitly that there were no unusual items affecting their assets, liabilities, equity, net income, or cash
flows (RM10); similarly, 99 Malaysian firms make explicit statement that there were no material changes in the
estimates (RM11).
52 Gibbins, Richardson and Waterhouse (1990) suggest that sensitive information is the information that is
important to the users, but which listed firms are reluctant to disclose. Therefore it may be disclosed to
particular recipients but not to the public.
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disclosure on the face of the performance statement and therefore non-disclosure on the face
is arguably, non-compliance.
RM16 relates to disclosure of material subsequent events. A very low compliance level is
found in this item for Singaporean firms (9%). The investigation of the sample interim
reports has not yet offered any legitimate reason for the non-compliance. However, it could
be that the material subsequent events are sensitive; the firms therefore may have more
incentives to withhold the disclosure.
RM8 requires the disclosure of changes in accounting policies applying to the interim reports.
Only 9 per cent of the Vietnamese sample meets the requirement. The low compliance with
RM8 is possibly because most of these firms tend to provide a summary of significant
accounting policies that have been applied in preparing the interim reports rather than
providing a list of changes from the most recent annual financial statements. In Vietnam,
firms are only allowed to change accounting policies if there is requirement of change by
laws or by an accounting standard; or the change will result in more reliability and relevance
of disclosure information (MOF, 2005). Further, the required change in accounting policies
usually takes effect for a new accounting year rather than interim periods. This would
influence the Vietnamese firms’ IR disclosure practices because they may consider the
disclosure of RM8 is unnecessary. Therefore, non-compliance with the requirement for
disclosing changes in accounting policies may be more about customary disclosure practices
in Vietnam rather than the withholding of sensitive information.
In summary, the levels of compliance with IR regulations, as measured by DSRM, vary
across the region, which is consistent with the significant variations in requirements for IR
disclosure as highlighted in Chapter 2. Further, the tests for DSRM mean differences indicate
that DSRM levels for firms which have adopted IFRS and provide mandatory half-yearly
reports differ significantly from the counterpart firms.
6.1.3 Regional IR Discretionary Disclosure (DSRD) Scores and Descriptive Statistics
Table 6.6 presents the descriptive statistics and mean difference tests for the DSRD score,
which measures the comprehensive level of information disclosed by the Asia-Pacific firms
in compliance with common mandatory IR regulations. This sub-component captures the
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level of disclosure comprehensiveness, measured as ‘low’, ‘medium’, or ‘high’, made beyond
the minimum disclosure compliant with the related DSRM disclosure items.
Table 6.6 - Descriptive Statistics and Mean Difference Tests for DSRD
N Mean Median Std.
Dev.
Min Max Mean Difference
Panel A: Descriptive statistics & ANOVA tests for the country mean difference F-value p-value
Pooled Sample 700 0.635 0.633 0.136 0.238 0.958 52.57 <0.001
By country (ranking by mean)
Australia (5) 100 0.635 0.636 0.141 0.292 0.933
Hong Kong (3) 100 0.670 0.667 0.094 0.389 0.952
Malaysia (1) 100 0.750 0.778 0.099 0.467 0.958
Singapore (6) 100 0.529 0.533 0.096 0.292 0.815
Philippines (2) 100 0.679 0.708 0.144 0.250 0.933
Thailand (4) 100 0.657 0.667 0.104 0.400 0.848
Vietnam (7) 100 0.523 0.519 0.105 0.238 0.792
Panel B: Descriptive statistics & t- tests for DSRD scores by IR factors t-value p-value
IFRS adoption (IFRS) 11.997 <0.001
IFRS adoption 400 0.683 0.697 0.128 0.250 0.958
Non IFRS adoption 300 0.570 0.567 0.119 0.238 0.848
Audit review status (ATYP) -3.493 <0.001
Audit-reviewed IR 385 0.619 0.630 0.128 0.238 0.952
Not audit-reviewed IR 315 0.654 0.667 0.144 0.250 0.958
Reporting frequency (RFRE) -4.324 <0.001
Half-yearly report 300 0.609 0.625 0.131 0.238 0.952
Quarterly report 400 0.654 0.667 0.137 0.250 0.958
This table provides the descriptive statistics and mean difference tests for DSRD scores. Panel A provides the
descriptive statistics and ANOVA test for DSRD mean differences across the sample countries. Panel B provides
the descriptive statistics and t-tests (2-tailed) for mean differences for DSRD scores by three categorical groups
consistent with the independent variables (IR-related factors) included in Equation 5.2.
Table 6.6 (Panel A) shows that DSRD score varies substantially across the seven sample
countries, ranging from a minimum of 0.238 to a maximum of 0.958 with a mean (median) of
0.635 (0.633). The overall cross-country variation in the DSRD score is consistent with the
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DSRA score. The DSRD scores for Hong Kong, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand are
above the mean; those for Singapore and Vietnam are below the mean; whereas that for
Australia is just about the mean of the pooled sample. Malaysia has the highest mean score,
whilst Vietnam has the lowest mean score. However, the ranking by means has changed for
the other four countries. Hong Kong has moved from second to third, Thailand from third to
fourth, Australia from fourth to fifth, and the Philippines moving up from fifth to second.
The one-way ANOVA test for DSRD mean differences reveals that variations are statistically
significant (F = 52.57, p < 0.001). Similar to DSRA, the results of Tukey’s HSD for the
DSRD means, as presented in Appendix V, indicate that DSRD disclosure levels in Malaysia
differ significantly from those in the other countries. There is no significant difference
between the DSRD scores for Australia, Hong Kong, the Philippines, and Thailand. The
DSRD score for Singapore is not significantly different from Vietnam.
The results from independent-sample t-tests, as presented in Table 6.6 (Panel B), indicate that
DSRD varies significantly within the three IR-specific groups. The t-test results for DSRD
mean differences are consistent with those for the aggregate score.
Appendix VI provides the descriptive statistics and ANOVA test of mean differences for the
DSRD scores by industry. The results indicate that the level of IR mandatory disclosure
varies significantly across industry sectors (F = 3.051, p = 0.001). Consistent with the DSRM,
the results for the Tukey’s HSD (see Appendix IV – Panel C) also reveal that no industry
sector has a DSRD score which is significantly different from the others.
The extent of DSRD disclosure by items also differs substantially across the sample countries.
Table 6.7 presents the breakdown of the 11 RD items of the DSRD index by the average score
by each country. The compliance score of each RD item, presented in per cent, is calculated
as a ratio of total actual disclosure score for this item made by each of the 100 sample firms
to its maximum possible score (adjusted for ‘NA’ case). For example, after adjusted for ‘NA’
cases, the average score for RD1 by 100 sample firms in Australia is 65 per cent; whereas
that for 100 Hong Kong sample firms is 71 per cent.
Table 6.7 shows a substantially cross-national variation in the level of IR discretionary
disclosure by each component item. Similar to DSRM, the differences are also evident cross-
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country and within-country. The average discretionary disclosure scores for the pooled
sample ranges from the minimum of 23 per cent (for RD5) to the maximum of 93 per cent
(for RD9). As indicated by the sample standard deviation, the disclosure of RD4 (30.9), RD5
(26.6), and RD2 (22.4) shows the largest variations in IR discretionary disclosure cross-
nationally. RD4 is the discretionary disclosure of changes in accounting policies (related to
RM8); RD5 measures the discretionary disclosure of effect of seasonality and cyclicality
(related to RM9); and RD2 assesses the comprehensive disclosure of diluted EPS (related to
RM 6). As such, these key differences are consistent with the breakdown of the DSRM
scores, as discussed in Section 6.1.2.
Table 6.7 - DSRD Scores by Item for Each Sample Country
Items (%)
Country RD1 RD2 RD3 RD4 RD5 RD6 RD7 RD8 RD9 RD10 RD11
Australia 65 64 68 90 19 67 50 52 91 83 78
Hong Kong 71 68 87 95 16 66 51 69 93 84 55
Malaysia 67 55 66 93 60 76 67 91 97 79 95
Singapore 66 65 40 75 4 68 56 62 91 43 44
Philippines 60 52 71 94 62 65 46 78 83 77 66
Thailand 80 30 95 84 2 70 67 91 96 74 95
Vietnam 67 7 74 9 1 55 83 90 100 68 88
Total sample 68 49 72 77 23 67 60 78 93 73 74
Std. Dev. 6.2 22.4 17.5 30.9 26.6 6.3 13.0 15.7 5.5 15.2 20.1
This table presents a breakdown score across each country for the 11 component items of the DSRD score, which
is consistent with the scoring method for measuring DSRD as discussed earlier in Section 5.2.2.
In summary, the mean DSRA, DSRM, and DSRD scores vary across countries as expected
based on the analyses of differences in IR disclosure regulations provided in Chapter 2. The
descriptive statistics consistently show that Malaysia have the highest mean, whereas
Vietnamese have the lowest mean across the three IR compliance disclosure scores. Further,
the results from one-way ANOVA tests highlight that the levels of IR disclosure compliance
by listed firms statistically differ cross-nationally. The results from independent-sample t-
tests provide initial evidences as to the association between IR-related factors with the
91
disclosure compliance levels. The t-test results indicate that IR disclosure compliance for
IFRS-adoption firms is significantly greater than non-IFRS adoption firms, consistent with
the H1 prediction. However, the t-test results suggest that IR disclosure compliance is
significantly lower for firms with audit-reviewed IR, which is contrary to the H2 prediction.
Regarding reporting frequency (H3), the t-test for mean differences also indicates that IR
disclosure compliance is significantly lower for firms with half-yearly reports. Notably, the
breakdowns of DSRM and DSRD by items also show considerable variations cross-country as
well as within-country.
6.1.4 Descriptive Statistics for the Independent Variables
Table 6.8 presents the descriptive statistics for the independent variables used in this study.
Panel A presents the descriptive for the continuous variables and Panel B presents the
descriptive for the dichotomous variables.
Reporting lag (RLAG) represents the extent to which firms comply with the allowable time
(regulatory lag) to release their interim reports. RLAG shows a substantial variation, ranging
from a minimum of 0.15 to a maximum of 1.91, with a mean (median) of 0.89 (0.91). Whilst
various regulations determine the regulatory lag, the actual reporting lag will be firm specific
and influenced by managerial decisions. Three countries in the sample, Australia, Hong Kong
and Singapore, have all firms releasing the interim reports within the allowable time, with
RLAG ranging from 0.40 (Australia), 0.46 (Hong Kong) and 0.36 (Singapore) to 1.0. Vietnam
has the highest mean (median) RLAG of 1.04 (1.03), whereas Hong Kong has the lowest
mean (median) of 0.77.
The extreme disparity between the regulatory and actual reporting lag in Vietnam could be
attributed to the method of submitting and releasing the reports. Listed firms in Vietnam did
not electronically lodge the reports, but posted them to the stock exchanges, which is likely to
lead to delays in releasing the half-yearly reports.53 As such, it is difficult to establish the
53 According to Decision 515/QĐ-UBCK (SSC, 2012), disclosure entities were still required to submit the
reports by courier or by hand to the State Securities Commission (SSC). The online submission using the
Information Disclosure System of the SSC has started from  September 25, 2013, in conformity with the
decision 563/QĐ-UBCK (SSC, 2013).
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exact time when firms submitted their 2012 first half-year reports to HOSE and HNX. Hence,
the released dates on the stock exchanges are employed to determine the reporting lag. This
approach allows for the consistency in measuring reporting lag for the whole sample, which
is determined based on the released date of the IR obtained from relevant stock exchanges.
However, it also introduces unavoidable error into the measurement of RLAG for Vietnam.
The low compliance level may however suggest lax enforcement of IR regulations in
Vietnam or may be an indicator that the strictly allowable reporting lag is not practicably
achievable. 54
Firm size (SIZE) is measured by the natural log of total asset and varies substantially across
the sample countries, ranging from a minimum of 2.10 (US$M 8) to a maximum of 13.60
(US$M 783,295), with a mean of 7.47 (US$M 12,915) and median of 7.40 (US$M 1,645).
Australian firms are the largest with a mean of 8.88 (US$M 42,441), whereas Vietnamese
firms are the smallest with a mean of 5.35 (US$M 883). Firms in Hong Kong, Malaysia and
Singapore have above-average SIZE, whilst those in the Philippines and Thailand are below
the average.
Leverage (LEV) is measured by total liabilities to total assets and demonstrates a significant
variation across the region, ranging from a minimum of zero to a maximum of 8.04, with a
mean (median) of 0.50 (0.48). Firms in the Philippines have the highest LEV with a mean
(median) of 0.55 (0.48). Firms in Thailand and Vietnam also have above-average of LEV.
Firms in Australia, Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore have below-average of LEV. Hong
Kong has the lowest average of LEV with a mean and median of 0.45.
54 Although the SSC has regularly imposed fines on firms for late submission interim and annual reports, it is
argued that ‘fines of up to a few hundred million dong are not severe enough to discourage firms from breaking
disclosure rules’ (Viet Nam News, 2011). Further, the fine is often determined based on a multiple period of
breaching the regulatory lag, which may further indicate the lax of enforcement of disclosure requirements by
the SSC. Surprisingly, only 4.18 per cent of listed firms in Vietnam in 2013 fully complied with disclosure
requirements under the Circular 52/2012/TT-BTC (MOF, 2012); even worse it has been increasing in a number
of firms which do not submit or submit periodic reports late (Thanh Nu, 2013). In 2014, the incompliance with
regulatory lag by firms listed in Vietnam has still continued providing that half of the listed firms on both HOSE
and HNX had not submitted their second quarter 2014 reports even though the regulatory lag for the separate
quarterly reports was passed (Tran, 2014).
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Table 6.8 - Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables Used in Regression Analysis
Sample Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Panel A Descriptive statistics for continuous independent variables
Pooled RLAG 0.89 0.91 0.18 0.15 1.91
(n=700) SIZE 7.47 7.40 1.91 2.10 13.60
LEV 0.50 0.48 0.37 0.00 8.04
PRO 1.77 1.44 2.34 -7.89 19.68
Australia RLAG 0.80 0.81 0.14 0.40 1.00
(n=100) SIZE 8.88 8.61 1.58 5.60 13.60
LEV 0.49 0.47 0.23 0.06 0.94
PRO 1.46 1.26 2.04 -7.68 13.29
Hong Kong RLAG 0.77 0.77 0.13 0.46 1.00
(n=100) SIZE 8.76 8.61 1.56 5.30 12.30
LEV 0.45 0.45 0.25 0.01 0.92
PRO 1.61 1.32 1.31 -1.35 6.47
Malaysia RLAG 0.85 0.90 0.18 0.15 1.02
(n=100) SIZE 7.66 7.48 1.50 4.60 12.00
LEV 0.48 0.47 0.24 0.02 0.95
PRO 2.39 1.67 3.00 -5.48 19.68
Singapore RLAG 0.84 0.88 0.18 0.36 1.00
(n=100) SIZE 7.72 7.38 1.51 4.80 12.50
LEV 0.48 0.47 0.21 0.05 0.99
PRO 1.46 1.42 1.70 -5.10 7.10
Philippines RLAG 0.98 1.00 0.14 0.38 1.38
(n=100) SIZE 6.65 6.50 1.74 2.60 10.20
LEV 0.55 0.48 0.79 0.00 8.04
PRO 1.99 1.56 3.03 -7.89 13.81
Thailand RLAG 0.94 0.91 0.15 0.44 1.31
(n=100) SIZE 7.27 7.00 1.47 4.90 11.20
LEV 0.53 0.52 0.22 0.06 0.94
PRO 1.74 1.58 2.55 -6.68 12.40
Vietnam RLAG 1.04 1.03 0.20 0.45 1.91
(n=100) SIZE 5.35 5.05 1.46 2.10 9.80
LEV 0.52 0.53 0.22 0.06 0.95
PRO 1.77 1.21 2.24 -2.18 11.33
94
Panel B Descriptive Statistics for Dichotomous Independent Variables
Variable
Pooled
(n=700)
Australia
(n=100)
Hong Kong
(n=100)
Malaysia
(n=100)
Singapor
e (n=100)
Philippine
s (n=100)
Thailand
(n=100)
Vietnam
(n=100)
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
IFRS 400 300 100 0 100 100 100 100 0 100 100 0 0 100 0 100
ATYP 385 315 100 0 74 26 4 96 7 93 0 100 100 0 100 0
RFRE 300 400 100 0 100 0 0 100 0 100 0 100 0 100 100 0
FOR 300 400 96 4 87 13 15 85 82 18 14 86 5 95 1 99
Variable definitions
RLAG (Reporting lag) = A ratio of the number of days that elapse between the end of a firm’s interim
period and the day on which the IR is received by the stock exchange to the
regulatory lag
SIZE (Firm size) = the natural log of a firm’s total assets as at the interim period’s end
LEV (Firm leverage) = a ratio of a firm’s total liabilities to its total assets as at the interim period’s end
PRO (Profitability) = a ratio of a firm’s net income of the interim period to its total assets as at the
interim period’s end (adjusted to quarterly profit)
IFRS (IFRS adoption) = ‘1’ if the country adopted IFRS (for the study period) and ‘0’ otherwise
ATYP (Audit-review) ‘1’ if IR is audit-reviewed and ‘0’ otherwise
RFRE (Reporting =
frequency)
‘1’ if IR is a half-yearly report and ‘0’ otherwise
FOR (Foreign listing)= ‘1’ if a firm had foreign listing(s) in the financial year 2012 and ‘0’ otherwise
This table presents descriptive statistics for continuous independent variables (Panel A) and dichotomous
independent variables (Panel B) employed in the Eq. 5.2 to estimate IR disclosure compliance levels. Of the 385
interim reports, there are only two reports (one in Australia and one in Vietnam) that were fully audited.
Therefore, these 385 interim reports are referred to as audit-reviewed for simplicity, as early noted in Chapter 1.
Profitability (PRO) is measured by return on assets, which is a ratio of a firm’s net income of
the interim period to its total assets as at the interim period’s end. PRO for the equivalent
quarterly period of firms in Australia, Hong Kong, and Vietnam was estimated as a half of
the half-yearly PRO. PRO differs considerably across the sample countries, ranging from a
minimum of -7.89 to a maximum of 19.68, with a mean (median) of 1.77 (1.44). By country,
firms in Malaysia have the highest PRO with a mean (median) of 2.39 (1.67). Firms in the
Philippines also have the above PRO with a mean (median) of 1.99 (1.56). Firms in the five
remaining countries (Australia, Hong Kong, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) have PRO
below the mean. Australian and Singaporean firms have the lowest PRO with a mean of 1.46,
and median of 1.26 and 1.46 respectively.
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RLAG, SIZE, LEV, and PRO are not normally distributed as a result of a small number of
extreme observations. The raw variables are winsoried to within three standard deviations to
approximate a normal distribution. The winsorised variables are then employed to check
whether the regression results for the based models using the raw variables are driven by the
influence of outliers (see Section 6.2.2 and Section 7.1).
Table 6.8 (Panel B) presents the descriptive statistics for dichotomous independent variables
for the pooled sample and by each of the seven Asia-Pacific countries. The description shows
that 400 (57.1%) of the firms have adopted IFRS for the sample year, 385 (55.0%) of the
interim reports had been audit-reviewed (ATYP), 300 (42.9%) of the interim reports are half-
yearly (RFRE), and 300 (42.9%) of the sample having foreign listing(s).
6.2 Factors Predicted to Influence IR Disclosure Levels (H1 to H4)
The second research question investigates factors associated with IR disclosure compliance
levels, which particularly focuses on IR-related variables. This section provides the results of
the regression model developed in Chapter 5 and a series of robustness tests for the
predictions of the four hypotheses. Table 6.9 presents the correlations matrix of the
independent variables for the purpose of identifying any issues of multicollinearity. There are
no correlation coefficients in excess of 0.632. Therefore, for the purpose of OLS regression,
the independent and control variables included in Equation 5.2 show limited threat of
multicollinearity (see, Gujarati, 2003).
Table 6.9 - Correlation Coefficients for Independent and Control Variables
IFRS ATYP RFRE RLAG SIZE LEV PRO FOR
IFRS 1 -0.244** 0.167** -0.271** 0.325** -0.081** 0.041 0.237**
ATYP -0.244** 1 0.632** -0.011 0.026 0.044 -0.062 0.058
RFRE 0.167** 0.632** 1 -0.128** 0.100** 0.002 -0.075* 0.323**
RLAG -0.247** 0.025 -0.079* 1 -0.320** 0.046 -0.077* -0.428**
SIZE 0.313** 0.026 0.087* -0.274** 1 0.344** -0.259** 0.518**
LEV -0.024 -0.007 -0.027 0.048 0.173** 1 -0.422** 0.033
PRO 0.043 -0.058 -0.059 -0.034 -0.238** -0.328** 1 -0.042
FOR 0.237** 0.058 0.323** -0.355** 0.513** <0.001 -0.081* 1
This table presents Spearman Rank and Pearson correlations between variables included in Equation 5.2. Spearman
Rank correlation coefficients are shown above the diagonal, whilst Pearson correlations are presented below. ** and *
denote significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels (two-tailed). The correlations between variables are calculated for the
sample of 700.
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As discussed in Chapter 4, it is predicted that IR disclosure compliance is higher for firms
that adopt IFRS (IFRS - H1), engage an auditor to review their interim reports (ATYP - H2);
but is not associated with reporting frequency (RFRE - H3) and reporting lag (RLAG - H4).
The four hypotheses are jointly tested using the OLS regression model to estimate IR
disclosure compliance level, which is measured as the regional IR aggregate disclosure score
(DSRA).
6.2.1 Multivariate Results for DSRA
Table 6.10 presents the regression results for estimating IR aggregate disclosure level
(DSRA). The results indicate that the base model (Model 1) is statistically significant in
explaining IR aggregate disclosure levels across countries (F = 35.77, p < 0.001). The
adjusted R2 reveals that IR-related and control variables explain 45.8 per cent of the variations
in DSRA. There is no serious multicollinearity in this model since the maximum variance
inflation factor (VIF) is 7.49, which is lower than the cut-off point of above 10 (e.g., Gujarati,
2003; Pallant, 2011).55
Consistent with the H1 prediction, the IFRS variable coefficient (β1) is positive and
significant, indicating that IFRS-adopting countries are likely to have a higher level of IR
aggregate disclosure compliance. The coefficient is also economically significant, implying
that IFRS-adoption countries have an average 58.8 per cent greater IR aggregate disclosure
scores. This result is consistent with the prior research finding that IFRS-adoption improves
with the level of annual reporting disclosure (see, for example, Morris et al., 2012).
Hypothesis 2 posits that the levels of IR disclosure compliance are greater for firms with
audit-reviewed interim reports. Consistent with the prediction, the ATYP variable coefficient
(2) is significant and positively associated with DSRA. The result suggests that, holding
everything else constant, the level of IR aggregate disclosure in audit-reviewed interim
reports is 32.9 per cent higher than in the non-audit reviewed counterparts. This finding is
consistent with prior studies (see, for example, Mangena & Pike, 2005), which reveal that the
55 Further, a scatterplots of standardized residuals against predicted values suggest limited evidence of
heteroscedasticity.
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external auditor involvement is positively related to IR disclosure levels by listed firms in a
single-country setting.
Table 6.10 - Multiple Regression Results for DSRA, = + , + , + , + , + , + ,+ , + , + + ( )
Hypothesis Expected sign Coefficients t-stat p-value
Variables
Intercept 1.235 24.193 <0.001
IFRS H1 + 0.588 16.940 <0.001
ATYP H2 + 0.329 7.720 <0.001
RFRE H3 ? -0.457 -10.418 <0.001
RLAG H4 ? -0.070 -2.254 0.025
SIZE ? 0.283 7.263 <0.001
LEV ? 0.011 0.376 0.707
PRO ? 0.016 0.508 0.612
FOR ? -0.120 -3.197 0.001
IND (Industry Dummies) ? Included Not significant
Adj. R2 0.458
F-stat 35.774 <0.001
Variable definitions
DSRA = regional IR aggregate disclosure scores
IFRS (IFRS adoption) = ‘1’ if the country adopted IFRS (for the study period) and ‘0’ otherwise
ATYP (Audit-review) = ‘1’ if IR is audit-reviewed and ‘0’ otherwise
RFRE (Reporting
frequency)
= ‘1’ if IR is a half-yearly report and ‘0’ otherwise
RLAG (Reporting lag) = a ratio of the number of days that elapse between the end of a firm’s
interim period and the day on which the IR is received by the stock
exchange to the regulatory lag
SIZE (Firm size) = the natural log of a firm’s total assets as at the interim period’s end
LEV (Firm leverage) = a ratio of a firm’s total liabilities to its total assets as at the interim
period’s end
PRO (Profitability) = a ratio of a firm’s net income of the interim period to its total assets as at
the interim period’s end (adjusted to quarterly profit)
FOR (Foreign listing) = ‘1’ if a firm had foreign listing(s) in the financial year 2012; ‘0’ otherwise
This table presents the results of OLS regression estimations of DSRA for the pooled sample of 700. P-values
are reported for 2-tailed tests. Dummy variable for health care sector is excluded from the regression as the
reference group. The coefficients and p-value for nine IND dummies are: Financials (β = -0.031, p = 0.686),
Industrials (β = -0.047, p = 0.459), Consumer Discretionary (β = -0.014, p = 0.805), Consumer Staples (β =
0.091, p = 0.097), Materials (β = -0.004, p = 0.945), Energy (β = -0.030, p = 0.498), Utilities (β = 0.047, p =
0.269), Telecommunication Services (β = 0.025, p = 0.510), and Information Technology (β = 0.034, p = 0.348).
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Given competing arguments, H3, stated in the null, suggests that IR disclosure compliance is
unrelated to reporting frequency. However, the result shows that the RFRE has a significant
negative association with IR disclosure compliance indicating a higher level of compliance
for mandatory quarterly reports. The result suggests that the timelier mandatory reports
provide higher levels of IR disclosure compliance. On average, the IR aggregate disclosure
level for mandatory half-yearly reporting is 45.7 per cent lower than for mandatory quarterly
reporting.
Given competing arguments, H4 is also stated in the null suggesting that IR disclosure
compliance is unrelated with reporting lags. However, the RLAG variable coefficient (4) is
significant and negatively related to DSRA. Thus, the result suggests that the timeliness of IR
disclosure is positively associated with levels of IR disclosure compliance. On average and
other things being equal, a 10 per cent increase in the reporting lag is associated with a seven
per cent decrease in IR aggregate disclosure level. This implies that firms taking a longer
time to release IR are likely to disclose less information.
In terms of control variables, the regression results indicate that firm size (SIZE) has a
significant and positive association with the level of IR aggregate disclosure. The finding is
consistent with the overwhelming evidence for the positive association in the literature on
annual reporting disclosure (see, for example, Singhvi & Desai, 1971; Cooke, 1992; Meek et
al., 1995; Gallery et al., 2008; Dong & Stettler, 2011) and interim reporting disclosure (see,
for example, Mangena & Pike, 2005; Mangena & Tauringana, 2007).
The results indicate that there is no significant association between firm leverage (LEV) and
IR aggregate disclosure. It may be that interim reports play a less important role for
facilitating the lenders to monitor firms’ compliance with debt covenants since most debt
covenant restrictions are based on annual rather than interim earnings (see, Bédard &
Courteau, 2015). On this basis, it could be suggested that firms would not be motivated to
disclose greater interim information because it might not lead to a reduction in agency cost
related to outside capital. For this reason, it is difficult to establish an association between
firm leverage and IR disclosure level. In the context of IR disclosure, this insignificant
association is consistent with prior studies (see, for example, Mangena & Pike, 2005;
Mangena & Tauringana, 2007).
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Similarly, no significant association is found for profitability (PRO). The finding is consistent
with the extant literature. In particular, Ahmed and Courtis (1999) suggest that profitability is
likely to influence voluntary disclosure, but not aggregate disclosure levels.
Further, the FOR variable coefficient (8) indicates a significant and negative association
between IR aggregate disclosure and foreign listing(s). This finding seems to be inconsistent
with the argument for foreign regulation by prior research in that foreign stock exchanges
may prescribe more disclosure requirements than the domestic ones, thereby positively
influencing annual reporting disclosure level (see, Cooke, 1989). However, it could be that
foreign stock exchanges do not impose more disclosure requirements relative to mandatory
regulations by the domestic developed stock exchanges. As presented in Table 6.8, the
majority of sample firms listing on the developed stock exchanges, Australia, Hong Kong and
Singapore, have foreign listing(s). As such, the expectation for the positive association
between IR disclosure compliance level and foreign listing may not be established.
Model 1 also includes nine industry dummies at the two-digit level of GICS, excluding the
health care sector with the median IR disclosure compliance, to control for industry specific
effects that are not captured by IR-regulated and firm-specific variables. None of the
coefficients on industry are significantly associated with IR disclosure compliance, which
indicates the absence of any specific industry effect.
To ensure the result is not driven by the influence of outliers, Model 1 is estimated using the
winsorised regressors. The result using the winsorised variables of RLAG, SIZE, LEV, and
PRO (see Appendix VII) is almost identical to the primary result using the raw variables.
Briefly, the multiple regression results suggest that IR-related factors, IFRS-adoption, audit
review, reporting frequency (half-yearly versus quarterly reports) and reporting lag, are
significant to explain cross-country variations in IR disclosure compliance. As predicted,
firms that have adopted IFRS and engage an auditor to review their interim reports are likely
to have higher levels of IR disclosure compliance. Interestingly, the results suggest that firms
producing mandatory half-yearly reports are likely to have lower levels of IR disclosure
compliance. Further, the findings further suggest that firms that take a shorter time to release
their interim reports are likely to have higher levels of IR disclosure compliance.
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6.2.2 Sensitivity Analysis - DSRA
With Alternative Measures of Explanatory Variables
First, the main findings are checked with two alternative proxies for SIZE: the natural log of
the interim period’s sales and the natural log of market capitalisation of the firm. The
inclusion of firm size measured by sales follows a large number of prior studies, such as
Meek et al. (1995), Wallace and Naser (1995), Botosan (1997), Inchausti (1997), Depoers
(2000), and Dong and Stettler (2011); whereas the inclusion of firm size measured by market
capitalisation follows prior studies, such as Lang and Lundholm (1993), Williams (1999), and
Lim, How and Verhoeven (2014). Total sales are collected from the interim reports and
translated to US dollar by using individual exchange rates for each interim report; and market
capitalisation is determined as at December 31, 2011. The exchange rates and market
capitalisation are obtained from Osiris database.
The regression results are presented in Table 6.11 Column A (for sales) and Column B (for
market capitalisation). The results from estimating Model 1 using the alternative proxies for
SIZE are consistent with the primary results with the only difference being that the
significance on the coefficient for RLAG (4) has dropped to the 10 per cent level (p-value =
0.099). As such, the primary findings are not sensitive to alternate proxies for SIZE.
Turning to profitability (PRO), Model 1 is estimated using a dummy variable indicating
whether a firm has a positive (‘1’) or negative (‘0’) net income for the interim period as a
proxy for firm profitability. The employment of this dummy variable follows prior studies,
such as Mangena and Pike (2005). The estimation of DSRA using the alternative proxy for
PRO, as presented in Table 6.11 Column C, yields results consistent with the primary
analysis.
Augmentation of Country Non-IR Regulatory Factors
Following the empirical evidences suggested by prior studies, the influence of legal origin
(LEG), the stage of economic development (ECO), and culture (CUL) of the country on
variations in the level of IR disclosure compliance is examined. However, due to the high
correlations, these three country non-IR regulatory variables (LEG, ECO, and CUL) are
added separately to the base model (Model 1).
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Table 6.11 - Multiple Regression Results for DSRA Robustness Tests
, = + , + , + , + , + , + , + ,+ , + + (Model 1)
Model A B C D E F G
Intercept 1.313
(<0.001)
1.221
(<0.001)
1.234
(<0.001)
1.229
(<0.001)
1.269
(<0.001)
1.090
(<0.001)
1.382
(<0.001)
IFRS
(H1)
+ 0.615
(<0.001)
0.561
(<0.001)
0.590
(<0.001)
0.586
(<0.001)
0.557
(<0.001)
0.819
(<0.001)
0.519
(<0.001)
ATYP
(H2)
+ 0.338
(<0.001)
0.313
(<0.001)
0.330
(<0.001)
0.337
(<0.001)
0.289
(<0.001)
RFRE
(H3)
? -0.508
(<0.001)
-0.415
(<0.001)
-0.459
(<0.001)
-0.461
(<0.001)
-0.390
(<0.001)
-0.845
(<0.001)
-0.525
(<0.001)
-0.-RLAG
(H4)
- -0.063
(0.044)
-0.052
(0.099)
-0.070
(0.023)
-0.065
(0.047)
-0.100
(0.002)
-0.063
(0.036)
-0.054
(0.226)
7SIZE ? 0.230
(<0.001)
0.252
(<0.001)
0.277
(<0.001)
0.277
(<0.001)
0.305
(<0.001)
0.236
(<0.001)
0.169
(0.012)
LEV ? -0.006
(0.885)
0.022
(0.476)
0.009
(0.756)
0.013
(0.664)
-0.003
(0.916)
0.008
(0.798)
0.045
(0.337)
PRO ? -0.024
(0.441)
-0.029
(0.356)
0.014
(0.641)
0.016
(0.615)
0.011
(0.730)
0.010
(0.753)
-0.065
(0.116)
0.
FOR ? -0.078
(0.029)
-0.113
(0.004)
-0.119
(0.002)
-0.128
(0.002)
-0.001
(0.982)
-0.069
(0.063)
0.018
(0.804)
LEG ? 0.023
(0.597)
ECO ? -0.193
(<0.001)
CUL ? 0.706
(<0.001)
AUD ? 0.115
(0.006)
IND ? Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc.
Adj. R2 0.451 0.446 0.458 0.458 0.468 0.487 0.492
F-stat 34.790
(<0.001)
34.163
(<0.001)
35.770
(<0.001)
33.767
(<0.001)
35.202
(<0.001)
39.967
(<0.001)
22.834
(<0.001)
Max VIFs 7.08 7.14 7.49 7.52 7.49 7.52 6.17
N 700 700 700 700 700 700 385
This table presents results of OLS regression estimations of the regional IR aggregate disclosure (DSRA) for the
robustness tests. P-values are reported for 2-tailed tests and presented in brackets below the standardised
coefficients. Dummy variable for health care sector is excluded from the regression as the reference group.
Variable definitions are discussed in the text or otherwise provided in Table 6.10, and Appendix VIII. DSRA is
estimated using sales (Column A) and market capitalisation (Column B) for SIZE, dummy variable for PRO
(Column C); adding LEG (Column D), ECO (Column E), CUL (Column F); and AUD (Column G). The
descriptive statistics for the alternative measures (sales, market capitalisation, and profit versus loss), the three
country non-IR regulatory variables (LEG, ECO, and CUL), and ADU are provided in Appendix IX.
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The classification of legal origin (LEG) follows La Porta et al. (1998), Nguyen (1999),
Tilleke and Gibbins (2011). Australia, Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore are classified as
common-law countries (coded as ‘1’), whilst the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam are
code-law countries (coded as ‘0’). The estimation of Model 1 with the augmentation of LEG,
as provided Table 6.11 Column D, confirms the main findings on the IR-related factors
associated with DSRA. However, legal origin is not significantly associated with the DSRA
score.
The stage of economic development (ECO) is determined by the International Monetary Fund
(2012). Countries with advanced economies are Australia, Hong Kong and Singapore (coded
as ‘1’); whereas Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam are classified as emerging
economies (coded as ‘0’). With the inclusion of ECO, the regression results, as presented in
Table 6.11 Column E, are quantitatively similar to the primary analysis with each of the four
IR-related factors. In terms of control variables, the only difference is that the FOR variable
coefficient is no longer significant. Contrary to expectations, there is a negative and
significant relation between DSRA and stage of economic development indicating that the IR
disclosure score is greater for developing countries than advanced economies.
In terms of culture, a recent study by Pevzner, Xie and Xin (2015) uses societal trust as a
measure of national culture (CUL) and contends that firms are likely to provide greater
information in more trusting countries. Societal trust is measured using the World Values
Survey database, which is the percentage of the respondents to the question ‘Generally
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in
dealing with people?’ The values of societal trust for the sample (by country) are obtained
from the World Values Survey database.
The correlation analysis identifies that the pairwise correlation between CUL and ATYP is
high (r = 0.840, p <0.001), indicating high multicollinearity. As such, the robustness check
for the influence of CUL is performed by excluding ATYP from Model 1, as presented in
Table 6.11 Column F. The estimation of DSRA with the inclusion of CUL is consistent with
the primary results. As expected, CUL (societal trust) is positive and significant in its
association with IR disclosure.
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Audit Quality
Within the sample, a number of firms voluntarily engage an auditor to review their interim
reports, including 74 firms in Hong Kong, four firms in Malaysia, and seven firms in
Singapore. As such, the sample has 300 mandatorily audit-reviewed interim reports (from
Australia, Thailand, and Vietnam) and 85 voluntarily ones (from Hong Kong, Malaysia, and
Singapore). Of the 385 audit-reviewed interim reports, 325 interim reports (84.4%) were
reviewed by a Big-4 auditor, whilst 60 interim reports (15.6%) were reviewed by a non-Big-4
auditor (Appendix VII, Panel B). Among the three countries having mandatory audit review
requirements, Vietnam has a lowest number of reports reviewed by the Big-4 auditors,
whereas most of the Australia interim reports were reviewed by a Big-4 auditor. A lower
proportion of the Vietnamese interim reports reviewed by the Big-4 auditors is not surprising
because KPMG, E&Y, PwC, and Deloitte are not the four auditing firms having the most
clients in Vietnam in 2012 (VACPA, 2013). As suggested by the extant literature (e.g.,
Singhvi & Desai, 1971; Inchausti, 1997; Gallery et al., 2008; Palmer, 2008), audit quality is
positively related to the level of annual reporting disclosure. As such, a sensitive test for the
main findings is performed to examine whether audit quality has any influence on the level of
IR disclosure compliance across the region.
In this sensitive test, the ATYP variable in Model 1 is replaced by audit quality (AUD), which
is coded as ‘1’ if the IR was reviewed by one of the Big-4 audit firms and ‘0’ otherwise. The
results, as presented in Table 6.11 Column G, indicate that AUD has a significant and positive
association with IR disclosure compliance levels. With the influence of audit quality, the
results from estimating DSRA are different from the main findings for the base model in that
the coefficients of RLAG (4) variables become insignificant.
6.3 Summary
This chapter discusses the empirical findings on the cross-country variations in IR disclosure
compliance levels. The descriptive statistics and tests for differences in means of IR
disclosure scores reveal that the disclosure compliance levels are significantly different
across the seven sample countries. A series of multivariate analyses conducted to test the four
IR-related hypotheses indicate that the IR disclosure compliance model developed in Chapter
5 is statistically significant. The results reveal that the four IR-related variables are significant
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in explaining cross-country variations in the disclosure compliance levels. Consistent with the
predictions, IR disclosure compliance is positively associated with IFRS-adoption (H1) and
audit-review of interim reports (H2). As such, firms that have adopted IFRS and engage an
auditor to review their interim reports are likely to disclose greater IR information. As for the
hypothesis H3, reporting frequency is significantly and negatively associated with IR
disclosure compliance. This finding suggests that firms providing a mandatory quarterly
report are likely to have a higher level of IR disclosure compliance. Finally, reporting lag
(H4) is significant and negatively related IR discretionary disclosure. As such, firms that take
a longer time to produce their interim reports tend to disclose less interim information.
With respect to firm-specifics, the results consistently show that firm size is positively related
to IR disclosure compliance, whilst foreign listing has a negative influence on the disclosure.
Neither firm leverage nor profitability is statistically associated with the disclosure levels.
Further, industry sectors do not show any significant association with DSRA.
For country non-IR related factors, the results suggest that firms that are located in an
emerging economy and in a country with higher societal trust are likely to have higher levels
of IR disclosure compliance. However, no significant association between IR disclosure
compliance and legal origin is found. Regarding audit quality, the findings suggest that firms
who engage a Big-4 auditor to review their IR are likely to have higher disclosure compliance
than those which have the interim reports reviewed by a non-Big-4 auditor.
The following chapter provides a series of supplementary analyses of IR disclosure
compliance to test the robustness of the primary analysis provided in this chapter.
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CHAPTER 7: SUPPLEMENTARY ANALYSES OF IR DISCLOSURE
COMPLIANCE
This chapter presents a series of supplementary analyses of IR disclosure compliance to offer
further evidences on the variation in IR disclosure compliance across the sample countries.
Section 7.1 discusses multivariate results from the robustness tests of the hypotheses using
different alternative measures of dependent variables, country dummy variables and
alternative grouping of industry. Section 7.2 provides analyses of within-country mandatory
IR disclosure compliance. Section 7.3 provides the concluding comments.
7.1 Robustness Tests of Hypotheses
7.1.1 Multivariate Results – Using DSRM
To examine if the results are robust to using the component IR disclosure compliance scores,
Model 1 is re-estimated using DSRM as the dependent variable as specified in Model 2. The
analysis undertakes the primary and all sensitivity tests similar to those for DSRA. The related
results are reported in Table 7.1.
The regression results, as reported in Column A, indicate that Model 2 is statistically
significant in explaining DSRM (F = 48.01, p < 0.001). With an adjusted R2 of 55.3 per cent,
the result indicates that Model 2 is well specified in explaining cross-country variations in IR
mandatory disclosure. The influence of IR-related and control variables in the DSRM model
is similar to the findings for the DSRA model, except that the PRO (7) becomes significant,
whereas the FOR variable coefficient (8) is now not significant. The positive impact of
profitability suggests that a higher profitability firm is induced to communicate more
information in order to obtain more benefits, such as supporting the managers’ positions and
compensation arrangements, improving the firm’s valuation, and justifying its reported
profits (e.g., Inchausti, 1997; Taplin et al., 2002).
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Table 7.1 - Multiple Regression Results for DSRM, = + , + , + , + , + , + , + ,+ , + + (Model 2)
Model A B C D E F G H
Intercept 0.802
(<0.001)
0.828
(<0.001)
0.791
(<0.001)
0.808
(<0.001)
0.783
(<0.001)
0.797
(<0.001)
0.724
(<0.001)
0.912
(<0.001)
IFRS
(H1)
+ 0.621
(<0.001)
0.641
(<0.001)
0.589
(<0.001)
0.630
(<0.001)
0.606
(<0.001)
0.632
(<0.001)
0.912
(<0.001)
0.728
(<0.001)
ATYP
(H2)
+ 0.449
(<0.001)
0.454
(<0.001)
0.428
(<0.001)
0.453
(<0.001)
0.506
(<0.001)
0.463
(<0.001) - -
RFRE
(H3)
? -0.544
(<0.001)
-0.588
(<0.001)
-0.497
(<0.001)
-0.554
(<0.001)
-0.580
(<0.001)
-0.567
(<0.001)
-1.034
(<0.001)
-0.675
(<0.001)
RLAG
(H4)
- -0.171
(<0.001)
-0.164
(<0.001)
-0.153
(<0.001)
-0.174
(<0.001)
-0.133
(<0.001)
-0.160
(<0.001)
-0.163
(<0.001)
-0.145
(<0.001)
SIZE ? 0.248
(<0.001)
0.214
(<0.001)
0.241
(<0.001)
0.226
(<0.001)
0.208
(<0.001)
0.240
(<0.001)
0.192
(<0.001)
-0.001
(0.978)
LEV ? -0.030
(0.283)
-0.047
(0.099)
-0.022
(0.441)
-0.046
(0.093)
-0.016
(0.583)
-0.025
(0.376)
-0.035
(0.188)
0.044
(0.244)
PRO ? 0.077
(0.008)
0.042
(0.144)
0.037
(0.195)
0.034
(0.212)
0.076
(0.008)
0.079
(0.007)
0.069
(0.013)
0.005
(0.882)
0.
FOR ? -0.047
(0.174)
-0.016
(0.629)
-0.051
(0.154)
-0.045
(0.199)
-0.111
(0.003)
-0.089
(0.053)
0.014
(0.683)
0.043
(0.478)
LEG ? -0.171
(<0.001) -
ECO ? 0.068
(0.163)
CUL 0.919
(<0.001)
AUD ? 0.138
(<0.001)
IND ? Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc.
Adj. R2 0.553 0.531 0.529 0.530 0.545 0.534 0.573 0.661
F-stat 48.011
(<0.001)
47.617
(<0.001)
47.146
(<0.001)
47.317
(<0.001)
47.502
(<0.001)
45.520
(<0.001)
56.237
(<0.001)
45.095
(<0.001)
Max VIFs 7.49 7.08 7.14 7.49 7.52 7.49 7.52 6.17
N 700 700 700 700 700 700 700 385
This table presents results of OLS regression estimations of the regional IR mandatory disclosure (DSRM) for the base
model (Column A). In the robustness tests, DSRM is estimated using sales (Column B) and market capitalisation (Column
C) for SIZE, dummy variable for PRO (Column D); adding LEG (Column E), ECO (Column F), CUL (Column G); and
AUD (Column H). P-values are reported for 2-tailed test and presented in brackets below the standardised coefficients.
Dummy variable for health care sector is excluded from the regression as the reference group. Variable definitions are
provided in Appendix VIII.
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The estimation for Model 2 is also repeated using the winsorised variables of RLAG, SIZE,
LEV, and PRO. The regression results using winsoried variables, as presented in Appendix
VII, are quantitatively consistent with those using the raw variables.
Additional tests are conducted to check the robustness of the main findings on factors
associated with DSRM. The results are reported in Table 7.1, Columns B to H. First, the
regression results using the alternative proxies for SIZE (Columns B and C) and for PRO
(Column D) are quantitatively similar with the only difference being that the PRO variable
coefficient (7) becomes insignificant. Second, the influence of country non-IR regulatory on
DRSM is examined by adding legal origin (LEG), economic development (ECO), and societal
trust (CUL) to Model 2 separately. With the inclusion of LEG, the FOR variable coefficient
(8) is now significant (Column E), whereas the other variables coefficients are consistent
with the main findings; LEG shows a significant negative impact on DSRM. With the
inclusion of ECO, the regression results, as presented in Column F, are quantitatively similar
to the main findings; ECO is not significantly associated with DSRM. With the CUL model,
as presented in Column G, the results are also quantitatively similar to the main findings
(except for the exclusion of auditor involvement - ATYP). Finally, the results from estimating
Model 2 using the sub-sample of 385 firms with audit-reviewed IR (Column H) reveal that
audit quality (AUD) has a positive impact on DSRM. The influences of IFRS-adoption
(IFRS), reporting frequency (RFRE), and reporting lag (RLAG) on DSRM are consistent with
the primary analysis of DSRA. However, the coefficients of SIZE and PRO are now not
significant.
Briefly, the findings on the association between the regional IR mandatory disclosure
(DSRM) and IR-related factors are quantitatively consistent with the primary results using
DSRA. In particular, the findings are consistent with the predictions of H1 and H2 positing
that disclosure compliance is higher for firms in IFRS-adoption countries (IFRS) and firms
with audit-reviewed interim reports (ATYP). Further, consistent with the regression results
using DSRA, the findings suggest that IR disclosure compliance is lower for firms with
mandatory half-yearly reporting (H3 - RFRE). With respect to reporting lag (H4), the findings
suggest that IR disclosure compliance is lower for firms taking a longer time (RLAG) to
release their IR.
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7.1.2 Multivariate Results – Using DSRD
Similarly, Model 1 is re-estimated using DSRD as the dependent variable, as specified in
Model 3, to examine whether the primary results are robust to using the second component
score. The analysis also undertakes all sensitive tests; and the related results are reported in
Table 7.2. The regression results, as presented in Column A, indicate that Model 3 is
statistically significant in explaining DSRD (F = 19.556, p < 0.001). The influence of IR-
related and control factors on DSRD is similar to the estimation result for the DSRA model
with the only difference being that the RLAG variable coefficient (4) is no longer significant.
This result suggests that the timeliness of IR does not have significant influence on IR
discretionary disclosure. As such, neither time constraint nor the cost-benefit trade-off related
to the timeliness of disclosure has impact on the level of IR discretionary disclosure.
Model 3 is also estimated using the winsorised variables of RLAG, SIZE, LEV, and PRO. The
regression results, as presented in Appendix VII, are similar to those using the raw variables
with the only difference being that the LEV variable coefficient (β6) becomes significant at
five per cent level.
The results of additional tests conducted to check the robustness tests of the main findings on
factors associated with DSRD are reported in Table 7.2, Columns B to H. The results are
quantitatively consistent with the main findings for Model 3 except that the FOR variable
coefficient drops its significance in the ECO model (Column F) and AUD model (Column H).
In terms of country non-IR regulatory factors, the results indicate that legal origin (LEG) is
not significantly associated with the regional IR discretionary disclosure (Column E);
whereas the stage of economic development (ECO) shows a significant negative relation
(Column F). Societal trust (CUL) has significant positive association with DSRD (Column
G). Finally, the regression results for sub-sample of 385 firms with audit-reviewed IR
(Column H) do not show the significant influence of AUD on DSRD, which is not consistent
with the regression result for DSRA and DSRM.
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Table 7.2 - Multiple Regression Results for DSRD
, = + , + , + , + , + , + , + ,+ , + + (Model 3)
Model A B C D E F G H
Intercept 0.433
(<0.001)
0.484
(<0.001)
0.430
(<0.001)
0.426
(<0.001)
0.446
(<0.001)
0.473
(<0.001)
0.366
(<0.001)
0.470
(<0.001)
IFRS
(H1)
+ 0.477
(<0.001)
0.503
(<0.001)
0.457
(<0.001)
0.475
(<0.001)
0.483
(<0.001)
0.424
(<0.001)
0.634
(<0.001)
0.281
(<0.001)
ATYP
(H2)
+ 0.204
(<0.001)
0.215
(<0.001)
0.194
(<0.001)
0.204
(<0.001)
0.181
(<0.001)
0.138
(0.004) - -
RFRE
(H3)
? -0.332
(<0.001)
-0.381
(<0.001)
-0.300
(<0.001)
-0.330
(<0.001)
-0.317
(<0.001)
-0.221
(<0.001)
-0.599
(<0.001)
-0.327
(<0.001)
RLAG
(H4)
- 0.003
(0.931)
0.008
(0.813)
0.017
(0.628)
0.004
(0.908)
-0.013
(0.729)
-0.048
(0.174)
0.008
(0.825)
0.018
0.727)
SIZE ? 0.260
(<0.001)
0.204
(<0.001)
0.220
(<0.001)
0.266
(<0.001)
0.277
(<0.001)
0.298
(<0.001)
0.227
(<0.001)
0.254
(0.001)
LEV ? 0.035
(0.305)
0.021
(0.555)
0.045
(0.191)
0.041
(0.211)
0.029
(0.394)
0.011
(0.752)
0.033
(0.334)
0.037
(0.508)
PRO ? -0.024
(0.499)
-0.061
(0.084)
-0.065
(0.065)
<0.001
(0.978)
-0.023
(0.506)
-0.033
(0.347)
-0.028
(0.420)
-0.101
(0.042)
0.
FOR ? -0.146
(0.001)
-0.104
(0.010)
-0.133
(0.003)
-0.146
(0.001)
-0.119
(0.010)
0.053
(0.333)
-0.110
(0.011)
-0.002
(0.985)
LEG ? -0.071
(0.150) -
ECO ? -0.323
(<0.001)
CUL ? 0.467
(<0.001)
AUD ? 0.079
(0.113)
IND ? Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc.
Adj. R2 0.311 0.303 0.298 0.311 0.312 0.340 0.326 0.275
F-stat 19.556
(<0.001)
18.872
(<0.001)
18.494
(<0.001)
19.537
(<0.001)
18.623
(<0.001)
21.047
(<0.001)
20.876
(<0.001)
9.580
(<0.001)
Max VIFs 7.49 7.08 7.14 7.49 7.52 7.49 7.52 6.17
N 700 700 700 700 700 700 700 385
This table presents results of OLS regression estimations of the regional IR discretionary disclosure (DSRD) for the base
model (Column A). In the robustness tests, DSRD is estimated using sales (Column B) and market capitalisation (Column
C) for SIZE, dummy variable for PRO (Column D); adding LEG (Column E), ECO (Column F), CUL (Column G); and
AUD (Column H). P-values are reported for 2-tailed test and presented in brackets below the standardised coefficients.
Dummy variable for health care sector is excluded from the regression as the reference group. Variable definitions are
provided in Appendix VIII.
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Briefly, the findings on the association between the regional IR discretionary disclosure
(DSRD) and IFRS-adoption (H1), audit-reviewed status (H2), and reporting frequency (H3)
are consistent with the primary results using the regional IR aggregate disclosure (DSRA). As
predicted, the regression results reveal that IR discretionary disclosure levels are
significantly, positively associated with IFRS-adoption (IFRS) and audit-reviewed interim
reports (ATYP). The findings also suggest that the IR discretionary disclosure is negatively
associated with firms issuing mandatory half-yearly reports (RFRE), consistent with the result
for DSRA. However, inconsistent with the primary results for DSRA, the estimation for DSRD
shows the insignificant association with reporting lag (RLAG).
7.1.3 Multivariate Results – Using Recoding Scores of IR Disclosure Compliance
As discussed in Section 6.1.2, the practice of providing an explicit statement in the notes to
financial statements as to any ‘not applicable’ required disclosure items is not consistent
across the seven sample countries. Within the primary method for coding IR disclosure
compliance scores (Section 5.2), those statements of ‘not applicable’ or ‘nothing to report’
are scored as compliance for the regional IR mandatory disclosure (DSRM) and excluded
from the calculation for the regional IR discretionary disclosure (DSRD). In order to
understand whether the primary regression results estimating the regional IR disclosure
compliance are driven by such scoring technique, all ‘not applicable’ disclosures are recoded
in the same way as non-disclosures.
The regression results using the recoding scores are presented in Appendix X. The findings
on the association between the four hypothesised IR-related variables and the disclosure
compliance are generally consistent with the primary results. The first difference is that the
RLAG variable coefficient (β4) is now not significantly associated with the DSRA (Appendix
X, Column A). The second difference is that the RFRE variable coefficient (β3) is no longer
significantly associated with the DSRD (Appendix X, Column C). However, given that the
regression results for the recoding scores of DSRM (Appendix X, Column B) are consistent
with the primary findings, this suggests that the influences of the four hypothesised IR-related
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variables are not driven by the practice of providing an explicit statement of ‘not applicable’
items. 56
7.1.4 Multivariate Results – Using Sub-scores of IR Disclosure Compliance
As discussed in Section 6.1, the differences in the regional IR disclosure compliance scores
cross-nationally are driven by the varying disclosure of a few sensitive items including i)
seasonality and cyclicality, ii) segment information, and iii) material events subsequent to the
balance sheet date. The three disclosure items form the basis for determining the sub-scores
of the regional IR disclosure compliance scores (DSRA, DSRM, and DSRD).
The regression results, as presented in Appendix XII, also indicate that the Equation 5.2 is
statistically significant in justifying the level of disclosure compliance with sensitive items in
interim reports across countries. However, two of the four hypothesised variables lose the
significant impact as compared to the primary findings. In particular, the influences of audit
review (ATYP) and reporting lag (RLAG) on the aggregate disclosure (DSRA) are now no
longer significant (Appendix XII, Column A). As for the two components of the aggregate
disclosure, RLAG loses its significant impact on the mandatory disclosure (Appendix XII,
Column B); whereas ATYP loses its significant association with the discretionary disclosure
(Appendix XII, Column C).
The loss of association for ATYP could be either due to the sub-scores determined using a
smaller number of items (only 2 versus the 11 items in the DSRD index). Alternatively, this
could be because the external auditors are not able to exert their impact on the comprehensive
disclosure of such sensitive items with the very limited assurance of audit reviews. Whereas,
the loss of association for RLAG could suggest that the level of disclosure compliance for
sensitive items is influenced by other constraints, such as the proprietary cost, rather than the
time determinants.
56 To further check the influence of practice of providing explicit statements as to ‘not applicable’ disclosure
items by Malaysian firms, the regressions for the three base models (Model 1, 2 and 3) are rerun by excluding
100 Malaysian firms. The regression results, as presented in Appendix XI, reveal that the association between
the four IR-related factors with IR disclosure compliance is generally similar to the primary findings with the
only difference being that the RLAG variable coefficient loses its significance to 10 per cent level for the DSRA
model. The findings suggest that the practice of making an explicit ‘not applicable’ statement does not drive the
result of the four IR-related determinants.
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Overall, the results using the sub-scores of sensitive items suggest that time constraints do not
drive variation in the mandatory disclosure of sensitive items; and that the involvement of
external auditors is not significant to enhance the comprehensive disclosure of these items.
Therefore, the impact of IFRS-adoption (IFRS) and reporting frequency (RFRE) are the two
most important determinants of the managers’ behaviour towards the disclosures of sensitive
items.
As for the effect of industry sectors, the regression results reveal the (sub-score) aggregate
disclosure is positively associated with the three industry sectors: Consumer Staples (β =
0.177, p = 0.002), Information Technology (β = 0.072, p = 0.058), and Utilities (β = 0.112, p
= 0.013). These industry sectors also have positive association with the (sub-score)
discretionary disclosure. The results may suggest that firms in the three industry sectors are
less likely to be influenced by fluctuation of operational cycles, therefore the managers are
more confident to disclose greater information.
7.1.5 Multivariate Results – Using Quarterly Reports for Vietnam
As discussed in Chapter 2, Vietnam is the exception case that requires listed firms issue
separately the second quarter reports (without assurance requirement) and the first half-year
reports (requiring being audit reviewed). In terms of regulatory lag, these reports are also
required to be lodged with the SSC and stock exchanges (i.e. HOSE or HNX) with different
time frame. In particular, the regulatory lag for the separate quarterly reports is 20 days and
for the consolidated ones being 45 days, whilst that for the separate and consolidated half-
yearly reports is 45 and 60 days, respectively.
Because of this special setting, the levels of disclosure compliance in the 2012 second quarter
reports issued by the sample of Vietnamese firms are measured. These scores (i.e. DSRA,
DSRM, and DSRD) are then used to check the primary results. The descriptive statistics and t-
test for mean differences, as presented in Appendix XIII, reveal that IR disclosure
compliance for the Vietnamese half-yearly reports is significantly higher than their quarterly
reports. It is difficult to generalise this finding given that each country has specific
requirements for IR disclosure, as discussed early in Chapter 2. However, the finding may
suggest that audit review has a positive impact on the disclosure level. Alternatively, it could
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be that listed firms are better complied with IR disclosure requirements for half-yearly reports
because of less time constraint.
The regression results are presented in Appendix XIV. The findings confirm that the base
model is even more powerful in explaining the cross-national variation in IR disclosure
compliance. Particularly, all adjusted R2s are now higher relative to those found in the
regressions using the base models. All hypothesised variables (IFRS, ATYP, RFRE, and
RLAG) maintain their significant association with the IR disclosure compliance. More
importantly, the RLAG variable coefficient (β4) becomes significant in the DSRD model
(Appendix XIV, Column C).
Turning to the control variables, leverage (LEV) is now significantly associated with DSRM
(β4 = -0.051, p = 0.044). Foreign listing (FOR) becomes significantly positive (from
insignificantly negative) for the DSRM model (β8 = 0.072, p = 0.036), but loses its
significance for the DSRD model (β8 = 0.021, p = 0.611).
7.1.6 Multivariate Results – Further Tests with Country and Industry Dummies
The focus of this study is on factors that are directly expected to impact on IR regulations and
explain differences in IR disclosure compliance. However, there could be other (less direct)
country-specific factors that may also have impact on the differences in the levels of
disclosure compliance cross-nationally. To assess this possibility, regressions for the based
models are estimated inclusive of country dummy variables instead of the four IR-related
variables.
The estimation results presented in Appendix XV reveal that the model consisting of six
country dummies and firm-specific variables is statistically significant in explaining variation
in the regional IR disclosure compliance. The coefficients of country dummy variables
indicate that country of reporting (origin) is important to explain differences in the disclosure
levels, which is consistent with the general findings by prior studies (see, for example, Meek
et al., 1995; Tan & Tower, 1999; Tower et al., 1999; Taplin et al., 2002).
The adjusted R2s for the country-dummy models are just slightly higher than those found in
the respective primary models. This finding suggests that omitted country-specific variables
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other than the four hypothesised factors do not have substantial impact on IR disclosure
compliance. In line with the results from the descriptive statistics (Section 6.1), the regression
results (see Appendix XV) confirm that Malaysian firms have significantly higher IR
disclosure compliance than the other six sample countries; whereas the disclosure compliance
levels for Vietnamese and Singaporean firms are significant lower than that for the remaining
countries.
Turning to the industry effect, the regression results discussed earlier do not reveal any
significant association between the 10 GICS industry sectors and the levels of disclosure
compliance with the exception that the three industry sectors (Consumer Staples, Information
Technology, and Utilities) have positive influence on the disclosure of sensitive items
(Section 7.1.4). Prior research suggests that firms potentially disclose more information if
their operations are less subject to seasonality (Baginski, Clinton, & McGuire, 2014). The
evidence that levels of IR disclosure compliance are higher for the three industry sectors than
the others may suggest that firms in these industry sectors are likely to have stable operating
cycles; they are therefore less reluctant to provide interim financial information relative to
those in the other six industry sectors.
Employing the evidence as to the positive association between the three industry sectors with
the sub-score disclosure compliance (Section 7.1.4), the estimations for the base models (i.e.
Models 1, 2, and 3) are repeated by using an alternative classification for industry.
Specifically, firms are categorised into two broad groups: firms with less fluctuation of
operational cycle (those belonging to Consumer Staples, Information Technology, and
Utilities) and the others. The regression results using the new dummy variable INDUSTRY
are presented in Appendix XVI.
The estimation results for the regional IR disclosure compliance are quantitatively consistent
with the primary results using 10 GICS industry sectors with the only difference being that
the coefficients for INDUSTRY (β9) are now significant and positive. The findings suggest
that, on average, level of IR aggregate disclosure (DSRA) for firms with less fluctuation of
operational cycle is 12.5 per cent higher than that for firms in the other industry sectors.
Consistent with DSRA, firms with less fluctuation of operational cycle have 6.3 per cent
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greater IR mandatory disclosure scores (DSRM) and 14.4 per cent greater IR discretionary
disclosure scores (DSRD).
7.2 Within-country IR Disclosure Compliance
As discussed in Section 5.2, regional IR disclosure compliance is measured based on
disclosure items commonly required across the seven sample countries. However, IR
disclosures by listed firms in each country are subject to additional mandatory requirements
stipulated by the country’s stock exchanges and other regulatory bodies. Those within-
country IR disclosure requirements are relevant to the understanding of IR disclosure
practices within and also across countries. For this reason, the following sub-sections provide
a discussion of the additionally mandatory requirements for IR disclosure by country (Section
7.2.1), the scoring of within-country IR mandatory disclosure levels (Section 7.2.2), and an
examination of factors influencing within-country mandatory disclosure levels (Section
7.2.3).
7.2.1 Within-country IR Disclosure Requirements
Consistent with the primary focus of this study, the DSRA index (Section 5.2) only consists of
disclosure items that are commonly required across the seven Asia-Pacific countries.
However, listed firms in each country are required to disclose other information in their
interim reports, which are different from country to country.
In Australia, Rule 4.2A.3 (ASX, 2010) requires listed firms to disclose supplementary
information in half-yearly reports beyond the mandatory disclosure requirements under
AASB 134 in the form of ‘Appendix 4D’. In total, 10 additional mandatory items are
required to be disclosed in the half-yearly reports for ASX listed firms. The additional
disclosure items and their component parts are presented in Appendix XVII.
In Hong Kong, Rule 13.48 (HKEx, 2012b, app. 16) requires listed firms to disclose additional
information in half-yearly reports beyond the mandatory disclosure in conformity with
HKAS 34. In total, three additional mandatory items are required to be disclosed in the half-
yearly reports for HKEx listed firms. The additional disclosure items and their component
parts are presented in Appendix XVIII.
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In Malaysia, Listing Requirements (BMSB, 2012, para. 9.22 ) mandate listed firms to provide
additional information in quarterly reports beyond the mandatory disclosure under MFRS
134. Notably, the issuer must make an explicit statement as to the notes if the disclosure
requirement is not applicable (BMSB, 2012, para. 9.22 - app.9B). In total, 10 additional
mandatory items are required to be disclosed in the quarterly reports for BMSB listed firms.
The additional disclosure items and their component parts are presented in Appendix XIX.
In Singapore, the SGX Rulebooks (SGX, 2011) stipulate that listed firms must disclose
additional interim information beyond the mandatory disclosure compliant with FRS 34.
Under Rule 705 (app. 7.2), the issuers must disclose specific information either in the face of
or in the notes to their interim reports. In total, 12 additional mandatory items are required to
be disclosed in the quarterly reports for SGX listed firms. The additional disclosure items and
their component parts are presented in Appendix XX.
In the Philippines, the SRC stipulates additional requirements for IR disclosures by PSE
listed firms. Under Annex 68-D of the SRC Rule 68 (amended 2011), listed firms are
required to provide additional information in quarterly reporting beyond the mandatory
disclosure under PAS 34. In total, three additional mandatory items are required to be
disclosed in the quarterly reports for PSE listed firms. The additional disclosure items and
their component parts are presented in Appendix XXI.
In Thailand, unlike the other above-mentioned countries, SET Rule books (SET, 2001, 2007)
have not provided substantial requirements for disclosing quarterly reporting supplementary
to TAS 34, except that listed firms must provide written clarification if their operation results
differ more than 20 per cent from the same period of the previous year. This additional
mandatory item is required to be disclosed with the quarterly reports for PSE listed firms as
noted in Appendix XXII.
In Vietnam, there is no identified additional disclosure required for half-yearly reports by
firms listed HOSE and HNX beyond the mandatory disclosure under VAS 27. Further, unlike
IAS 34 and the other countries’ equivalent accounting standards on IR, VAS 27 does not
provide the list of significant events and transactions, which must be disclosed.
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In summary, the supplementary requirements for IR disclosure differ cross-nationally. Whilst
Thailand and Vietnam do not have supplementary requirements for IR disclosure, the other
five countries mandate additional disclosure items, which are incremental to those commonly
required under IR accounting standard. The within-country mandatory requirements are
employed in the following section to develop the index to measure the within-country IR
mandatory disclosure scores.
7.2.2 Within-country IR Mandatory Disclosure Scores
Within the analysis in prior chapters, the regional IR compliance disclosure scores only
capture those IR disclosures common across the sample countries. They do not capture all of
the specific IR disclosures that are provided in conformity with requirements imposed by
other relevant IR regulations rather than accounting standards. As such, the within-country
disclosure compliance is examined to inform the extent to which listed firms in the seven
countries comply with the country’s mandatory requirements for IR disclosure, and how it is
related to the regional IR disclosure compliance.
The level of within-country disclosure compliance is measured by the within-country IR
mandatory disclosure (CM) scores, which is a sum of the country-supplementary mandatory
disclosure (CSM) score and the regional IR mandatory disclosure (DSRM) score that has been
discussed in Section 5.2.1.
The CSM score is a compliance disclosure score determined from an index consisting of
supplementary mandatory disclosure requirements imposed by each country in addition to
those common across the seven countries. The CSM disclosure items, drawn from the
country’s listing and disclosure rules as well as relevant regulations, are not repetitive, but
rather incremental requirements for common regional IR disclosure. The lists of CSM
disclosure items by country and the scoring scheme allocated to each item are presented in
the Appendices (from XVII to XXII).
The scoring method applied to the CSM items is consistent with that applied to the DSRM,
which includes a score of ‘1’ for compliance, ‘0’ for incompliance, or ‘NA’ for explicit non-
applicable items. The validation of the CSM scoring technique is the same as applied to the
DSRM and DSRD scoring methods. The percentage of agreement on disclosure scores
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between the two independent coders and the researcher reported in Section 5.3 includes the
coding for CSM. Table 7.3 presents the mean and ranking by mean of the within-country IR
mandatory disclosure (CM) score for each sample country with the references to its regional
IR disclosure compliance scores.
As can be seen from Table 7.3, within-country IR mandatory disclosure varies considerably
across the sample countries. Notably, the mean score of CSM for Singapore is substantial
high as compared to the other four countries; whereas Singapore is consistently the second
lowest (by mean rank of regional IR disclosure compliance) of the seven sample countries (as
discussed early in Section 6.1). It could be that firms listing in Singapore tend to comply
more with the country’s securities regulation rather than general disclosure guided by
accounting standards, therefore leading to the low level of regional IR disclosure compliance.
The findings suggest that information provided in conformity with other IR regulations may
offset the disclosures required by the accounting standard itself.
Table 7.3 - IR Disclosure Compliance Scores by Country
Country
DSRA DSRM DSRD CSM CM
Mean Ranking Mean Ranking Mean Ranking Mean Ranking Mean Ranking Std. Dev.
AU 1.548 4 0.913 2 0.635 5 0.812 4 1.725 3 0.129
HO 1.570 2 0.900 3 0.670 3 0.988 1 1.888 1 0.064
MA 1.687 1 0.936 1 0.750 1 0.934 2 1.871 2 0.081
SI 1.334 6 0.805 6 0.529 6 0.908 3 1.712 4 0.107
PH 1.547 5 0.868 5 0.679 2 0.746 5 1.614 5 0.158
TH 1.553 3 0.896 4 0.657 4 - - 0.896 - 0.053
VI 1.267 7 0.744 7 0.523 7 - - 0.744 - 0.063
This table provides the mean and ranking by mean of the five measures of IR disclosure compliance scores. AU
= Australia, HO = Hong Kong, MA = Malaysia, SI = Singapore, PH = the Philippines, TH = Thailand, and VI =
Vietnam. DSRA = regional IR aggregate disclosure score, DSRM = regional IR mandatory disclosure score,
DSRD = regional IR discretionary disclosure score, CSM = country-supplementary IR mandatory disclosure
score, and CM = within-country IR mandatory disclosure score. Rankings by CSM and CM means are not
applied to Thailand and Vietnam as there are no within-country additional mandatory items for IR disclosure by
listed firms in Thailand and Vietnam as discussed early.
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7.2.3 Factors Influencing Within-country Mandatory Disclosure
The following model is designed to examine factors influencing the levels of IR disclosure
compliance within each country. The model is an adaptation of the primary model (see Eq.
5.2) and is depicted in Equation 7.1.
= + , + , + , + , + , + + ( . 7.1)
where:
CMi = within-country IR mandatory disclosure score of the firm i, which is a sum of
the firm’s country-supplementary mandatory disclosure (CSMi) score and
regional mandatory disclosure (DSRMi) score.
Dependent and control variables are the same as those described in Section 5.4.2.57
Following prior cross-country disclosure studies, such as Tan and Tower (1999), and Ali et
al. (2004), the CM model is separately estimated for each of the seven sample countries. As
specified in Equation 7.1, the level of within-country IR mandatory disclosure by each
country’s listed firms is predicted by reporting lag (RLAG), firm size (SIZE), leverage (LEV),
profitability (PRO), and foreign listing (FOR) and controlled for industry membership (IND).
Table 7.4 summarises the results from estimating the country-based model as specified in
Equation 7.1.
The regression results reveal that the CM model (Model 4) is only statistically significant for
Australia, Singapore, the Philippines, and Vietnam. In relation to the four IR-related factors,
only RLAG is included in the CM model. The OLS regression results reveal that RLAG only
has a significant negative association with CM for Vietnam. This is consistent with the
findings for the DSRA and DSRM models (Sections 6.2.2 and 7.1.1).
57 A full summary of the description and measures of variables employed in the study is also provided in
Appendix VIII.
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Nine industry dummies (excluding health care sector) are also included in estimating CM by
country. However, the findings indicate that only consumer stables sector ( = 0.249, p =
0.044) and financials sector ( = 0.571, p = 0.003) are significantly associated with CM for
Australia.
Table 7.4 - Factors Influencing Within-country IR Mandatory Disclosure Levels
= + , + , + , + , + , + + ( )
Australia Hong Kong Malaysia Singapore Philippines Thailand Vietnam
RLAG NS NS NS NS NS NS -0.304**
SIZE NS NS -0.432** NS NS NS NS
LEV NS NS NS NS NS NS NS
PRO NS NS NS NS NS NS NS
FOR NS NS NS NS NS NS NS
IND Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc.
F-statistic 2.299** 0.537 0.999 2.194** 1.949* 0.964 2.046*
Adj. R2 0.155 -0.070 0.001 0.144 0.118 -0.005 0.121
This table summarises the regression results for the country-based multiple regressions. CM is within-country IR
mandatory disclosure score. RLAG = reporting lag, SIZE = firm size, LEV = firm leverage, PRO = profitability,
FOR = foreign listing, and IDN = Industry Dummies.
The results for the country-based model are contrary to those in Ali et al. (2004), which
reveal that the combination of explanatory variables are significant in explaining annual
reporting disclosure level both for their pooled sample and sub-sample country. However, the
country-based results here are consistent with results in Tan and Tower (1999) who find no
significance in the sub-sample countries compared to significant findings for their pooled
sample.
Consistent with Tan and Tower (1999), the insignificant findings could be due to the very
low variability of both IR mandatory disclosure score (Table 6.4) and within-country IR
mandatory disclosure score (Table 7.3) compared to the IR aggregate disclosure score (Table
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6.1). This loss of association may also be due to the substantially fewer observations in the
within-country models (100 firms) compared to the regional model (700 firms).
7.3 Summary
This chapter provides two main supplementary analyses of IR disclosure compliance to offer
further evidence in relation to the cross-national variation in the regional IR disclosure
compliance as discussed in Chapter 6. The first analysis involves using alternative measures
for dependent variables including i) each component scores of the regional IR disclosure
compliance (i.e. DSRM and DSRD), ii) the recoding scores of DSRA relating to ‘NA’
disclosure items, iii) the sub-scores of sensitive items, and iv) the regional IR disclosure
compliance scores using the second quarter reports for 100 Vietnamese firms instead of their
half-yearly reports; and v) employing the country dummy variables as well as a broad
grouping of industry sectors. These robustness tests of the four IR-related hypotheses indicate
that the alternative measures of DSRA are generally consistent with the primary results.
Like the primary regression results for DSRA (Table 6.10), IFRS-adoption is consistently
significant to all alternative measures of IR disclosure compliance indicating that the H1
prediction is strongly supported. The finding for the review of IR by external auditors is also
consistent with the H2 prediction, except for its loss of significance in the association between
the sub-score for DSRA and DSRD. Likewise reporting frequency (H3) shows a significant
negative association with the IR disclosure compliance, except for its loss of significance in
the recoding scores for DSRD. Finally, in line with the primary results for the DSRA,
reporting lag (H4) shows a negative association with the IR mandatory disclosure compliance
(Table 7.1 - Column A), but not with DSRD (Table 7.2 - Column A). However, the RLAG
coefficient variable (β4) loses significance when using the sub-scores for the sensitive items
(Appendix XII, Column B).
The second analysis is of the within-country supplementary IR mandatory disclosure
compliance. In terms of supplementary IR disclosure compliance, the cross-country
variations are also evident in the within-country IR mandatory disclosure requirements and
scores. However, the regression results for the country-based model do not confirm the
powerful explanatory of the identified variables (RLAG, SIZE, LEV, PRO, FOR, and IND). In
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particular, whilst the model is statistically significant in explaining within-country IR
disclosure compliance in Australia, Singapore, the Philippines, and Vietnam; it is not
significant in explaining within-country IR compliance disclosure in Hong Kong, Singapore,
and Thailand. This implies that there are potentially other factors which could explain the IR
disclosure behaviour by the listed firms in each single country context. However, identifying
what these factors are is beyond the scope of this thesis. The following chapter concludes the
thesis with the summary of findings, limitations, contributions, and suggestions for future
research.
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS
This study has examined IR disclosure in the Asia-Pacific region, with a focus on disclosures
in compliance with regulatory requirements across the region. Motivated by the international
diversity in IR practices and a lack of research on IR disclosure, the study addresses two
research questions: (1) how does IR disclosure compliance vary across the Asia-Pacific
Region? and (2) what are the factors associated with variations in IR disclosure compliance in
the Asia-Pacific Region? In addressing these questions the study has focused on seven
countries in the region. The findings reveal considerable diversity in cross-country IR
disclosure compliance practices and identify key factors influencing the disclosure
differences.
In this concluding chapter, a summary of the preceding chapters and a discussion of the key
findings in relation to the research questions are provided (Section 8.1). Then the limitations
of the study and some areas for further research are identified (Section 8.2). Finally the major
implications and contributions of the study are presented (Section 8.3).
8.1 Summary and Discussion of Findings
In order to document the interim reporting environment in the Asia-Pacific region, Chapter 2
outlines the institutional settings with the objective of comparing regulatory differences in IR
across the region. Importantly, Chapter 2 reveals that requirements for IR disclosure by listed
firms across the Asia-Pacific region are different in major aspects: IFRS-adoption, reporting
frequency (quarterly or half-yearly reporting), regulatory lag (timeliness of reporting), and
the audit requirement (mandatory or voluntary).
As of the 2012 financial year (the study year), Australia, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and the
Philippines had adopted IFRS, whereas Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam had not yet
adopted (or fully adopted). In terms of reporting frequency, Vietnam is the only country
where listed firms are required to publish separately both quarterly reports and half-yearly
reports; whereas the other countries mandate either quarterly reports (Malaysia, Singapore,
the Philippines, and Thailand) or half-yearly reports (Australia and Hong Kong). Interim
reports are required to be lodged with the stock exchanges within different time frames
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(regulatory lags). A mandatory IR audit review is only stipulated for firms listing in Thailand
(for quarterly reports), and for those in Australia and Vietnam (for half-yearly reports).
Accordingly, the seven selected Asia-Pacific countries provide a useful sample for
investigating how IR disclosure compliance varies cross-nationally and what factors are
associated with the disclosure variations.
Chapter 3 provides an overview of the literature relevant to the investigation of IR disclosure
compliance. The review highlights that IR plays an important role in capital markets.
Importantly, the literature finds that the informational role of IR is influenced by reporting
frequency and auditor involvement. This, again, motivates the examination of IR disclosure
compliance in the region where countries have different regulatory positions on the IR
frequency and audit requirements. Additionally, the review of prior studies on corporate
disclosure identifies a significant gap in the literature on the determinants of the variation in
IR disclosure compliance cross-nationally. Further, while the review identified various firm-
specific attributes associated with different levels of disclosure, there was a noticeable
scarcity of cross-national research on the effect of regulatory-factors on the disclosure levels.
Also, prior studies often focus on broad national factors (such as legal origin, economic
development, and culture) rather than regulatory-specific factors (such as IFRS adoption and
reporting lag) in attempting to explain cross-country differences in corporate disclosure.
Chapter 4 develops the theoretical framework and hypotheses to address the two research
questions, including factors predicted to be associated with IR cross-country disclosure
compliance variations. In the absence of a comprehensive theory on mandatory disclosure,
the thesis adopts general economic theory in developing the theoretical framework. Agency
theory in the context of information economics is employed as the overarching theory to
explain the information asymmetry caused by the conflicting interests between the firm’s
managers and resource owners. Based on this theory, managers’ disclosure decisions
(including disclosure frequency and extent) will be impacted by their incentives to either
increase or mitigate information asymmetry. Importantly, the theory is applied to explain the
cross-national variations in IR disclosure compliance in four IR-related hypotheses.
Specifically, it is predicted that IR disclosure compliance is higher for firms that have
adopted IFRS (H1) and engaged an auditor to review their interim reports (H2). In terms of
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timeliness, due to competing argument, the association stated in the null suggests that IR
disclosure compliance is unrelated to reporting frequency (H3) and reporting lags (H4).
Chapter 5 details the research design used to address the research questions and related
hypotheses. A sample of 700 Asia-Pacific firms (each 100 top listed firms by market
capitalisation as at December 31, 2011 across seven countries) is selected to examine the
cross-country variations in IR disclosure levels and the associated factors. The sample
represents a variety of countries with differing IR disclosure requirements and other country-
specific attributes, thereby providing a suitable range of major countries and firms in the
region to test the research hypotheses.
To measure disclosure compliance, an IR aggregate disclosure score is determined using a
researcher-constructed index which consists of mandatory disclosure items common across
the seven Asia-Pacific countries. Both weighted and unweighted approaches are applied to
determine the IR disclosure compliance levels. Statistical tests for differences in mean scores
of IR disclosure compliance levels are applied to address the first research question. A
regression model is developed to jointly test the four IR-focused hypotheses in relation to the
second research question including the IR-related variables and firm-specific control
variables. Finally, a range of sensitivity tests is employed to check the robustness of the
research findings.
Chapter 6 presents the empirical results for the study. As expected, the results from tests for
mean differences indicate that IR disclosure compliance varies significantly cross-nationally.
This suggests that country of origin has an influence on IR disclosure compliance practices,
which is often identified by prior cross-country studies on corporate disclosure. The influence
could be due to national differences in reporting environments. Importantly, in line with the
cross-national variations in IR regulations, it is predicted that the levels of IR disclosure
compliance are influenced by IR-related factors. As predicted, the regression results indicate
that IR disclosure levels are higher for firms in IFRS-adoption countries (H1), and for firms
with audit-reviewed interim reports (H2). The results reveal that IR disclosure compliance
significantly varies by reporting frequency (H3); in particular, the IR disclosure levels are
higher for firms with mandatory quarterly reports relative to firms with mandatory half-yearly
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reports. The results also indicate that IR disclosure levels are higher for firms taking a shorter
time to release their interim reports (H4).
Overall, with the absence of empirical evidence in literature on cross-national IR disclosure,
the findings that IFRS-adoption has a significantly positive association on IR disclosure
compliance levels (H1) confirm the benefits of adopting IFRS in enhancing financial
reporting disclosure and reducing information asymmetry, as often discussed in the literature.
As such, this thesis extends the evidence to a post-IFRS period and to a cross-country setting
of IR. Similar, the findings that audit review is significantly and positively associated with IR
disclosure compliance levels (H2) extend the evidence from a single country setting (see, for
example, Mangena & Pike, 2005; Mangena & Tauringana, 2007) to a cross-national context,
therefore suggesting that audit-review has a positive impact on IR disclosure compliance,
both in a single country and cross-country. Importantly, the findings on the association
between reporting timeliness (as measured by more frequent reporting and shorter reporting
lags) and better IR disclosure compliance provide new empirical evidence on the influential
factors.
Chapter 7 provides the results of supplementary analyses of IR disclosure compliance. The
regression results from various robustness tests suggest that the primary findings on the
association between IR-related factors and IR disclosure compliance are generally not
sensitive to various alternative measures. These include using the two components of the
regional IR disclosure compliance scores, different scoring methods for ‘not-applicable’
disclosure items, the sub-scores of sensitive items, and the employment quarterly reports for
Vietnamese firms instead of their half-yearly reports.
Further, the additional analysis of within-country IR mandatory disclosure indicates a
substantial variation in the within-country disclosure requirements and compliance levels by
listed firms cross-nationally. However, the country-based model that is adapted from the
regional model is not statistically significant in explaining within-country IR disclosure
compliance. In particular, reporting lag is only significant and negatively associated with
within-country IR disclosure levels for Vietnamese firms. The findings suggest that there
may exist other firm-specific factors which could explain differences in the level of
compliance with IR disclosure requirements stipulated by each individual country.
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8.2 Limitations and Areas for Further Research
Despite the potential contributions, this research faces certain limitations common to this type
of research. First, due to the limitations imposed by the study’s scope, not all countries in the
Asia-Pacific region were examined and the study is limited to one interim period due to the
fact that data acquisition, being hand-collected, is labour-intensive and costly. Also, for this
one period, the IR disclosure compliance level is the primary construct and is measured using
a researcher-constructed index. In constructing this index, not all aspects of IR reporting
beyond the prescribed disclosures (such as voluntary disclosures) were considered. It is
possible that managers substitute mandatory for voluntary disclosures or vice versa. This is
an interesting and promising area for further research.
Second, data for independent variables were hand-collected from interim reports. As such,
the thesis includes selected firm-specific variables to control for the key IR-related factors
expected to have an influence on variations in IR disclosure compliance. It is possible that
other factors not included in this study may also have an impact on compliance levels (such
as internal corporate governance attributes including ownership structure and other country-
specific factors including enforcement of IR regulations). Further research could consider
these possible determinants and their interactions with those identified in this study.
Third, in terms of external validity, the study only covers the top 100 listed firms by market
capitalisation in seven selected countries at one time period (in 2012). Accordingly, this
selection process could affect the ability to generalise the findings to more countries, smaller
firms and different time periods. Further research could be extended to a larger sample, more
countries and a longitudinal setting to improve the external validity of the findings.
Finally, the study does not examine the market impact (i.e. the value relevance) of IR
disclosures which may limit the interpretation of the usefulness of IR disclosure from a
capital market perspective. Future research could address this limitation and identify what
type of interim disclosures (e.g. mandatory or voluntary) are the most beneficial to market
participants.
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8.3 Contributions and Implications
This is the first cross-country study examining IR disclosure compliance practices in the
Asia-Pacific region. In this regard, it provides a major contribution to the disclosure
literature. The findings that IR disclosure compliance is directly related to a number of
regulatory-specific factors are generally not recognised in the extant disclosure literature.
Accordingly, these findings are useful and should be considered when researchers investigate
the role of IR disclosure in domestic and international capital markets. More importantly,
with the trend of regulation (formal) harmonisation between domestic accounting standards
and IFRS, findings on the significant variations in IR disclosure levels (i.e. practice or
material harmonisation) are of interest to researchers for evaluating the effectiveness of the
harmonisation process.58
The study provides a number of other practical contributions. First, by comparing and
documenting cross-country differences in IR disclosure regulations, it provides regulators
with useful empirical evidence when reviewing the effectiveness of IR rules. With the scarce
empirical evidence available in the field, the important findings that IR disclosure compliance
is greater when a country has adopted IFRS, mandates an audit review, requires quarterly
reporting, and does not allow long reporting lags, may be useful to regulators when reviewing
their IR disclosure regimes. These findings have important implications for regulatory
effectiveness. Notably, firms producing half-yearly interim reports and those that produce
less timelier reports (i.e. take longer to make them public) are likely to have lower levels of
IR disclosure compliance. While it is possible that the lower disclosure levels for half-yearly
reporters is due to factors not examined in this thesis, such as a preference by some firms for
communicating through continuous disclosure and other supplementary reporting, the results
nevertheless suggest that quarterly reporting may be preferred to half-yearly reporting if
regulators desire better disclosure compliance. Also, the negative association between IR
disclosure compliance levels and reporting lag may suggest that time constraints on preparing
58 Accounting regulation harmonisation (also called formal harmonisation) is referred to as the harmony of
accounting standards (legal or other requirements or guidelines), whereas accounting practice harmonisation
(also called material harmonisation) is referred to as the harmony of financial reporting (see, Van der Tas, 1988,
1992)
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IR does not influence the extent of information provided in the reports. Therefore, this
finding may be of interest to policymakers who may be considering shortening the time
allowed for the release of interim reports, such as is currently occurring in Hong Kong.
Second, the disclosure compliance scores and their determinants provide a window into
corporate disclosure quality, which is useful in informing investors about the reliability and
usefulness of company disclosures. In particular, the IR disclosure compliance scoring
method and the identified variation in scores across items may assist investors to better
evaluate IR disclosure compliance quality, leading to better investment decisions.
Finally, financial report preparers, managers, and others in the organisation (e.g. internal
auditors) can use the disclosure indices and the findings on IR disclosure compliance levels in
evaluating and benchmarking their firms’ IR disclosures. Specifically, the disclosure scoring
instrument developed in this thesis could be adapted in interim report preparation and in
reviewing the extent of disclosure compliance. Thus, the findings are likely to be useful to
companies in improving their disclosure practices.
In conclusion, this study has been able to shed light on an area of disclosure that has been
neglected in the academic literature and often overlooked by regulators and practitioners.
Since frequent reporting in the form of interim reports is costly, but potentially very useful to
investors, it is hoped that the findings presented here contribute to a better understanding of
the effectiveness of interim report disclosures and motivate further research that ultimately
leads to better informed investors.
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Appendix
APPENDIX I
I. Summary of Reviewed Studies on IR Disclosure and Annual Report Disclosure
Author (year) Objectives (Disclosure
Measurement)
Reporting
Frequency (Study
period)
Sample Setting Statistical Test Influential Factors/Findings Positive (+) Negative (-)
Influence
Panel A Studies on IR disclosure
Cross-country Studies
Tan and Tower
(1997)
Half-yearly reporting disclosure and its
determinant factors (using the researcher-
constructed index)
Half-yearly
reports
(1995/1996)
Australia (n=89), Singapore
(n=97)
Not stated explicitly Country of reporting, firm size,
leverage
Firm size (+), Leverage (-)
Tan and Tower
(1999)
Half-yearly reporting disclosure and its
determinant factors (using the researcher-
constructed index)
Half-yearly
reports
(1995/1996)
Australia (n=89), Singapore
(n=97)
ANOVA, t-test,
regression
Country of reporting, firm size,
leverage
Leverage (-)
Link (2012) Analysing the effects of the Transparency
Directive (TD) on reporting frequency in
the European Union (EU)
Quarterly
reports (2005 to
2010)
Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
France, Germany, Ireland,
Luxemburg, Netherlands, UK,
Finland, Greece, Portugal,
Sweden, Italy, and Spain
Logistic regression Not applicable Not applicable
Within-Country Studies
McEwen and
Schwartz (1992)
Examining compliance levels based on
researcher-constructed index
Quarterly
reports (1989)
US (n=76) Descriptive statistics Not applicable Not applicable
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Author (year) Objectives (Disclosure
Measurement)
Reporting
Frequency (Study
period)
Sample Setting Statistical Test Influential Factors/Findings Positive (+) Negative (-)
Influence
Bradbury (1991) Voluntary half-yearly earnings disclosure
and its associated factors
Half-yearly
reports (1973-
1976)
New Zealand (n=158) Logistic regression Outside capital, interim dividend
payment, unexpected earnings,
and seasonal volatility
Outside capital (+),
interim dividend payment
(+), unexpected earnings
(+), and seasonal volatility
(-)
Bradbury (1992) Examining factors associated with
voluntary half-yearly earnings disclosure
Half-yearly
reports (1973-
1976)
New Zealand (n=172) Mann-Whitney U
test of differences in
means
Earnings volatility, unexpected
earnings, firm size
Unexpected earnings (+)
Schadewitz and
Blevins (1998)
Examining determinants of interim
reporting disclosure (using the research-
constructed index)
Interim reports
(1985-1993)
Finland (n=573) OLS regressions Business risk, firm size, growth
potential
Business risk (+), firm
size (+), growth potential
(-)
Oberholster and
Nieuwoudt
(2001)
Examining IR regulations and levels of
compliance
Half-yearly
reports (1997-
1999)
South Africa (n=50) Descriptive statistics Not applicable Not applicable
Ku Ismail and
Chandler (2004)
Examining factors associated with IR
disclosure timeliness
Quarterly
reports (2001)
Malaysia (n=117) Spearman's
correlation and
Mann-Whitney tests
Not applicable Not applicable
Ku Ismail and
Chandler (2005)
Examining the extent of IR disclosure
measured by number of words
Quarterly
reports (2001)
Malaysia (n=117) OLS regression Leverage Leverage (+)
Mangena and
Pike (2005)
Examining the level of IR disclosure and
its associated factors (focusing on
characteristics of a firm’s audit
committee)
Half-yearly
reports
(2001/2002)
UK (n=262) OLS regression Audit committee shareholding,
Audit committee financial
expertise, firm size, multiple
listings, auditor involvement
AC shareholding (-), AC
financial expertise (+), firm
size (+), multiple listings
(+), auditor involvement (+)
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Author (year) Objectives (Disclosure
Measurement)
Reporting
Frequency (Study
period)
Sample Setting Statistical Test Influential Factors/Findings Positive (+) Negative (-)
Influence
Mangena and
Tauringana
(2007)
Examining the level of IR disclosure
compliance with non-mandatory
statements of best practice and its
associated factors
Half-yearly
reports
(2001/2002)
UK (n=262) OLS regression Multiple listing, firm size,
interim dividend, new share
issuance, auditor involvement,
audit committee independence,
audit committee financial
expertise
Multiple listing (+), firm
size (+), interim dividend
(+), new share issuance
(+), auditor involvement
(+), AC independence (+),
AC financial expertise (+)
Alias, Clark, and
Roudaki (2009)
Examining reporting lag and compliance
levels (using the researcher-constructed
index)
Quarterly
reports (2005 to
2007)
Malaysia (n=60) Descriptive statistics Not applicable Not applicable
Saxena, Saxena,
and Kumar
(2012)
Examining IR compliance levels (using
the researcher-constructed index)
Quarterly
reports
(2009/2010)
India (n=6) Descriptive statistics Not applicable Not applicable
Panel B Studies on IAS/IFRS disclosure
Meek, Roberts,
and Gray (1995)
Voluntary disclosure by multinational
corporations and its determinant (using
the researcher-constructed indices)
Annual reports
(1989)
UK (n=64), US (n=116), France
(n=16), Germany (n=12),
Netherlands (n=18)
OLS regression
(country dummy
variable included)
Country of origin, firm size,
foreign listing status, leverage
Firm size (+), foreign
listing (+), leverage (-)
Craig and Diga
(1998)
Company disclosure and its determinant
(using the researcher-constructed indices)
Annual reports
(1993)
Singapore (n=30), Malaysia
(n=30), Indonesia (n=30),
Philippines (n=30), Thailand
(n=25)
OLS regression
(country dummy
variable included)
Firm size, industry group,
foreign ownership, country of
reporting
Firm size (+), foreign
ownership (-)
Tower, Hancock,
and Taplin
(1999)
Company compliance with IAS and its
determinants (using the researcher-
constructed indices)
Annual reports
(1997)
Australia (n=10), Malaysia
(n=10), Hong Kong (n=10),
Philippines (n=10), Singapore
(n=10), Thailand (n=10)
General linear model
(country dummy
variable included)
Country of reporting, reporting
lag
Reporting lag (-)
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Author (year) Objectives (Disclosure
Measurement)
Reporting
Frequency (Study
period)
Sample Setting Statistical Test Influential Factors/Findings Positive (+) Negative (-)
Influence
Taplin, Tower,
and Hancock
(2002)
Company compliance with IAS and its
determinant (using the researcher-
constructed indices)
Annual reports
(1997)
Australia (n=10), Malaysia
(n=10), Hong Kong (n=10),
Philippines (n=10), Singapore
(n=10), Thailand (n=10)
ANOVA and
MANOVA
Country of reporting, firm
profitability
Firm profitability (+)
Ali, Ahmed, and
Henry (2004)
Company compliance with national
accounting standards and its determinant
(using the researcher-constructed index)
Annual reports
(1998)
Bangladesh (n=118), India
(n=219), Pakistan (n=229)
OLS regression (not
including country
dummy or country-
specific variable)
Firm size, profitability,
multinational status
Firm size (+), profitability
(+), multinational status
(+)
Morris,
Susilowati, and
Gray (2012)
Company disclosure and the impact of
IFRS adoption on annual reporting
disclosure (using the researcher-
constructed index)
Annual reports
(2002, 2007)
Australia (n=41), China (n=12),
Hong Kong (n=39), India (n=24),
Japan (n=46), Malaysia (n=40),
Philippines (n=22), Singapore
(n=41)
OLS regression
(country-specific
variables added on-
at-a-time to the
model including all
firm-specific
variables)
IFRS adoption, enforcement,
leverage, business segment,
multinational status, issuance of
debt/equity capital
IFRS adoption (+),
enforcement (+), leverage
(+), business segment (+),
multinational status (+),
capital issuance (+)
Glaum, Schmidt,
Street, and Vogel
(2013)
Company compliance with IFRS 3 and
IAS 36 and its determinant (using the
researcher-constructed index)
Annual reports
(2005)
Austria (n=16), Belgium (n=16),
Czech (n=6), Denmark (n=14),
Finland (n=21), France (n=34),
Germany (n=21), Hungary (n=6),
Ireland (n=14), Italy (n=33),
Luxembourg (n=4), Netherlands
(n=18), Poland (n=13), Spain
(n=28), Sweden (n=20),
Switzerland (n=18), UK (n=75)
OLS regression
(including country-
dummy variables,
country-specific
variables, firm-
specific variables)
Enforcement, economic
development, goodwill, audit
quality, issuance of debt/equity
capital, ownership concentration,
industry membership
Enforcement (+), economic
development (+), goodwill
(+), audit quality (+),
capital issuance (+),
ownership concentration (-),
financial sector (-)
Note: Influential factors refer to factors that are found to be associated with the level of IR (annual reporting) disclosure/compliance.
Appendix I has been provided for the purposes of Section 3.2 and Section 3.3
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APPENDIX II
II. Examples of Significant Events and Transactions
Item Description
1 Write-down of inventories and the reversal of such write-down
2 Recognition of a loss from the impairment of assets (financial assets; property, plant and
equipment; or intangible assets) and the reversal of such an impairment loss
3 The reversal of any provisions for the costs of restructuring
4 Acquisitions and disposals of items of property, plant and equipment
5 Commitments for capital, lease, purchase of property, plant and equipment
6 Litigation settlements
7 Corrections of prior period errors
8 Changes in the business or economic circumstances that affect the fair value of the entity’sfinancial assets and financial liabilities
9 Any loan default or breach of a loan agreement has not been remedied on or before the end
of the reporting period
10 Related party transactions
11
Transfers between levels of the fair value hierarchy used in measuring the fair value of
financial instruments
12
Changes in the classification of financial assets as a result of a change in the purpose or use
of those assets
13 Changes in contingent liabilities or contingent assets
14
Other significant events or items determined and disclosed by the preparer (such as business
restructuring)
Note: The list is constructed based on IAS 34, Para 15B
Appendix II has been provided for the purposes of Section 5.2.1 (Table 5.4) and Section
5.2.2 (Table 5.5)
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APPENDIX III
III. Scores Sheet for Assessing Regional IR Discretionary Disclosure (DSRD) Index
Item Disclosure
Requirement
Scoring Technique
NA = Not
Applicable
1 = Low 2= Medium 3 = High
RD1 Discloses details of
basic EPS
Amount of current
period’s basic EPS
A computation of
basic EPS
Comparative
information
Disclosure of the
amount of basic EPS
either in the face or
the notes of the
financial statements
Disclosure of the
numerators and
denominators to
calculate basic EPS
Disclosure of other
comparative
information, such as
basic EPS from
continuing operation,
from discontinuing
operation,
management adjusted
basic EPS, or
underlying EPS
RD2 Discloses details of
diluted EPS
Amount of current
period’s diluted EPS
A computation of
diluted EPS
Comparative
information
No potentially
dilutive ordinary
shares or no diluting
events existed
during the period
(i.e. RM6 = NA)
Disclosure of the
amount of diluted EPS
either in the face or
the notes of the
financial statements
Disclosure of the
numerators and
denominators to
calculate diluted EPS
Disclosure of other
comparative
information, such as
diluted EPS from
continuing operation,
from discontinuing
operation,
management adjusted
diluted EPS, or
underlying EPS
RD3 Discloses details of
significant events or
transactions (defined
by IAS 34, para.15B,
see Appendix II)
No significant
events or
transactions
Presence of significant
events or significant
transactions
Nature/effects of
events or transactions
on financial reports
Details of the events or
transactions
Disclosure of the
existence or the
amount of the events
or transactions, either
in the face or notes of
the financial
statements
Comments on the
nature and/or effects
of the events or
transactions on the
financial statements
Disclosure of the
details of the events or
transactions (such as
description of time,
status of the events, or
breakdowns of the
amount)
RD4 Discloses nature and
effects of the
changes of
accounting policies
and methods of
computation
No changes in
accounting policies
and methods of
computations
Existence of the
changes
Discussion of the
changes
Effects on the interim
financial statements
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Item Disclosure
Requirement
Scoring Technique
NA = Not
Applicable
1 = Low 2= Medium 3 = High
Disclosure of the
nature of or the reason
for the changes (such
as the issuance of
amendments or new
accounting
standards/policies)
Disclosure of the
names of accounting
policies or methods of
computation related to
the changes
Disclosure of the
effects of the changes
and provision of
restatements if there is
any effects resulting
from the changes
RD5 Comments on the
nature and effects of
seasonality and/or
cyclicality
Not affected by
seasonal and
cyclical factors
Presence/absence of
seasonal and/or
cyclical factors
Nature of seasonality
and/or cyclicality
Effects of seasonality
and/or cyclicality on
the entity operation
Statements of whether
the entity’s operation
activities were
impacted by seasonal
and/or cyclical factors
Comments on the
nature of seasonality
and cyclicality
Comments on the
effects of seasonality
and/or cyclicality on
the entity’s operation,
such as production,
sales, and revenue
RD6 Comments on the
nature and the effects
of unusual items
No unusual items Presence of unusual
items
Nature of unusual
items
Effect of unusual
items
Unusual items,
events or transaction
are justified by their
size, nature, or
incidence. For
example,
discontinued
operation, gain/loss
on foreign currency
translation, gain/loss
on foreign exchange
difference, and
others are often
presented in
comprehensive
income
Disclosure of the
items’ amount
Comments on the
nature of the items
Comments on the
effects of the items on
financial statements
(i.e. reporting
numbers)
RD7 Discloses details of
changes in estimates
No changes in
estimates
Existence of the
changes
Nature of the changes Effects of the changes
Estimations such as
provisions,
over/under tax
provision, changes in
average annual
income tax rate,
impairment loss/gain
Disclosure of the
amount
Comments on the
nature of the changes
Comments on the
effects of the changes
RD8 Discloses details of
issuances,
repurchases and
repayments of debt
securities
No issuances,
repurchases and
repayments of debt
securities
Presence of such
transactions
Effects of the
transactions
Details of the
transactions
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Item Disclosure
Requirement
Scoring Technique
NA = Not
Applicable
1 = Low 2= Medium 3 = High
Debt securities such
as bonds, notes,
debentures, bills of
exchange, or
preference shares
Disclosing the amount
of the issuances,
repurchases,
repayments
Breakdown of the
issuances, repurchases,
repayments
Disclosure details of
transactions (such as
purpose, time, type of
debt securities, interest
rates, and maturity)
RD9 Discloses details of
issuances,
repurchases and
repayments of equity
securities
No issuances,
repurchases and
repayments of
equity securities
Presence of such
transactions
Effects of the
transactions
Details of the
transactions
Disclosing the amount
of the issuances,
repurchases,
repayments
Breakdown of the
issuances, repurchases,
repayments
Disclosure details of
transactions (such as
time, number of
shares, and price)
RGD10 Discloses details of
the primary segment
information
Only one reportable
segment (i.e. RM15
= NA)
Primary information Reconciliations of
segmental figures
Disclosure segmental
information in addition
to beyond basic
segment information
(such as assets and
liabilities)
Disclosure of
segmental revenue and
result (profit)
Disclosure of
reconciliations of
segmental amounts
(i.e. revenue and
result)
Disclosing additional
information (such as
assets, and liabilities)
RGD11 Disclose details of
changes in the
composition of the
entity
No changes in
composition of the
entity
Existence of the
changes
Effects of the changes Details of the changes
Disclosure of the
amount
Disclosure of the
movements in carrying
amounts
Disclosure of the
transaction details
(such as dividend
received or share of
profit from associates
or joint venture)
Note: Each item from RD1 to RD11 will be given either zero (0), one (1), two (2), three (3), or NA. Zero is given where
required disclosure has not been made. NA is assigned where required disclosure is not applicable to the reporting entity.
The score of one, two, or three is given depending on the how depth information has been provided.
Appendix III has been provided for the purposes of Section 5.2.2, Table 5.5
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APPENDIX IV
IV. Tukey’s HSD Test for Mean Differences in IR Disclosure Scores by Industries
Means of Differences (i – j)
Industry(i)
Industry (j)
FIN IND CON.D CON.S MAT ENE UTI HEA TEL INF
Panel A: Tukey’s HSD test for DSRA mean difference among industries
FIN 0
IND 0.0610 0
CON.D 0.0302 -0.0307 0
CON.S -0.0246 -0.0855 -0.0548 0
MAT 0.0633 0.0023 0.0330 0.0878 0
ENE 0.0581 -0.0029 0.0278 0.0826 -0.0052 0
UTI -0.0502 -0.1111 -0.0805 -0.0257 -0.1135 -0.1083
HEA 0.0514 -0.0095 0.0212 0.0760 -0.0118 -0.0066 0.1017 0
TEL -0.0898 -0.1508* -0.1201 -0.0653 -0.1531 -0.1479 -0.0396 -0.1412 0
INF 0.0545 -0.0064 0.0243 0.0791 -0.0087 -0.0036 0.1047 0.0031 0.1443 0
Panel B: Tukey’s HSD test for DSRM mean difference among industries
FIN 0
IND 0.0239 0
CON.D 0.0077 -0.0162 0
CON.S -0.0005 -0.0244 -0.0081 0
MAT 0.0236 -0.0003 0.0159 0.0241 0
ENE 0.0195 -0.044 0.0118 0.0200 -0.0041 0
UTI -0.0154 -0.0393 -0.0231 -0.0149 -0.0390 -0.0349 0
HEA 0.0033 -0.0205 -0.0043 0.0038 -0.0202 -0.0161 0.0188 0
TEL -0.0357 -0.0595 -0.0433 -0.0352 -0.0592 -0.0551 -0.0202 -0.0390 0
INF 0.0263 -0.0024 0.0186 0.0268 0.0027 0.0068 0.0417 0.0229 0.0619 0
Panel C: Tukey’s HSD test for DSRD mean difference among industries
FIN 0
IND 0.0371 0
CON.D 0.0226 -0.0145 0
CON.S -0.0241 -0.0611 -0.0467 0
MAT 0.0397 0.0026 0.0171 0.0637 0
ENE 0.0386 0.0015 0.0160 0.0627 -0.0011 0
UTI -0.0348 -0.0719 -0.0574 -0.0108 -0.0745 -0.0734 0
HEA 0.0481 0.0110 0.0255 0.0721 0.0084 0.0095 0.0829 0
TEL -0.0543 -0.0914 -0.0769 -0.0303 -0.0940 -0.0929 -0.0195 -0.1024 0
INF 0.0282 -0.0088 0.0057 0.0523 -0.0114 -0.0104 0.0631 -0.0198 0.0826 0
This table compares differences in pairs of means of IR disclosure scores by firms in the 10 industry sectors, including Financials
(FIN), Industrials (IND), Consumer Discretionary (CON.D), Consumer Staples (CON.S), Materials (MAT), Utilities (UTI), Health
Care (HEA), Telecommunication Services (TEL), and Information Technology (INF). * denotes that the means are significantly
different at the 0.05 level. DSRA = Regional IR aggregate disclosure scores, DSRM = Regional IR mandatory disclosure scores, DSRD
= Regional IR discretionary disclosure scores.
Appendix IV has been provided for the purposes of Sections 6.1.1, 6.1.3 & 6.1.3
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APPENDIX V
V. Tukey’s HSD Test for Mean Differences in DSRM and DSRD Scores by Countries
Means of Differences (i – j)
Country(i)
Country (j)
Australia Hong Kong Malaysia Singapore Philippines Thailand Vietnam
Panel A:
DSRM
Australia 0
Hong Kong 0.0137 0
Malaysia -0.0229* -0.0366* 0
Singapore 0.1088* 0.0951* 0.1318* 0
Philippines 0.0450* 0.0313* 0.0679* -0.0638* 0
Thailand 0.0172 0.0035 0.0401* -0.0916* -0.0278* 0
Vietnam 0.1696* 0.1559* 0.1925* 0.0608* 0.1246* 0.1524** 0
Panel B:
DSRD
Australia 0
Hong Kong -0.0350 0
Malaysia -0.1151* -0.0801* 0
Singapore 0.1059* 0.1409* 0.2210* 0
Philippines -0.0434 -0.0085 0.0716* -0.1494* 0
Thailand -0.0228 0.0122 0.0923* -0.1287* 0.0207 0
Vietnam 0.1125* 0.1475* 0.2276* 0.0066 0.1560** 0.1353* 0
This table compares differences in pairs of means of IR disclosure scores by firms in the seven sample countries. * denotes
that the means are significantly different at the 0.05 level. DSRM = Regional IR mandatory disclosure scores, DSRD =
Regional IR discretionary disclosure scores. The value indicates differences in means of DSRM, and DSRD that are
computed using Tukey’s HSD test.
Appendix V has been provided for the purposes of Section 6.1.2 and Section 6.1.3
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APPENDIX VI
VI. Descriptive Statistics and ANOVA Tests for DSRM and DSRD by Industry
N Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max
ANOVA test
F-value p-value
Panel A: Descriptive statistics & ANOVA test for DSRM by industry 2.188 0.021
Financials 213 0.874 0.892 0.083 0.579 1.000
Industrials 124 0.850 0.865 0.086 0.667 1.000
Consumer Discretionary 81 0.866 0.886 0.077 0.667 1.000
Consumer Staples 78 0.874 0.890 0.071 0.722 1.000
Materials 68 0.850 0.886 0.086 0.611 0.970
Energy 40 0.854 0.886 0.088 0.686 0.971
Utilities 34 0.889 0.917 0.101 0.647 1.000
Health care 24 0.870 0.890 0.088 0.656 0.972
Telecommunication Services 20 0.909 0.912 0.056 0.784 1.000
Information Technology 18 0.847 0.863 0.090 0.722 1.000
Panel B: Descriptive statistics & ANOVA test for DSRD by industry 3.051 0.001
Financials 213 0.646 0.636 0.135 0.292 0.958
Industrials 124 0.609 0.622 0.132 0.292 0.933
Consumer Discretionary 81 0.624 0.633 0.136 0.250 0.934
Consumer Staples 78 0.670 0.667 0.128 0.417 0.944
Materials 68 0.607 0.619 0.133 0.333 0.952
Energy 40 0.608 0.600 0.132 0.292 0.833
Utilities 34 0.681 0.706 0.176 0.238 0.933
Health care 24 0.598 0.606 0.140 0.400 0.889
Telecommunication Services 20 0.700 0.734 0.116 0.467 0.857
Information Technology 18 0.618 0.618 0.101 0.417 0.833
This appendix presents descriptive statistics and ANOVA tests for DSRM and DSRD by industry sectors (GICS 2-
digits).
Appendix VI has been provided for the purposes of Section 6.1.2 and 6.1.3
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APPENDIX VII
VII. Multiple Regression Results – Using Winsorised Variables, = + , + , + , + ,+ , + , + , + , + +
Model A B C
Variables Hypothesis Expected
sign
Coefficients
(p-value)
Coefficients
(p-value)
Coefficients
(p-value)
Intercept 1.235 0.802 0.433
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
IFRS H1 + 0.597 0.623 0.489
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
ATYP H2 + 0.333 0.451 0.209
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
RFRE H3 ? -0.462 -0.547 -0.339
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
wRLAG H4 - -0.072 -0.169 -0.002
(0.020) (<0.001) (0.953)
wSIZE ? 0.263 0.248 0.232
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
wLEV ? 0.049 -0.006 0.075
(0.140) (0.842) (0.045)
wPRO ? 0.025 0.078 -0.011
(0.429) (0.008) (0.749)
FOR ? -0.113 -0.048 -0.135
(0.003) (0.174) (0.002)
IND (Industry Dummies) ? Included Included Included
(NS) (NS) (NS)
Adj. R2 0.460 0.531 0.314
F-stat 35.774 47.606 19.778
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
Max VIFs 7.49 7.49 7.49
This table presents the results of OLS regression estimations of the regional IR disclosure compliance for the
pooled sample of 700. The dependent variable (IR disclosure compliance scores) is the alternative of the DSRA
(Column A), DSRM (Column B), and DSRD (Column C). P-values are reported for 2-tailed tests. Nine dummy
variables (excluding health care as the reference group) are included in the regressions. wRLAG, wSIZE, wLEV,
and wPRO are the winsoried variables of RLAG, SIZE, LEV, and PRO respectively.
Appendix VII has been provided for the purposes of Sections 6.2.1, 7.1.1, and 7.1.2
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APPENDIX VIII
VIII. Description and Measurement of Independent Variables
Variable name Label and
expected sign Description and Measure
IR-related variables
IFRS adoption IFRS (+) Indicating whether a country has adopted IFRS for accounting year 2012 as
specified by the IFRS Foundation and the announcements of the seven
countries’ accounting standard setters. Dummy variable: IFRS = ‘1’ if a
country has adopted IFRS and ‘0’ otherwise.
Audit-review ATYP (+) Dummy variable, indicating whether IR was audit reviewed (ATYP = 1) or
not (ATYP = 0).
Reporting
frequency
RFRE (+) Dummy variable, indicating whether IR is a mandatory half-yearly report
(RFRE = 1) or quarterly report (RFRE = 0).
Reporting lag RLAG (+) Reflecting relative of the released IR, measured as a ratio of the number of
days that elapse between the end of a firm’s interim period and the day on
which the IR is received by the stock exchange to the regulatory lag.
Control variables
Firm size SIZE (?) Reflecting a firm size, measured as the natural log of a firm’s total assets as
at the interim period’s end.
Leverage LEV (?) The financial leverage of a firm, measured as a ratio of a firm’s total
liabilities to its total assets as at the interim period’s end.
Profitability PRO (?) Reflecting the profitability of a firm, measured as return on assets, which is
a ratio of a firm’s net income of the interim period to its total assets as at the
interim report’s end (adjusted for quarterly).
Foreign listing
status
FOR (?) Dummy variable, indicating whether a firm has shares listed on foreign
stock exchanges (FOR = 1) or not (FOR = 0).
Industry group IND (?) Dummy variables representing 10 industry sectors, classified based on two-
digit GICS codes.
Audit quality AUD (?) Dummy variable: indicating whether a firm’s IR was audit reviewed by a
Big-4 auditor (AUD = 1) or not (AUD = 0).
Legal origin LEG (?) Dummy variable: indicating if a country’s legal origin is common law (LEG
= 1) or code law (LEG = 0); Consistent with La Porta et al. (1998), Nguyen
(1999), Tilleke and Gibbins (2011).
Economic
development
ECN (?) Indicating the stage of economic development. Dummy variable: ECN = 1 if
a country is an advanced economy (developed country), otherwise ECN = 1;
as determined by International Monetary Fund (2012).
National culture CUL (?) Reflecting societal trust, measured as the four-wave average of the
percentage of the respondents to the question ‘Generally speaking, would
you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in
dealing with people’; as determined by the World Values Survey database.
Appendix VIII has been provided for the purposes of Section 6.2.2, Section 7.1, and
Section 7.2
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APPENDIX IX
IX. Descriptive Statistics for Control Variables Used in Supplementary Analysis
Sample Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Panel A Descriptive Statistics for Continuous Variables
Pooled SIZE (Sales) 5.29 5.27 2.04 -4.10 10.60
(n=700) SIZE (MC) 6.91 6.88 1.72 3.00 12.20
CUL 0.30 0.41 0.17 0.07 0.52
Australia SIZE (Sales) 7.10 7.13 1.76 -2.3 10.5
(n=100) SIZE (MC) 8.45 8.12 1.03 7.20 11.60
CUL 0.43 0.43 0.00 0.43 0.43
Hong Kong SIZE (Sales) 6.42 6.37 1.78 1.70 10.60
(n=100) SIZE (MC) 7.78 7.59 1.49 5.70 12.20
CUL 0.41 0.41 0.00 0.41 0.41
Malaysia SIZE (Sales) 5.42 5.43 1.24 3.00 9.50
(n=100) SIZE (MC) 7.45 7.13 1.05 6.10 9.90
CUL 0.09 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.09
Singapore SIZE (Sales) 5.21 4.83 1.63 -0.10 9.30
(n=100) SIZE (MC) 7.08 6.68 1.24 5.70 10.50
CUL 0.17 0.17 0.00 0.17 0.17
Philippines SIZE (Sales) 3.94 4.37 2.30 -4.10 8.40
(n=100) SIZE (MC) 6.43 6.40 1.37 4.40 9.40
CUL 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.07
Thailand SIZE (Sales) 5.24 5.01 1.47 -0.50 10.00
(n=100) SIZE (MC) 6.88 6.52 1.05 5.70 10.30
CUL 0.42 0.42 0.00 0.42 0.42
Vietnam SIZE (Sales) 3.67 3.75 1.55 0.10 6.70
(n=100) SIZE (MC) 4.29 3.88 1.20 3.00 7.70
CUL 0.52 0.52 0.00 0.52 0.52
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Panel B Descriptive Statistics for Dichotomous Variables
Variable
Pooled
(n=700)
Australia
(n=100)
Hong Kong
(n=100)
Malaysia
(n=100)
Singapore
(n=100)
Philippine
s (n=100)
Thailand
(n=100)
Vietnam
(n=100)
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
PRO (d) 641 59 95 5 96 4 98 2 90 10 84 16 86 14 92 8
AUD 325 60 99 1 71 3 4 - 7 - - - 81 19 63 37
LEG 400 300 100 0 100 0 100 0 100 0 0 100 0 100 0 100
ECO 300 400 100 0 100 0 0 100 100 0 0 100 0 100 0 100
Variable definitions
SIZE (Sale) = An alternative measure of firm size (SIZE), measured as a natural log of the
interim’s sales
SIZE (MC) = An alternative measure of firm size (SIZE), measured as a natural log of market
capitalisation of the firm as at December 31, 2011 (from Osiris database)
CUL (National =
Culture)
Reflecting societal trust, measured as the four-wave average of the  percentage
of the respondents to the question ‘Generally speaking, would you say that most
people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people’
PRO (d) = Dummy variable: indicating whether a firm’s IR net income is positive (1) or
negative (0).
AUD (Audit quality) = Dummy variable: indicating whether a firm’s IR was audit reviewed by a Big-4
auditor (AUD = 1) or not (AUD = 0).
LEG (Legal Origin) = Dummy variable: indicating if a country’s legal origin is common law (LEG =
1) or code law (LEG = 0)
ECO (Economic =
Development)
Indicating the stage of economic development. Dummy variable: ECN = 1 if a
country is an advanced economy (developed country), otherwise ECN = 1.
This table presents descriptive statistics for continuous independent variables (Panel A) and dichotomous
independent variables (Panel B) employed in sensitivity (Section 6.2.2) and supplementary analyses (Section
7.1.1 and 7.1.2). Of the 700 interim reports, there are only 385 reports that were reviewed by external auditors.
Appendix IX has been provided for the purposes of Section 6.2.2, Section 7.1.1, and
Section 7.1.2
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APPENDIX X
X. Multiple Regression Results for the Recoding Scores, = + , + , + , + , + ,+ , + , + , + +
Model A B C
Variables Hypothesis Expected sign Coefficients
(p-value)
Coefficients
(p-value)
Coefficients
(p-value)
Intercept 0.765 0.601 0.156
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
IFRS H1 + 0.167 0.277 0.081
(<0.001) (<0.001) (0.041)
ATYP H2 + 0.304 0.352 0.244
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
RFRE H3 ? -0.123 -0.233 -0.044
(<0.001) (<0.001) (0.377)
RLAG H4 - -0.016 -0.105 -0.042
(0.619) (<0.001) (0.234)
SIZE ? 0.483 0.484 0.432
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
LEV ? 0.012 -0.009 0.025
(0.711) (0.752) (0.475)
PRO ? -0.043 0.002 -0.065
(0.188) (0.953) (0.071)
FOR ? 0.120 0.147 0.093
(0.002) (<0.001) (0.030)
IND (Industry Dummies) ? NS NS NS
Adj. R2 0.406 0.516 0.291
F-stat 29.066 44.722 17.846
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
Max VIFs 7.49 7.49 7.49
This table presents the results of OLS regression estimations of the recoding scores for regional IR disclosure
compliance for the pooled sample of 700. The dependent variable is the alternative of the recoding scores for
DSRA (Column A), DSRM (Column B), and DSRD (Column C). P-values are reported for 2-tailed tests.
Dummy variable for health care sector is excluded from the regression as the reference group.
Appendix X has been provided for the purposes of Section 7.1.3
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APPENDIX XI
XI. Multiple Regression Results for the Three Base Models – Excluding Malaysia, = + , + , + , + ,+ , + , + , + , + +
Model A B C
Variables Hypothesis Expected
sign
Coefficients
(p-value)
Coefficients
(p-value)
Coefficients
(p-value)
Intercept 1.197 0.786 0.410
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
IFRS H1 + 0.563 0.589 0.451
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
ATYP H2 + 0.379 0.485 0.247
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
RFRE H3 ? -0.463 -0.551 -0.328
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
RLAG H4 - -0.058 -0.163 0.018
(0.107) (<0.001) (0.659)
SIZE ? 0.285 0.251 0.258
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
LEV ? 0.005 -0.031 0.026
(0.889) (0.329) (0.497)
PRO ? 0.005 0.070 -0.037
(0.897) (0.031) (0.351)
FOR ? -0.065 0.008 -0.100
(0.144) (0.841 (0.046)
IND (Industry Dummies) ? Included Included Included
(NS) (NS) (NS)
Adj. R2 0.411 0.510 0.254
F-stat 25.544 37.663 13.004
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
Max VIFs 7.50 7.50 7.50
This table presents the results of OLS regression estimations of the regional IR disclosure compliance for the
sample of 600 (excluding 100 Malaysian firms). The dependent variable (IR disclosure compliance scores) is
the alternative of the DSRA (Column A), DSRM (Column B), and DSRD (Column C). P-values are reported for
2-tailed tests. Nine dummy variables (excluding health care as the reference group) are included in the
regressions.
Appendix XI has been provided for the purposes of Sections 7.1.3
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APPENDIX XII
XII. Multiple Regression Results for the Sub-scores− , = + , + , + , + , + ,+ , + , + , + +
Model A B C
Variables Hypothesis Expected sign Coefficients
(p-value)
Coefficients
(p-value)
Coefficients
(p-value)
Intercept 0.237 0.304 0.001
(0.117) (<0.001) (0.995)
IFRS H1 + 0.613 0.619 0.552
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
ATYP H2 + 0. 046 0.140 -0.059
(0.302) (0.002) (0.194)
RFRE H3 ? -0.111 -0.132 -0.102
(0.016) (0.005) (0.032)
RLAG H4 - -0.002 -0.048 0.034
(0.955) (0. 151) (0.314)
SIZE ? 0.206 0.156 0.178
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
LEV ? -0.025 -0.027 -0.012
(0.438) (0.403) (0.706)
PRO ? -0.056 -0.007 -0.038
(0.089) (0.833) (0.262)
FOR ? -0.270 -0.304 -0.198
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
IND (Industry Dummies) ? NS
Adj. R2 0.417 0.377 0.380
F-stat 29.438 25.906 25.405
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
Max VIFs 7.57 7.49 7.57
N 678 700 678
This table presents the results of OLS regression estimations of the regional IR disclosure compliance sub-
scores. The dependent variable is the alternative of the sub-scores of DSRA (Column A), DSRM (Column B),
and DSRD (Column C). The sub-scores only include the disclosure of seasonality and cyclicality (RM9 and RD
5), segment information (RM15 and RD 10) and subsequent events (RM 16). P-values are reported for 2-tailed
tests. Nine dummy variables for nine industry sectors (other than health care sector) are included. However, only
three industry sectors having significant (positive) association with the sub-scores of DSRA and DSRD are
Consumer Staples, Information Technology, and Utilities.
Appendix XII has been provided for the purposes of Section 7.1.4
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APPENDIX XIII
XIII. Descriptive Statistics and Mean Difference Tests for IR Disclosure Compliance by
Vietnamese Listed Firms (Half-yearly versus Quarterly Reports)
N Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max
t-test
t-value p-value
Regional IR Aggregate Disclosure (DSRA) Scores
First Half-yearly Reports 100 1.267 1.250 0.152 0.885 1.669
10.510 <0.001
Second Quarterly Reports 100 1.025 1.010 0.172 0.620 1.400
Regional IR Mandatory Disclosure (DSRM) Scores
First Half-yearly Reports 100 0.744 0.739 0.063 0.579 0.983
12.082 <0.001
Second Quarterly Reports 100 0.629 0.610 0.072 0.490 0.810
Regional IR Discretionary Disclosure (DSRD) Scores
First Half-yearly Reports 100 0.523 0.519 0.105 0.238 0.792
7.926 <0.001
Second Quarterly Reports 100 0.398 0.410 0.117 0.130 0.700
This table presents the descriptive statistics and t-tests (2-tailed) for mean differences for the regional IR
disclosure compliance scores (DSRA, DSRM, and DSRD) in the first half-yearly reports and the second quarterly
reports by 100 Vietnamese listed firms.
Appendix XIII has been provided for the purposes of Section 7.1.5
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APPENDIX XIV
XIV. Multiple Regression Results – Using Quarterly Reports for Vietnamese Firms, = + , + , + , + ,+ , + , + , + , + +
Model A B C
Variables Hypothesis Expected
sign
Coefficients
(p-value)
Coefficients
(p-value)
Coefficients
(p-value)
Intercept 1.059 0.696 0.363
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
IFRS H1 + 0.729 0.695 0.667
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
ATYP H2 + 0.473 0.550 0.361
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
RFRE H3 ? -0.647 -0.599 -0.604
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
RLAG H4 - -0.132 -0.168 -0.090
(<0.001) (<0.001) (0.003)
SIZE ? 0.316 0.273 0.309
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
LEV ? -0.020 -0.051 0.004
(0.438) (0.044) (0.907)
PRO ? 0.022 0.076 -0.019
(0.410) (0.004) (0.540)
FOR ? 0.046 0.072 0.021
(0.202) (0.036) (0.611)
IND (Industry Dummies) ? Included Included Included
Adj. R2 0.594 0.629 0.458
F-stat 61.088 70.587 35.748
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
Max VIFs 7.51 7.51 7.51
This table presents the results of OLS regression estimations of the regional IR disclosure compliance for the
pooled sample of 700 using the 2Q12 reports for Vietnamese listed firms instead of the 1H12 reports. The
dependent variable (IR disclosure compliance scores) is the alternative of the DSRA (Column A), DSRM
(Column B), and DSRD (Column C). P-values are reported for 2-tailed tests. Nine dummy variables (excluding
health care as the reference group) are included in the regressions. Information Technology sector is positive
association with DSRA (β = 0.069, p = 0.029), DSRM (β = 0.061, p = 0.043), and DSRD (β = 0.067, p = 0.067).
Appendix XIV has been provided for the purposes of Section 7.1.5
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APPENDIX XV
XV. Multiple Regression Results – Using Country Dummies Variables
, = ++ + , + ,
+ , + , + +
Model
A B C
Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value
Intercept 1.379 <0.001 0.856 <0.001 0.523 <0.001
COUNTRY (β1-6)
Australia -0.094 0.041 0.060 0.152 -0.173 0.001
Hong Kong -0.052 0.241 -0.004 0.924 -0.073 0.144
Malaysia 0.211 <0.001 0.152 <0.001 0.214 <0.001
Singapore -0.425 <0.001 -0.373 <0.001 -0.391 <0.001
Philippines 0.012 0.743 -0.105 0.001 0.082 0.046
Vietnam -0.424 <0.001 -0.596 <0.001 -0.254 <0.001
Firm specifics (β7-10)
SIZE 0.219 <0.001 0.127 <0.000 0.241 <0.001
LEV 0.004 0.883 -0.022 0.414 0.020 0.554
PRO 0.002 0.936 0.068 0.013 -0.038 0.259
FOR 0.049 0.303 -0.029 0.500 0.089 0.098
IND ( 9 Industry
Dummies: β11-19) Inc. NS Inc. NS Inc. NS
Adj. R2 0.506 0.586 0.364
F-stat 38.658 <0.001 53.042 <0.001 22.043 <0.001
Max VIFs 7.68 7.68 7.68
This table presents the results of OLS regression estimations of the regional IR disclosure compliance for the
pooled sample of 700. The dependent variable (IR disclosure compliance scores) is the alternative of the DSRA
(Column A), DSRM (Column B), and DSRD (Column C). P-values are reported for 2-tailed tests. The country
dummy of Thailand and the industry dummy of health care sector are excluded as the reference group.
Appendix XV has been provided for the purposes of Section 7.1.6
168
APPENDIX XVI
XVI. Multiple Regression Results – Using an Alternative Classification of Industry Group, = + , + , + , + ,+ , + , + , + , + , +
Model A B C
Variables Hypothesis Expected
sign
Coefficients
(p-value)
Coefficients
(p-value)
Coefficients
(p-value)
Intercept 1.222 0.792 0.430
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
IFRS H1 + 0.592 0.623 0.481
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
ATYP H2 + 0.339 0.456 0.215
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
RFRE H3 ? -0.464 -0.545 -0.342
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
RLAG H4 - -0.072 -0.172 0.001
(0.019) (<0.001) (0.981)
SIZE ? 0.282 0.245 0.261
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
LEV ? 0.012 -0.031 0.037
(0.688) (0.258) (0.277)
PRO ? 0.024 0.080 -0.013
(0.431) (0.005) (0.697)
FOR ? -0.120 -0.048 -0.146
(0.001) (0.156) (<0.001)
INDUSTRY ? 0.125 0.063 0.144
(<0.001) (0.018) (<0.001)
Adj. R2 0.462 0.537 0.315
F-stat 67.615 91.184 36.763
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
Max VIFs 2.40 2.40 2.40
This table presents the results of OLS regression estimations of the regional IR disclosure compliance for the
pooled sample of 700. The dependent variable (IR disclosure compliance scores) is the alternative of the DSRA
(Column A), DSRM (Column B), and DSRD (Column C). P-values are reported for 2-tailed tests. Nine dummy
variables (excluding health care as the reference group) are included in the regressions. INDUSTRY is coded as
‘1’ if firms belong to the industry of Consumer Staples, Information Technology or Utilities, and ‘0’ otherwise
Appendix XVI has been provided for the purposes of Section 7.1.6
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APPENDIX XVII
XVII. Score Sheet for Measuring Supplementary Mandatory Disclosure – Australia
Item Requirement Reference Score
MA1 Details of the current and previous corresponding reporting period LR 4.2A.3, App. 4D(1) 1/0
MA2 Performance review
1) Changes in ordinary activities' revenue from the previous
corresponding period
LR 4.2A.3, App. 4D(2.1) 2
a) Amount up (or down) 1/0
b) Percentage up (or down) 1/0
2) Changes in ordinary activities' profit (loss) from the previous
corresponding period
LR 4.2A.3, App. 4D(2.2) 2
a) Amount of after-tax profit (or loss) up (or down) 1/0
b) Percentage of after-tax profit (or loss) up (or down) 1/0
3) Changes in net profit attributable to members from the previous
corresponding period
LR 4.2A.3, App. 4D(2.3) 2
a) Amount of net profit up (or down) 1/0
b) Percentage of net profit (or loss) up (or down) 1/0
MA3 Interim dividends paid (declared) 4
1) Amount per security LR 4.2A.3, App. 4D(2.4) 1/0/NA
2) Franked amount per security LR 4.2A.3, App. 4D(2.4) 1/0/NA
3) Record date for determining entitlement to the dividends. LR 4.2A.3, App. 4D(2.5) 1/0/NA
4) Statement on not proposing to pay interim dividends LR 4.2A.3, App. 4D(2.6) 1/0/NA
MA4 Net tangible asset per security LR 4.2A.3, App. 4D(3) 2
1) For the current interim period 1/0
2) For the previous corresponding period 1/0
MA5 Entities over which control has been gained or lost during the interimperiod
LR 4.2A.3, App. 4D(4) 4
1) Name of the entity 1/0/NA
2) Date of gain or loss of control 1/0/NA
3) Share of such entities to the reporting entity's profit (loss) from
ordinary activities 1/0/NA
4) Profit (loss) of such entities during the whole of the previous
corresponding period 1/0/NA
170
Item Requirement Reference Score
MA6 Details of dividend(s) or distribution(s) LR 4.2A.3, App. 4D(5) 2
1) Dividend or distribution date 1/0/NA
2) Amount per security of foreign sourced dividend or distribution,
if known 1/0/NA
MA7 Details of dividend(s) or distribution(s) reinvestment plans (DRP) in
operation
LR 4.2A.3, App. 4D(6) 1/0/NA
MA8 Details of associates and joint venture entities LR 4.2A.3, App. 4D(7) 5
1) Name of the entities 1/0/NA
2) Percentage holding of the reporting entity in each of these
entities 1/0/NA
3) Share of such entities to the reporting entity's profit (loss) 1/0/NA
4) Contributions to net profit for each of these entities 1/0/NA
5) Comparative figures for each of these disclosures for the
previous corresponding period 1/0/NA
MA9 Information on audit or review LR 4.2A.3, App. 4D(9) 3
1) Audit status 1/0
2) Description of likely dispute or qualification if the report have
not yet been audited or reviewed or are in the process of being
audited or reviewed
1/0/NA
3) Description of dispute or qualification if the report have been
audited or reviewed 1/0/NA
MA10 Directors' report declares 2
1) Whether the entity will be able to pay its debts when it becomes
due and payable
CA 2001, S.303(4) 1/0
2) Whether interim report give a true and fair view of the entity's
financial position and performance
CA 2001, S.305 1/0
The maximum score is 30.
Appendix XVII has been provided for the purposes of Section 7.2
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APPENDIX XVIII
XVIII. Score Sheet for Measuring Supplementary Mandatory Disclosure – Hong Kong
Item Requirement Reference Score
MH1
Status of the audit committee's review and the audit committee's
opinion on the review if the AC disagreed with accounting treatment
and accounting policies that is stated to be applied in the report.
LR App.16 Para 39
1/0
MH2 The entity's performance in the interim period LR App.16 Para 40 2
1) Discussion of the performance (changes of performance) 1/0
2) Analysis of the performance (influential factors) 1/0
MH3 Audit status of the interim report LR App.16 Para 43 2
1) Has (A) or has not been audited or reviewed 1/0
2) If yes, inclusion of the auditors' report in the interim report 1/0/NA
The maximum score is 5.
Appendix XVIII has been provided for the purposes of Section 7.2
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APPENDIX XIX
XIX. Score Sheet for Measuring Supplementary Mandatory Disclosure – Malaysia
Item Requirement Reference Score
MM1 Performance review of the reporting entity and all operating
segments
LR App.9B-PartA, Note 1 4
1) Revenue figures for the current period and financial YTD
(compared to the same period of previous year) 1/0
2) Profit (loss) figures for the current period and financial YTD
(compared to the same period of previous year) 1/0
3) Explanation about material factors affecting the revenue 1/0
4) Explanation about material factors affecting the profit 1/0
MM2 Material change in the profit before tax for the current quarter (as
compared to the first quarter)
LR App.9B-PartA, Note 2 2
1) Disclose the amount 1/0
2) Providing an explanatory comment on the changes 1/0
MM3 Reporting entity's prospect LR App.9B-PartA, Note 3a 2
1) General projections 1/0
2) Factors affecting the prospect 1/0
MM4 Disclosure of the following if they were previously announced ordisclosed in a public document
LR App.9B-PartA, Note 3b-
4 3
1) Entity's progress to achieve its targets (revenue estimate, profit
estimate, or other internal targets) 1/0/NA
2) Steps taken or proposed to achieve its targets (revenue estimate,
profit estimate, or other internal targets) 1/0/NA
3) Board of director's opinion to achieve its targets 1/0/NA
MM5 Tax expense LR App.9B-PartA, Note 6 2
1) A breakdown 1/0
2) Explanation of variance between the effective & statutory tax
rate for the current quarter and financial YTD 1/0
MM6 Status of corporate proposals announced LR App.9B-PartA, Note 9 7
1) Proposals have not completed 1/0/NA
2) Proceeds raised from any corporate proposal
a. Purpose 1/0/NA
b. Proposed utilisation 1/0/NA
c. Actual utilisation 1/0/NA
d. Intended timeframe for utilisation 1/0/NA
e. Deviation 1/0/NA
f. Explanations 1/0/NA
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Item Requirement Reference Score
MM7 Group borrowing and debt securities LR App.9B-PartA, Note 10 4
1) Breakdown of secured and unsecured 1/0/NA
2) Breakdown of short-term and long-term borrowings 1/0/NA
3) Any borrowing and debt securities denominated in foreign
currency 1/0/NA
4) Breakdown of the debt or borrowings in each currency 1/0/NA
MM8 Changes in material litigation LR App.9B-PartA, Note 12 1/0/NA
MM9 Dividends LR App.9B-PartA, Note 13 7
1) Has or has not declared or recommended 1/0/NA
2) Amount per share for current period 1/0/NA
3) Amount per share for the previous corresponding period 1/0/NA
4) Payable date of the current period 1/0/NA
5) Cut-off date for entitlement to dividends 1/0/NA
6) Tax effect (whether dividend amount is before tax, net of tax, or
tax exempt) 1/0/NA
7) Tax rate if dividend amount is before tax or net of tax 1/0/NA
MM10 Qualification of audit report of the preceding annual financial
statements
LR App.9B-PartA, Note 15 3
1) Type of qualification 1/0/NA
2) The current status of the matter(s) giving rise to the qualification
for the current quarter 1/0/NA
3) The current status of the matter(s) giving rise to the qualification
for the financial year to date 1/0/NA
The maximum score is 35.
Appendix XIX has been provided for the purposes of Section 7.2
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APPENDIX XX
XX. Score Sheet for Measuring Supplementary Mandatory Disclosure – Singapore
Item Requirement Reference Score
MS1 Group borrowing and debt securities Rule 705, App.7.2-Part I 3
1) Breakdown of short-term (one year or less or on demand) and
long-term (after one year) amount repayable
- Para 1(b.ii) 1/0/NA
2) Breakdown of secured and unsecured - Para 1(b.ii) 1/0/NA
3) Details of any collaterals - Para 1(b.ii) 1/0/NA
MS2 Details of any changes in the entity's share capital Rule 705, App.7.2-Part I 3
1) Changes arising from right issue, bonus issue, share buy-backs,
exercise of share options or warrants, conversion of other issues
of equity securities, issue of shares for cash or as consideration
for acquisition or for any other purpose since the end of
previous reporting period
- Para 1(d.ii)
1/0/NA
2) Number of shares that may be issued on conversion of all
outstanding convertibles and treasury shares against the total
number of issued shares excluding treasury of the entity at the
end of current period
- Para 1(d.ii)
1/0/NA
3) Number of shares that may be issued on conversion of all
outstanding convertibles and treasury shares against the total
number of issued shares excluding treasury of the entity at the
end of corresponding period of the immediately preceding
financial year
- Para 1(d.ii)
1/0NA
MS3 Disclosure of the total number of issued shares excluding treasury
shares
Rule 705, App.7.2-Part I 2
1) As at the end of the current period - Para 1(d.iii) 1/0
2) As at the end of the immediately preceding year - Para 1(d.iii) 1/0
MS4 Disclosure of treasury shares as at the end of the current period
segregated into
Rule 705, App.7.2-Part I 4
1) Transfers (sales) - Para 1(d.iv) 1/0/NA
2) Disposal (purchase) - Para 1(d.iv) 1/0/NA
3) Cancellation - Para 1(d.iv) 1/0/NA
4) Use - Para 1(d.iv) 1/0/NA
MS5 Audit status of the interim report Rule 705, App.7.2-Part I 3
1) Has or has not been audited or reviewed - Para 2 1/0
2) If yes, disclosure of auditing standard or practice that were
applied
- Para 2 1/0/NA
3) If yes, inclusion of the auditors' report in the IR and any
qualifications or emphasis of matter
- Para 3 1/0/NA
MS6 Net asset value per ordinary share based on the total number issued
shares excluding treasury shares of the entity
Rule 705, App.7.2-Part I 2
1) At the end of the current reporting period - Para 7 1/0
2) At the end of the immediately preceding financial year - Para 7 1/0
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Item Requirement Reference Score
MS7 Performance review Rule 705, App.7.2-Part I 7
1) Significant factors affected the entity's - Para 8(a)
a. Revenue (turnover) 1/0
b. Cost (expenses) 1/0
c. Profit (earnings) 1/0
2) Material factors affected the entity's - Para 8(b)
a. Cash flows 1/0
b. Working capital 1/0
c. Assets 1/0
d. Liabilities 1/0
MS8 Variance between actual results and a forecast or prospect statementhas been previously disclosed to shareholders
Rule 705, App.7.2-Part I,
Para 9 1/0/NA
MS9 A commentary at the date of announcement Rule 705, App.7.2-Part I 2
1) The significant trends and competitive conditions of the entity's
industry
- Para 10 1/0/NA
2) Factors or events that may affect the entity in the next reporting
period and 12 months
- Para 10 1/0/NA
MS10 Dividends Rule 705, App.7.2-Part I 7
1) Has or has not declared or recommended - Para 11, 12 1/0
2) Amount per share for current financial period reported on - Para 11 1/0/NA
3) Amount per share for the corresponding period of the
immediately preceding financial year
- Para 11 1/0/NA
4) Payable date of the current quarter - Para 11 1/0/NA
5) Cut-off date for entitlement to dividends (books closure date) - Para 11 1/0/NA
6) Tax effect (whether dividend amount is before tax, net of tax, or
tax exempt)
- Para 11 1/0/NA
7) Tax rate if dividend amount is before tax or net of tax - Para 11 1/0/NA
MS11 Interested person transaction Rule 705, App.7.2-Part I 4
1) Any interested person transactions - Para 13 1/0/NA
2) The aggregate value of the transactions including - Para 13
a. Name of the interested person 1/0/NA
b. The aggregate value of the interested person transactions
under review 1/0/NA
c. The aggregate value of the interested person transactions
conducted pursuant to the general mandate 1/0/NA
MS12 Directors' report declares that the interim financial statements aretruthful and not misleading
Rule 705, App.7.2-Part I,
Para 14 1/0
The maximum score is 39.
Appendix XX has been provided for the purposes of Section 7.2
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APPENDIX XXI
XXI. Score Sheet for Measuring Supplementary Mandatory Disclosure – Philippines
Item Requirement Reference Score
MP1 Disclosures of financial soundness indicators in two comparative
interim periods, including: i) current/liquidity ratios; ii) solvency
ratios, debt-to-equity ratios; iii) asset-to-equity ratios; iv) interest rate
coverage ratios; v) profitability ratios; vi) other relevant ratios if
necessary
SRC Rule 68, Part I.4(D) 1/0
MP2 Additional disclosures provided either in the face of the balance
sheet or the notes to financial statements
SRC Rule 68, Annex 68-D 11
1) Segregation of trade and other receivables (such as: customers,
related party, and other receivables)
- Para 1(A) 1/0
2) Commitments for any unusual purchase of inventories - Para 1(B) 1/0
3) Separate disclosure of any other current assets in excess of 5%
of total current assets
- Para 1(C) 1/0
4) Separate disclosure of any indebtedness or advances to
unconsolidated subsidiaries and related parties
- Para 1(D) 1/0
5) Separate disclosure of any other non-current assets in excess of
5% of total non-current assets
- Para 1(E) 1/0
6) Segregation of trade and other payables(such as trade payables,
related party payables, and advances)
- Para 1(F) 1/0
7) Separately disclosure of other current liabilities (payable
dividends, liabilities under trust receipts, portion of long-term
debt due within one year, deferred income, any other current
liabilities in excess of 5% of total current liabilities)
- Para 1(G) 1/0
8) Separate disclosure of any other noncurrent liabilities in excess
of 5% of total noncurrent liabilities
- Para 1(H) 1/0
9) Disclosure of capital stock by providing a brief discussion of the
entity's track record of registration of securities
- Para 1(I)
a. Number of shares registered 1/0
b. Issue or offer price 1/0
c. Date of approval 1/0
MP3 Additional disclosures in the income statement SRC Rule 68, Annex 68-D 11
1) Revenue: disclosing separately in the face of the income
statement each of the following
- Para 2(A)
a. Revenue from sale of goods 1/0/NA
b. Revenue from rendering of services 1/0/NA
c. Share of net earnings (profit or loss) of associates and joint
ventures
1/0/NA
d. Other revenue (income) 1/0/NA
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Item Requirement Reference Score
2) Costs: disclosing separately (in the face of the income
statement) each of the following
- Para 2(B)
a. Costs of sales/goods sold 1/0/NA
b. Cost of rendering services 1/0/NA
c. Operating expenses 1/0/NA
d. Other expenses 1/0/NA
3) Disclosing separately in the notes to financial statements
elements of finance costs (such as interest expense, amortisation
of debt discount, premium)
- Para 2(C) 1/0/NA
4) Disclosing separately other material income in the notes to
financial statements (i.e. each material other income,
gains/losses on sale of each class of assets, miscellaneous
income if they are in excess of 5% of the entity's revenue)
- Para 2(D) 1/0/NA
5) Disclosing separately expenditures (in other expenses) if they
are in excess of 5% the entity's revenue
- Para 2(E) 1/0/NA
The maximum score is 23.
Appendix XXI has been provided for the purposes of Section 7.2
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APPENDIX XXII
XXII. Scores Sheet for Measuring Supplementary Mandatory Disclosure – Thailand
Item Requirement Reference Score
MT1
Provide the written clarification of the variation if the entity's
business operations results presented in the current quarterly
statement of profit and loss vary more than 20 per cent from that of
the same period for the preceding year
Disclosure Manual 2007,
p.18, Rules Book
(Bor.Jor/Por.01-00) 1/0/NA
The maximum score is 1.
Appendix XXII has been provided for the purposes of Section 7.2
